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In the wake of the brutal deaths of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor,
lawmakers and corporate boards from Wall Street to the West Coast have
introduced a slew of reforms aimed at increasing Diversity, Equity, and
Inclusion (“DEI”) in corporations. Yet the reforms face difficulties ranging
from possible constitutional challenges to critical limitations in their scale,
scope, and degree of legal obligation and practical effects.
In this Article, we provide an old answer to the new questions facing
DEI policy and offer the first close examination of how corporate law duties
impel and facilitate corporate attention to diversity. Specifically, we show
that corporate fiduciaries are bound by their duties of loyalty to take
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affirmative steps to make sure that corporations comply with important civil
rights and antidiscrimination laws and norms designed to ensure fair access
to economic opportunity. We also show how corporate law principles like the
business judgment rule do not just authorize, but indeed encourage American
corporations to take effective action to reduce racial and gender inequality
and increase inclusion, tolerance, and diversity given the rational basis that
exists connecting good DEI practices, corporate reputation, and sustainable
firm value. By both incorporating requirements to comply with key
antidiscrimination laws and enabling corporate DEI policies that go well
beyond the legal minimum, corporate law offers critical tools with which
corporations may address DEI goals that other reforms do not—and that can
embed a commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion in all aspects of
corporate interactions with employees, customers, communities, and society
generally. The question, therefore, is not whether corporate leaders can take
effective action to help reduce racial and gender inequality—but will they?
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INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, Milton Friedman famously told corporate
fiduciaries that they should narrowly focus on generating profits for
stockholders. Less focused upon, but explicit, was his view that
corporations should not have a “social conscience” or take action to
“eliminat[e] discrimination,” which he trivialized as a “catchword[ ] of
the contemporary crop of reformers.” 1 Since then, Friedman and his
adherents have espoused this cramped vision of fiduciary duty within
the debate over corporate purpose and, even worse, sought to erode the
external laws promoting equality and inclusion.
Today, the problem Milton Friedman trivialized remains urgent.
The inequality gap between Black and white Americans grew in the
period in which Friedman’s views became influential with directors and
policymakers, while the COVID-19 pandemic’s unequal impact on
minorities has underscored the persistence of inequality. So have
horrific instances of violence against Black people and other evidence of
ongoing exclusion. Likewise, inequality in wages and opportunity
continues to adversely affect women.
Demands are growing for corporate leaders to address these
serious issues by promoting effective practices to treat their employees,
1.
Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. In that same passage, Friedman
similarly belittled “providing employment” for workers and “avoiding pollution.” Id. Fifty years
later, racial inequality, income and wage inequality, and environmental harm remain huge
societal problems.
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communities of operation and service, and customers with respect—and
to take affirmative steps to ensure equal opportunity, create an
inclusive and tolerant workplace, and embrace the diversity of
humanity. This commitment to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
(“Diversity” or “DEI” for short) is not just one corporations are being
asked to make internally, but is also one requiring companies to
evaluate how they treat their consumers and the communities in which
they have an impact.
Although the immediate aftermath of the Floyd killing has
tended to mute those who view corporate action to address issues like
Diversity as an improper and illegitimate diversion from the pursuit of
shareholder profits, history shows that will not last for long. Those who
share Friedman’s worldview will argue that corporate fiduciaries are on
unstable ground if they commit their companies to Diversity, Equity,
and Inclusion policies that go beyond the legal minimum of
nondiscrimination and will suggest they face possible legal risk for
failing to focus solely on corporate profit. Indeed, even as issues of racial
equality have been central and many leading members of the corporate
community are recognizing their obligation to do better, some have
openly taken Friedman’s position and have directed their employees to
stay focused on profits and to avoid discussions of race at all costs. We
fear that as the current moment wanes, attempts to twist corporate law
will reemerge and argue that corporate leaders may not take action to
assure that their companies go beyond the bare legal minimum to
promote these important values, because by doing so they would be
improperly diverting their focus from profit maximization.
In this Article, we explain why arguments of that type have no
grounding in a proper understanding of corporate law, and in particular
the important principles of fiduciary duty that govern the equitable
expectations of corporate directors and officers. We show that, even
under the nation’s most stockholder-focused corporate law, that of
Delaware, Friedman’s normative view is not one that American
corporate law embraces, and that corporate law presents no barrier to
voluntary corporate efforts to increase equality and diversity.
In fact, a proper understanding of corporate fiduciary duties
supports the ability of corporations to put in place effective DEI policies.
Indeed, fiduciary duty requires boards to attend to DEI by monitoring
company policies and practices that assure the company’s compliance
with important laws that focus on the equal treatment of diverse
applicants, employees, customers, communities, and business partners.
Not only that, the fiduciary duty of loyalty requires affirmative efforts
to promote the sustainable success of the corporation, and directors and
managers must try to promote the best interests of the company.
Substantial evidence exists that companies with good DEI practices will
not only be less likely to face adverse legal, regulatory, worker,
community, and consumer backlash from their conduct, but that their
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boards and workforces will be more effective and their reputation with
an increasingly diverse customer base and public will grow, as will trust
from institutional investors increasingly focused on sustainable
profitability and the avoidance of harmful externalities costly to their
clients, who have diversified portfolios tracking the entire economy.
As a matter of fiduciary duty, therefore, corporate leaders not
only have broad authority to promote an inclusive and diverse corporate
culture, their affirmative obligation to act in the best interests of the
corporation can be understood to require it, given the important legal
requirements for corporations to avoid invidious discrimination and
growing societal and investor expectations that business contribute to
reducing racial and gender inequality. Even more, foundational
corporate law principles like the business judgment rule protect and
support directors and managers who believe that committing their
companies to help improve Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion is the right
way to do business. And that fiduciary duty imposes minimal guardrails
and even floors of basic activity that must be undertaken to ensure that
corporations honor societal laws protecting against discrimination.
This legal reality is important to ensuring that the
accountability debate proceeds with clarity over whether corporate
leaders, and the institutional investors who control public companies,
are doing what they should to promote these values. All too often, the
issue of Diversity is viewed as a cost center or something external to the
mission of the modern firm—driving criticisms of Diversity-oriented
corporate reforms as “virtue signaling at the expense of someone else.” 2
But this Article advances a different theory—that the pursuit of
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion is solidly authorized by the operation
of traditional corporate law principles and can even be easily squared
with the views of those who embrace what has come to be known as
“shareholder primacy.” As such, our contribution does not debate what
corporate law should be, but instead explores what corporate law
already is. And it offers an old answer to the novel question of what
tools and obligations managers and directors must contemplate when
grappling with the challenge and opportunity of Diversity.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we document the
demographic dilemma facing corporate boards and C-suites across the
United States—namely, the striking gap between the demographics of
the leadership of corporate America and the nation as a whole. We then
explore the implications of the data in a post-George Floyd, post2.
The Editorial Board, Opinion, The Woke Nasdaq, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2020, 6:39 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-woke-nasdaq-11606865986 [https://perma.cc/CLW5-65PK]. Such
criticisms have been embraced by some of the most respected regulatory voices as well. See, e.g.,
Arthur Levitt Jr., Opinion, If Corporate Diversity Works, Show Me the Money, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
20, 2021, 6:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/if-corporate-diversity-works-show-me-themoney-11611183633 [https://perma.cc/EX3P-N23R] (arguing that “diversity requirements are
political at their core”).
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pandemic environment, in which demands for better corporate behavior
and greater racial economic opportunity have both swelled and
intensified.
Part II addresses the nexus between DEI and firm value. It
starts with a survey of the empirical research associating diversity with
financial performance and finds a mixed picture, but one that
nonetheless has practical and legal importance for corporate
decisionmakers weighing whether and how to address DEI issues. We
find that as in many complex areas relevant to running a business,
information is incomplete, at times defective, and a work in progress;
nevertheless, the evidence from academic studies, and the logical
arguments advanced by leading business consultants and thinkers,
provide a rational basis for corporate fiduciaries to conclude that
effective DEI policies are in the best interests of the corporation.
Continuing this theme, we then turn our analysis to the long-running
literature in organizational psychology that identifies cognitive
diversity (and Diversity more generally) as prophylactics for groupthink
and other social pathologies that can impair good decisionmaking and
thus, in this context, endanger firm value. We then close this Part with
what is perhaps the most compelling business case for Diversity—that
of corporate reputation and its relationship to firm credibility and
success. The Part investigates how DEI relates in a broader way to
corporate success and highlights why attention to DEI is necessary for
businesses to avoid the severe reputational harm, legal risk, and other
downside consequences of being perceived as not being a business
committed to treating all Americans with respect. We then connect that
risk to the demographic realities facing firms seeking to preserve and
maximize their returns. Because the available workforce, customer
base, and strategic partners are diversifying both domestically and
internationally, DEI considerations bear importantly on firms’
reputation with these key stakeholders, and thus on their cost of
capital, talent, and customer acquisition and retention. For all these
reasons, we conclude that the requisite foundation for corporate policies
advancing DEI exists, making the adoption of these policies, as we later
address in more detail, eligible for the protection of the business
judgment rule.
Part III examines current legislative and market initiatives to
improve DEI within the corporate sector. To provide context, we start
with an analysis of key federal laws that advance racial and gender
equality in the business sector. We then catalogue a growing number of
initiatives: investment fund activities where employee, environmental,
social, and governance factors (“EESG”) have been integrated into
investment processes; 3 California and New York state corporate law
3.
Notably, these arrangements are described in the literature, and by the participants
themselves, in different ways, though traditionally as “ESG” programs in light of the importance
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reforms aiming for greater board diversity; proposed new listing rules
for Nasdaq requiring disclosure of corporate board metrics; and a pledge
made by Goldman Sachs to only assist companies meeting minimum
diversity metrics when going public. These initiatives, we find, hold the
prospect of potentially important upgrades to corporate Diversity. We
conclude, however, that many face substantial constitutional
challenges. As important, virtually all are board-level initiatives and do
not cover private companies, which comprise an increasingly large
share of economic activity. Nor do they address Equity and Inclusion,
and by extension issues such as how corporations use contracted
workers and interact with customer communities. They are thus, by
definition, limited in their reach and robustness. For these reasons, if
serious improvement in corporate practices is desirable, supplemental
actions by corporations will be essential.
In Part IV, we provide a foundational theory of how the
corporate law of fiduciary duty applies to corporate DEI policies. First,
we explain the general principles underlying the duties of loyalty and
care, and how the corporation’s obligation to comply with the law is
fundamental to the operation of corporate law. We show that the
fiduciary duty of loyalty requires not only a negative responsibility to
avoid harm to the corporation, but that it also requires the duty to take
affirmative steps to advance the best interests of the corporation. This
includes, as reflected in Delaware’s famous Caremark decision, an
obligation for fiduciaries to undertake active efforts to promote
compliance with laws and regulations critical to the operations of the
company. 4 Importantly, we show that the most central role of Caremark
is in the normative obligation it imposes on directors to try to avoid the
regulatory penalties, managerial turnover, stakeholder backlash, and
overall reputational and financial harm that occurs when companies
violate laws essential to society. As we show, the very fact that a
Caremark case is brought is usually a sign that the company has
already lost, even if the directors do not ultimately face liability under
Caremark itself. We also highlight the considerable discretion that the
affirmative component of fiduciary duty law gives business leaders to
pursue policies they rationally believe to be in the best interests of the
corporation in terms of its sustained profitability and reputational
integrity with its stakeholders, society, and regulators.
of environmental, social, and governance factors in investment decisions. We use the term “EESG”
in this Article to highlight the additional emphasis many corporations and funds are placing on
how corporations treat the constituency arguably most responsible for its success—the
employees—with respect. See David Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update:
EESG and the COVID-19 Crisis, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 31, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/31/corporate-governance-update-eesg-and-the-covid-19crisis [https://perma.cc/C9TX-XQBV] (noting increasing stakeholder and employee centric
disclosures in response to the human capital impact of the COVID-19 crisis).
4.
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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Part V takes the crucial step of showing how these general
principles apply specifically to DEI. As to managers and directors
skeptical about DEI, or those who fear it might be beyond their remit of
responsibility as fiduciaries, we explain why fiduciary duty requires
them to focus on antidiscrimination practices to some meaningful
extent, and why failing to do so is riskier than making sure the company
has effective DEI practices. We show how the legal expectation of lawful
conduct, reflected in Delaware’s Caremark decision, charges fiduciaries
with preventative monitoring for compliance with antidiscrimination
laws and legislation as a core feature of their duty of loyalty. Should
they fail to do so, companies not only risk corporate liability
accompanying such violations; they—along with their directors and top
managers—also face the possibility of large reputational costs,
stakeholder backlash, internal turnover at the top of management and
on the board itself, and fines and injunctions from regulators, even if
the follow-on derivative lawsuits are ultimately dismissed. From this
standpoint, corporate law’s fiduciary duty of compliance is not only
important as a matter of “hard” law enforced by the threat of corporate
and personal liability. It also defines what fiduciaries are expected by
corporate law to do as normative “soft” law. 5 These expectations go
beyond what fiduciaries can be held liable for in damages and require
them to protect the corporation from the financial, management, and
reputational consequences of failing to comply with critical laws. And
these consequences have been supercharged in the wake of George
Floyd and Breonna Taylor and the inequality–revealing and
exacerbating pandemic.
We then close by identifying why corporate managers and
directors who wish to fulfill their normative duty of loyalty by taking
affirmative steps to improve sustainable corporate profitability can
safely embrace a commitment to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion—i.e.,
more ambitious DEI policies that go beyond their duty under Caremark
to monitor core antidiscrimination compliance obligations. In doing so,
we emphasize that corporate fiduciaries do not need definitive evidence
of DEI’s impact on value to act. Because there is a rational basis for
concluding that the promotion of DEI will improve the ability of
corporations to function profitably in an increasingly diverse domestic
and international economy, fiduciary duty law, and in particular the
business judgment rule, provides authorization for corporate DEI
policies and therefore leaves business leaders no corporate law reason
not to adopt them, and some strong reasons to do so.

5.
By soft law, scholars refer to norms or guidelines which, though perhaps not legally
binding at all or, as in the case of Caremark, not easily enforceable by way of monetary damages
for their violation, nonetheless carry high costs where they are violated. For more, see CHRIS
BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 141 (2012) (noting how a poor
reputation can hinder a regulator’s ability to conduct economic diplomacy).
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In forwarding this framework, this Article offers a doctrinally
sound yet novel approach that will not be without its ideological
detractors. For all of the attention now directed at DEI in corporate
America, it is not usually talked about as a matter of long-standing
corporate law principles. Indeed, from Friedman’s derision of reformist
“catchwords” to a sensitivity even among some Black Lives Matter
activists to belittling the significance of Diversity by reducing a moral
call to action to one of business prerogatives, Diversity is most
commonly understood as an external matter to the firm.
We believe, however, that the case for Diversity has both a
strong moral and business rationale, making it relevant even as a
matter of traditional corporate law principles. Moreover, the
internal/external dichotomy of the Friedman view is highly misleading:
the very DNA of corporate law’s most foundational duty, that of loyalty,
is as much outwardly facing as it is inwardly facing in that it creates
obligations to comply with all laws—including core civil rights
legislation—that are of critical importance to the company, its
stakeholders, and society. These clarifications enable important
interventions for refining current reforms and enabling new ones
within even our legacy corporate law framework. This important reality
poses a substantial question to American business leaders and the
institutional investors who wield power over them: If corporate law not
only enables directors and the board to address important DEI issues,
but also requires corporate attention to them, will they meet their
duties head on, and even exceed them, or will they incur the high
financial, reputational, and legal risks of ignoring them?
I. THE DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA: THE INEQUALITY AND
REPRESENTATIONAL GAP IN CORPORATE AMERICA
Discussions about corporate law—whether in the context of
mergers and acquisitions, proxy statements, or (much more rarely)
Diversity—invariably focus on boards and management. This is in part
because of the very peculiar governance challenges corporate leaders
face vis-à-vis the corporation’s shareholders. It also reflects the
concentrated power they wield collectively in making decisions that
impact shareholders, employees, and broader society. Yet American
corporate leadership is markedly unrepresentative of our nation’s
diversity—a reality that stands in stark contrast to broad calls for fairer
economic opportunity and participation. To this end, we provide an
overview of the most recent data concerning the Diversity of U.S.
corporate boards and management. We then situate the problem
against the backdrop of severe racial wealth and income gaps
underscored by the pandemic and calls across society in the wake of
George Floyd’s brutal death to reform corporations in ways that not only
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diversify corporate upper ranks, but that also embed a commitment to
DEI in all corporate action affecting important corporate stakeholders.
A. Corporate Boards: Their Twenty-First Century Importance and the
Representational Gap
Corporate boards are intended to help address three sorts of
agency problems associated with corporate organizations: “those
between managers and dispersed shareholders, between controlling
and noncontrolling shareholders, and between shareholders and
creditors.” 6 And despite an earlier New Deal perception of corporate
boards as part of a concentration of economic power catalyzing the rise
of the large corporation, boards are today recognized as serving a key
gatekeeping function given incentive problems that can arise in the
separation of shareholder “ownership” and managerial “control,”
especially apparent in public companies. 7
On a less theoretical basis, corporate boards have also increased
in importance because of real-world developments. Since concerns
emerged about managerial improprieties in the 1970s, leading to the
mandate for audit committees of outside directors, and the takeover
boom of the 1980s, in which independent directors came to the fore as
an answer to the problems hostile bids presented for management, 8
corporate boards as an institution have become increasingly important
in corporate governance. 9 The board is now taken seriously as a
governing instrument itself, distinct in important ways from day-to-day
top managers; and corporate case law, Exchange rules, 10 and statutory
6.
Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1907, 1910 (2013).
7.
See id.; see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (identifying the separation of ownership and control as a master
problem in corporate law and sociology). Though notably, for Berle and Means the idea of
“managers” consisted of both the “board of directors and the senior officers of the corporation.” Id.
at 202.
8.
Martin Lipton’s iconic article, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101
(1979), by way of example, articulated the manner in which a board of directors should operate in
the context of a takeover bid, with a strong role for the nonmanagement directors to deliberate
among themselves and to oversee management’s conduct. See id. at 120–23. That article would
then influence the Delaware Supreme Court in key cases like Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985), in encouraging a strong hand for independent directors and
creating standards of review that shifted power away from management.
9.
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 237, 238 (1997) (“The board is not itself unflawed, but as an organ that is compact and
cohesive, individualized to the corporation, and capable of being made relatively independent of
management control, it is well situated to monitor management on an ongoing and close basis on
the shareholders’ behalf.”).
10. The NYSE requires listed companies to “have a nominating/corporate governance
committee composed entirely of independent directors.” N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.04(a) (rev. 2021), https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-companymanual [https://perma.cc/F6LR-5XRJ]. Nasdaq requires director nominees of listed companies
“must either be selected, or recommended for the Board’s selection, either by: (A) Independent
Directors constituting a majority of the Board’s Independent Directors in a vote in which only
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reforms at the state and federal level have only acted to emphasize the
salience of the role of the board. 11
Because of the increasing centrality of corporate boards, they
have been the focus of a greater number of electoral and other
challenges in recent decades, with institutional investors pressing for
greater numbers of independent directors who would be more
responsive to their demands and who have characteristics institutional
investors favor. 12 But that focus on the composition of boards has not
translated into boards representative of our nation; rather, corporate
boards have fallen short of even minimal thresholds of racial or gender
Diversity. African Americans comprise 13.4% of the U.S. population, for
example, but as of the time of the writing of this article in late 2020,
only 8.6% of the boards of Fortune 500 companies. 13 See Figure 1.A.
Meanwhile, the share of white people on boards far outstripped that of
Blacks. On the boards of Fortune 500 companies, for example, whites
reportedly comprise 83.9% of all members, over 28% higher than that
of their percentage of the U.S. population.
As shown in Figure 1.B, women’s representation on Fortune 500
boards, at 26.1%, has compared favorably to that of African Americans
Independent Directors participate, or (B) a nominations committee comprised solely of
Independent Directors.” NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET LLC RULES: RULE 5605(e) (rev. 2021),
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq/rules/ [https://perma.cc/B5SZ-QYH6].
11. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775–77 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
12. During the last two decades, the incidence of proxy fights, withhold campaigns, and other
contested votes has markedly increased, as has the rate of success of those efforts in procuring, by
agreement or ballot-box victory, what the insurgents wanted. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius
Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J.
CORP. L. 545, 554–56 (2016) (identifying only fifty-two hedge fund activist campaigns over twenty
consecutive months in 2005–2006 in contrast to 1,115 such campaigns between 2010 and early
2014, with 347 campaigns in 2014 alone).
13. Jeff Green, Focus on Black Directors Has Latinos Asking: What About Us?, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 18, 2020, 1:58 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-18/latinos-call-forboard-seats-left-out-of-efforts-to-promote-black-directors [https://perma.cc/46YE-X7BW]. For
Latinos, the numbers are even more skewed. Despite comprising roughly 18.3% of the U.S.
population, Latinos only comprise 4.1% of Fortune 500 boards—less than a quarter of their
representation among the wider population. DELOITTE & ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES
REPORT: THE BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 19
(6th
ed.
2021),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/pressreleases/number-of-fortune-500-boards-with-over-40-percent-diversity-nearly-quadrupled-since2010.html [https://perma.cc/3WAB-3UHP]. Moreover, their participation does not appear to reflect
the demographic changes facing the country. Since 1990, the Latino share of the U.S. population
has more than doubled from 9% in 1990 to approximately 20% today. 1990s: National Tables, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/1990snational.html (last updated Oct. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/J2EK-JH5R] (open file for “Population
Data” under the heading “Annual Population Estimates by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin,
Selected Years from 1990 to 2000”);
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US#qf-headnote-b (last visited Oct. 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/HQ4A-9596]. But even with this exponential increase of over 10% in the last two
decades, the percentage of Fortune 500 board seats held by Latinos increased in this time by less
than 3%. DELOITTE & ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, supra, at 20, 35.
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and Latinos, who make up roughly only 12.5%. They are, however, as a
group, still disproportionately underrepresented compared to their
50.2% share of the overall population. 14 Within this demographic, white
women have seen their share of board seats increase the most, from
around 15.7% in 2004 to 22.5% in 2018, accounting for nearly 70% of
board seats transferred from white men. 15 See Figure 1.C. Minority
women, meanwhile, saw virtually no increase in their board
representation, with a gain of only 1%, from 3.2% to 4.6%. Minority men
also experienced only minimal progress from 9.9% to 11.5%. 16
FIGURE 1.A: AFRICAN AMERICAN UNDER-REPRESENTATION ON
FORTUNE 500 BOARDS IN 2020

Source: Bloomberg

14. Women on Corporate Boards: Quick Take, CATALYST (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-on-corporate-boards/ [https://perma.cc/7X5Q-CMF6].
15. On the other hand, minority men and women saw their share of board seats grow only
3.3%, from 12.8% to 16.1%. We Know Diversity Is Good for Business, So Why Do Corporate Leaders
Remain Predominantly White and Male?,
DIVERSITY JOBS (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://www.diversityjobs.com/2020/11/corporate-gender-ethnic-veteran-disability-lgbtqiadiversity/ [https://perma.cc/S7YH-3YNH].
16. Id.
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FIGURE 1.B: GENDER REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE BOARDS IN
2020

Source: Catalyst

FIGURE 1.C: REPRESENTATION ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS FROM 2004 TO
2018

Source: Diversity Jobs

An extensive literature has grown detailing the sources of the
demographic shortcomings of corporate boards. The prospects for Black
and female corporate board membership improved gradually in the
aftermath of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. But progress has
often been sporadic and slow. 17
This literature identifies a number of common obstacles to board
diversity, most relating to how board members are chosen. First, boards
17. Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and Continued
Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 580 (2006) (“[W]hile women have made
substantial progress onto boards since 1934 as well as significant contributions to those boards,
they confront considerable barriers to board membership that must be addressed proactively.”).
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often lean towards candidates who have run business units or held
operations posts—in short, chief executives from other companies who
have served on an outside board—which translates into a pool of fewer
female and minority candidates. Absent efforts to look for leaders with
management experience in sectors of the economy—government,
military, education, and legal—where minorities and women have
made more inroads, 18 corporate boards will tend to reflect the
composition of corporate management ranks. Additionally, board seats
for the country’s largest companies are rarely available due to low
turnover—and the number of candidates interviewed is often small and
composed of candidates with prior board experience. 19 As a result,
opportunities for diversification are few, and, even where slots are open,
minority candidates and women may not be interviewed at all. 20
But arguably the most important reason is that women and
minorities are unlikely to have the social networks and relationships
necessary for candidates seeking positions on boards. CEOs prefer
individuals they can trust, know from direct personal experience are
competent, and can collaborate with—and influence. 21 Often, this leads
to the consideration of individuals who are already known within the
social circles of C-suite executives or other board members. These
dynamics disadvantage women and minorities who do not necessarily
hail from or participate in the same cultural or socioeconomic networks
as the white men who dominate corporate boards. 22 Though for those
18. See, e.g., EILEEN PATTEN & KIM PARKER, PEW RSCH. CTR., WOMEN IN THE U.S. MILITARY:
GROWING SHARE, DISTINCTIVE PROFILE 1 (2011), https://www.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/2011/12/women-in-the-military.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PKW-YMW5] (“The
share of women among the enlisted ranks has increased seven-fold, from 2% to 14%, and the share
among commissioned officers has quadrupled, from 4% to 16%.”); Dylan Jackson, The Diversity
LAW.
(June
2020),
https://www.bal.com/wpScorecard,
AM.
content/uploads/2020/05/TAL05272020449781Berry.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T6RL-NKRW]
(“[M]inority attorneys have seen a 3.9% increase in representation among the country’s largest
firms.”); Hilary Burns, Study: Higher Ed Could Be First Mass. Sector to Hit Gender Parity, BOS.
BUS. J. (Nov. 4, 2019, 6:22 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2019/11/04/studyhigher-ed-could-be-first-mass-sector-to-hit.html [https://perma.cc/8M4N-6DSF] (“Women make up
48% of all provosts in Massachusetts and 55% of all deans and senior leadership team members
statewide.”).
19. J. Yo-Jud Cheng, Boris Groysberg & Paul M. Healy, Why Do Boards Have So Few Black
Directors?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/08/why-do-boards-have-so-fewblack-directors?registration=success [https://perma.cc/E868-FHLF].
20. Id.
21. See generally Udi Hoitash, Should Independent Board Members with Social Ties
Disqualify Themselves from Serving on a Board?, 99 J. BUS. ETHICS 399 (2011) (examining how
social ties between directors and management may increase trust and information sharing).
22. We do not ignore the reality that corporate directors and managers are not representative
of typical white men either. On balance, they come from far more privileged and elite backgrounds
than typical white Americans. Indeed, in our view of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, efforts to
include all Americans are important, and that includes white people who do not come from
privileged backgrounds and who often face some of the same difficulties in opportunity and access
as people of color with limited means. See Adia Harvey Wingfield, How Organizations Are Failing
Black Workers—and How to Do Better, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/01/how-organizations-are-failing-black-workers-and-how-to-do-better
[https://perma.cc/L7XE-FJA7] (finding that many organizations fill available director positions
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underrepresented persons who do make it, they fit to form: a 2016
survey of over one thousand board directors indicated that over half of
Black directors were known to a fellow board member before being
appointed (as compared to 35% of white directors). 23 Similarly, white
directors were more likely to be a current or former executive of the
company. Nearly one-third were already known by the CEO by the time
they were introduced to the board. 24
B. CEOs and C-Suite Officers: The Representational Chasm Deepens at
the Top Management Level
General corporate statutes vest management, and in particular
the chief executive officer, with making major corporate decisions and
overseeing the operations and resources of a company. 25 CEOs are the
most important single officers of corporations, and, in their
management capacities, they are tasked with ensuring that the goals of
the corporate board are pursued at lower levels of the firm. In practice,
this means that CEOs hire other executives and staff, implement
corporate policy and board instructions, and serve as the primary
interface between the broader public and the corporation. CEOs are also
primarily responsible for identifying how resources of the company are
directed and for what purpose. They may also be responsible for
implementing recruiting, retention, and promotion strategies at the
firm and ensuring a workplace culture commensurate with the
objectives of the company.
Even though what is required to be an effective CEO can vary
considerably by industry, CEOs, like the board that is responsible for
managing them, are a highly homogenous group. When it comes to
CEOs of S&P 500 companies, only 9% are ethnic minorities. 26
Specifically, 3% are Latino, 2% are Indian, 1% are Asian, 1% are Middle
Eastern, 1% are multiracial, and 1% are Black. 27

through social networks, similar to elite professional service firms that only hire from a few select,
elite universities on the East Coast).
23. Cheng et al., supra note 19.
24. Id.
25. Adam
Hayes,
Chief
Executive
Officer
(CEO),
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ceo.asp (last updated July 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6MCN5X7Q].
26. Te-Ping Chen, Why Are There Still So Few Black CEOs?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2020,
10:16
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-are-there-still-so-few-black-ceos-11601302601
[https://perma.cc/HQ9C-K2GL] (stating that African Americans represent only 3% of executive or
senior-level roles among U.S. companies with one hundred or more employees).
27. Id.
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FIGURE 1.D: S&P CEOS BY ETHNICITY

Source: MyLogIQ

Things hardly get better when assessing the diversity of Fortune
500 C-suites, the most senior leaders of large companies that include
the chief financial officer (“CFO”), chief operating officer (“COO”), and
chief information officer (“CIO”). In this rarified group of officers, just
3.2% are African Americans. 28 Only 4.3% of Fortune 500 executives are
Latino. 29 Meanwhile, an overwhelming majority—over 85%—are white.

28. CTR. FOR TALENT INNOVATION, BEING BLACK IN CORPORATE AMERICA: AN
INTERSECTIONAL
EXPLORATION
3
(2019),
https://coqual.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/CoqualBeingBlackinCorporateAmerica090720-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/33DY-P9CM] (finding that despite the disparate numbers, African American
professionals are more likely than white professionals to be ambitious; overall, 65% of African
Americans were considered “very ambitious” in their careers, compared to 53% of their white
counterparts).
29. J.D. Swerzenski, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & Eric Hoyt, This Is Where There Are the
Most Hispanic Executives (and It’s Not Where You Think), FAST CO. (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90456329/this-is-where-there-are-the-most-hispanic-executivesand-its-not-where-you-think [https://perma.cc/6T6Y-Q3WP].
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FIGURE 1.E: REPRESENTATION IN FORTUNE 500 C-SUITES BY
ETHNICITY

Source: JD Swerzenski, University of Massachusetts Amherst

As in the case of corporate boards, there are more women
occupying top executive roles than there are underrepresented
minorities—167 at the country’s top three thousand companies. 30 And
the data indicate that women have made progress among C-suite
executives, growing from roughly 7% of top management to nearly 12%
today. 31 By comparison, of the 279 top executives listed at the fifty
biggest companies in the S&P 100, only five are Black. 32 Still, women
remain overwhelmingly underrepresented when compared to their
50.2% share of the overall U.S. population. 33 Moreover, women hold
only 6% of CEO positions among Fortune 500 companies, with
ethnically diverse individuals faring similarly as 9% of the Fortune 500
CEO population. 34

30. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Where Are All the Women CEOs?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2020, 10:34
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-so-few-ceos-are-women-you-can-have-a-seat-at-the-tableand-not-be-a-player-11581003276 [https://perma.cc/Z3B6-DCZG].
31. Id.
32. Jessica Guynn & Brent Schrotenboer, Why Are There Still So Few Black Executives in
America?, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/money/business/2020/08/20/racismblack-america-corporate-america-facebook-apple-netflix-nike-diversity/5557003002/ (last updated
Feb. 4, 2021, 8:54 AM) [https://perma.cc/38WW-8DPN].
33. Fuhrmans, supra note 30.
34. Id. (women comprise only 25% of all Fortune 100 C-Suite positions, with racially diverse
individuals comprising only 16% of the Fortune 100 executive positions).
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FIGURE 1.F: FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN C-SUITE ROLES

Source: The Wall Street Journal

As with corporate boards, researchers have identified exclusion
from professional networks as a key driver of the imbalance in C-suites.
Networking—and socializing—can make or break careers, and women
and minorities can find it difficult to integrate into dominant corporate
cultures and participate on equal footing with their white male
colleagues. As a result, they are often unable to fully develop the
relationships necessary for advancement. 35 The consequences can be
important. Promotions in many companies are informally decided
before jobs are ever posted, leaving members from underrepresented
groups without the chance to compete and without sponsors in the
corporate leadership to put their name forward. 36
Inadequate opportunities for advancement at earlier stages of
careers play a role as well. CEOs, recruiters, and scholars routinely
report that women and Black professionals face greater obstacles early
in their career, including work-life balance and family responsibilities,
and are viewed more critically than their colleagues. 37 And even if
minorities and women make it close to the C-suite, they are rarely given
the profit-and-loss positions that serve as stepping stones to the top jobs
like CEO and CFO, and are instead more typically placed into roles such
as marketing or human resources. 38 “A Wall Street Journal study of
executives at . . . the biggest publicly traded firms by market value,
shows that men,” occupying the most senior jobs in companies,
“overwhelmingly get the management jobs in which a company’s profits

35.
36.
37.
38.

Chen, supra note 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and losses hang in the balance.” 39 Women by contrast “often fill roles
such as head of human resources, administration or legal, . . . the jobs
[that] don’t have profit-generating responsibility” and that are not
usually routes to running a company. 40
For nonwhite women, climbing the corporate ladder is even more
difficult. 41 In a 2019 survey of 329 major companies and more than
sixty-eight thousand of their employees, women of color were less likely
to say their bosses gave them opportunities to manage people and
projects or helped them navigate corporate politics. 42 They made up just
3% of C-suite roles, according to the research by McKinsey & Co. and
LeanIn.Org, a nonprofit that promotes the advancement of women at
work. 43
FIGURE 1.G: REPRESENTATION ACROSS CORPORATE RANKS

Source: McKinsey

In the end, an increasingly steep decoupling of white men from
virtually all other groups arises as one moves up the corporate ladder.
What is an initially modest gap in representation at the entry level of
hiring arising between white men on the one hand, and women and
39. Fuhrmans, supra note 30.
40. Id.
41. Lisa Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of
Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1116
(2005) (stating that non-white women “describe barriers to their success as a ‘concrete’ ceiling, as
opposed to the ‘glass’ ceiling experienced by white women”).
42. Amber Burton, Women of Color: Invisible, Excluded, and Constantly ‘On Guard,’ WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/women-of-color-invisible-excludedand-constantly-on-guard-11571112060?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/8MYR-9PEF].
43. MCKINSEY & CO. & LEANIN.ORG, WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 8 (2020), https://wiwreport.s3.amazonaws.com/Women_in_the_Workplace_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/EPE3-EF6K].
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minorities on the other, jumps at every step across the corporate
hierarchy. This demographic decoupling culminates in C-suite figures
that do not come close to representing the demographics of the United
States. 44 Instead, minorities and women lose ground as white men,
predominately from relatively affluent backgrounds, 45 gain an evergreater share of corporate leadership positions.
C. Corporate Law’s Post-George Floyd, Pandemic Moment
Corporate America’s demographic dilemma has attracted
attention for decades, though scrutiny of the problem has intensified
since the brutal death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis
police. The tragedy not only supercharged the then-nascent Black Lives
Matter movement, but it also highlighted an array of societal inequities,
from police brutality to the racial wealth and income gaps. As activists
have delved into questions of legal meaning, entitlement, and
democracy, a natural point of emphasis has been the racially disparate
allocation of resources and opportunity in society. 46 The pandemic’s
unequal impact on people of color 47 has only doubled down on the focus,

44. Id. at 8–9 (the 2020 report focuses specifically on how the COVID-19 pandemic has
affected women at work, including its unique impact on women of different races and ethnicities).
45. Richard L. Zweigenhaft, Diversity Among CEOs and Corporate Directors: Has the Heyday
Come
and
Gone?,
WHORULESAMERICA.NET
(Dec.
2013),
https://whorulesamerica.ucsc.edu/power/diversity_among_ceos.html
[https://perma.cc/ZER5S4MC] (examining corporate directors at elite companies and finding that they were
overwhelmingly from upper class or upper-middle class backgrounds, including directors who were
female or from non-Black minority groups).
46. See Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equity Metrics, 130 YALE L.J.F. 869,
872 (2021) (observing that under the Black Lives Matter movement, “[c]onversations that initially
focused on the appropriate role of police within American society turned into debates about, quite
simply, everything”). The picture that emerges, according to an extensive review of hundreds of
documents and interviews about George Floyd’s life, is one that underscores how systemic racism
has calcified within many of America’s institutions, creating sharply disparate outcomes in
housing, education, the economy, law enforcement, and health care. Toluse Olorunnipa & Griff
Witte, Born with Two Strikes: How Systemic Racism Shaped Floyd’s Life and Hobbled His
Ambition, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/george-floydamerica/systemic-racism/ (last updated Oct. 8, 2020, 7:47 AM) [https://perma.cc/3H4N-AVQ8].
47. For an important summary of the economic and health effects of the pandemic on Black
workers, see Elise Gould & Valerie Wilson, Black Workers Face Two of the Most Lethal Preexisting
Conditions for Coronavirus—Racism and Inequality, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 1, 2020),
https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workers-covid/ [https://perma.cc/ZDC3-KRDW]. Women,
especially Black, non-Hispanic women and Latinas, were also hit hard by the pandemic, as they
are overrepresented in sectors—such as hospitality and retail—which experienced the brunt of
pandemic-related job losses. Jasmine Tucker & Claire Ewing-Nelson, COVID-19 Is Making
Women’s Economic Situation Even Worse, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Sept. 2020),
https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/PulsedataFS-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ABK-UJJQ].
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leading to an epistemic shift—or “Great Awakening”—in American
consciousness. 48
Thus, the cruel events of 2020 made ignoring racial inequality
impossible for most Americans, and especially for high-profile business
leaders. 49 The facts on the ground led to new questions being asked of
corporations about their role in contributing to the undeniable problem
of persistent inequality and what actions they may and should take to
address it. And for the first time, a mainstream conversation has arisen
as to what the relative lack of Diversity has meant for not only Blacks,
but also for society—and whether corporate governance might have a
role in promoting more constructive corporate behavior.
This is not to say that there have not been scholars with an eye
on what social externalities an absence of corporate Diversity could
create. Research has found, for example, that corporations with less
Diversity and fewer women are less likely to engage in philanthropic
giving. 50 Similarly, recent events have highlighted how corporations
with fewer powerful African Americans and Latinos on their boards and
in their workforces are less likely to support causes relevant to Diverse
communities—or to take social justice stands that reflect the values of
Diverse minority communities. 51 Even attention to issues like equitable
48. Van
Jones,
Opinion,
Welcome
to
the
‘Great
Awakening,’
CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/12/opinions/great-awakening-empathy-solidarity-george-floydjones/index.html (last updated June 14, 2020, 11:21 PM) [https://perma.cc/V6T7-SSP8] (observing
how George Floyd’s killing and the Black Lives Matter movement have birthed a “phenomenon
infinitely larger than itself” that is best described as a “ ‘Great Awakening’ of empathy and
solidarity, one without historical precedent”); see also Jose A. Del Real, Robert Samuels & Tim
Craig, How the Black Lives Matter Movement Went Mainstream, WASH. POST (June 9, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/how-the-black-lives-matter-movement-wentmainstream/2020/06/09/201bd6e6-a9c6-11ea-9063-e69bd6520940_story.html
[https://perma.cc/8ANX-NPE5] (noting that the mainstreaming of the Black Lives Matter
movement is happening against the backdrop of a global pandemic that, in the United States, has
disproportionately hurt minorities).
49. See Natalie Sherman, George Floyd: Why Are Companies Speaking Up this Time?, BBC
(June 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-52896265 [https://perma.cc/L8X4-X2EV] (“For
years, black deaths in the hands of police have gone unremarked in corporate America. But this
time, as protesters pour into streets across the country set off by the killing of George Floyd,
businesses are speaking out.”).
50. See Robert J. Williams, Women on Corporate Boards of Directors and Their Influence on
Corporate Philanthropy, 42 J. BUS. ETHICS 1 (2003) (supporting the notion that firms that have a
higher proportion of women serving on their boards engage in charitable giving to a greater extent
than firms having a lower proportion of women serving on their boards).
51. The most obvious, and studied, recent case in point concerns the disparate responses from
the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) and National Football League (“NFL”) to Colin
Kaepernick’s protest of the American flag. The NBA—where Black players wield economic power—
embraced social protests, and the NFL—where white owners wield economic power—largely
eschewed them and ostracized Kaepernick for his demonstration. See, e.g., Michael Conklin &
Christine Noel, Unsportsmanlike Conduct? The NFL’s Response to the Kneeling Controversy, 12 J.
ETHICAL & LEGAL ISSUES 1, 3 (2019) (noting the higher percentage of Black players in the NBA
and the larger number of Black viewers); see also John Branch, Why the N.F.L. and the N.B.A. Are
22,
2018),
So
Far
Apart
on
Social
Justice
Stances,
N.Y. TIMES (June
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/sports/nfl-nba-social-justice-protests.html
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environmental policy may be less likely where corporate boards and
management lack Diversity and the attendant perspective to recognize
problems and optimize solutions. 52
Still, what are perhaps the most direct and concerning
implications of the data are the larger macroeconomic repercussions for
the country’s racial wealth and income gaps. In the decades since the
height of the civil rights movement, corporate America has failed to
consistently
hire
and
promote
women
and
historically
underrepresented minorities, stalling many from rising above middle
management. 53 The absence of diversity at the top of corporations is
widely accepted in the organizational psychology literature as one key
factor likely impeding diversity lower down the corporate hierarchy,
where the bulk of employees work and the most interactions between
the corporation, customers, and community occur. 54 The reasons are
varied but generally start with hiring. Individuals, regardless of race,
tend to like individuals who are similar to themselves and evaluate
them more positively than those who are different. Because of this
“affinity bias,” managers may repeatedly favor individuals who are
[https://perma.cc/PNW7-JFVT] (noting that the NFL’s lack of guaranteed contracts and the NBA’s
smaller and more unified workforce, where Black players are marketed, resulted in vastly different
corporate responses).
52. The same issue is under intense scrutiny in the nonprofit sector, where there are
parallels. See Ambika Chawla, A Look at Why Environmentalism Is So Homogeneous–And How
(July
28,
2020),
Organizations
Might
Cultivate
Genuine
Diversity,
ENSIA
https://ensia.com/features/environmental-workforce-diversity-systemic-racism/
[https://perma.cc/B6PU-WT3L] (“[P]eople of color can offer unique perspectives on both why
diversity is lacking in the green sector and what organizations can do to diversify the
environmental workforce.”); see also Victoria Bortfeld, This ‘Green’ Space Shouldn’t Be So White,
CLIMATE
SCH.:
STATE
OF
THE
PLANET
BLOG
(Aug.
21,
2020),
COLUM.
https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2020/08/21/environmental-sciences-anti-racism/
[https://perma.cc/7U9P-8DXC] (“[T]he institutional settings and professional workplaces that
house and advance environmental work in some ways mirror the environmental injustices that
unfold in our society.”); Ihab Mikati, Adam F. Benson, Thomas J. Luben, Jason D. Sacks & Jennifer
Richmond-Bryant, Disparities in Distribution of Particulate Matter Emission Sources by Race and
Poverty Status, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 480 (2018) (finding that people of color are not only much
more likely to live near polluters and breathe polluted air, but also that race has a stronger effect
on exposure to pollutants than poverty, which indicates that something beyond the concentration
of poverty among Black and Brown communities is at play).
53. As of July 15, 2020, less than 2% of the 279 top executives at the fifty largest companies
in the United States were Black. Guynn & Schrotenboer, supra note 32. For a recent survey and
analysis of the racial wealth gap, see Neil Bhutta, Andrew C. Chang, Lisa J. Dettling & Joanne
W. Hsu, Disparities in Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances,
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.
(Sept.
28,
2020),
BD.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparities-in-wealth-by-race-andethnicity-in-the-2019-survey-of-consumer-finances-20200928.htm [https://perma.cc/JR79-UNCJ].
54. See Jill A. Gould, Carol T. Kulik & Shruti R. Sardeshmukh, Trickle-Down Effect: The
Impact of Female Board Members on Executive Gender Diversity, 57 HUM. RES. MGMT. 931 (2018)
(finding a trickle-down effect on female representation operating between the board and executive
levels). See generally Rachel W. Flam, Jeremiah Green, Joshua A. Lee & Nathan Y. Sharp, A Level
Playing Field? Empirical Evidence That Minority Analysts Face Unequal Access to Corporate
Managers
(rev.
Dec.
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3622417
[https://perma.cc/T37D-QWDC]
(finding that ethnic minority analysts face unique barriers to management access).
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similar to themselves, viewing them as more trustworthy, intelligent,
or qualified. 55 Meanwhile, women, and especially Black and Brown
candidates, may be subject to “outsider bias,” the idea that those not
part of a known circle of friends and associates must have values and
interests foreign to your own. 56 In business, this and other affinitybased biases can have an especially large impact during the
recruitment processes, where it presents itself as a lack of “culture fit,”
an ambiguous evaluation employed to disqualify job candidates. 57
Perhaps not surprisingly, data from the National Academy of Sciences
indicate that the rate of callbacks for Black candidates is generally
lower than that of white candidates, and this rate has changed little
since the 1970s. 58
Similar dynamics complicate the promotion of those Black and
Brown people who are hired. “Confirmation bias,” the human tendency
to selectively seek out, favor, and use information that confirms what
you already believe, can in non-Diverse contexts stymie the progress of
Black and Brown employees. 59 To the extent white leaders 60 of a firm
expect Black employees to be less qualified, they will likely be more
inclined to ignore new information proving otherwise, even where

55. Adwoa Bagalini, 3 Cognitive Biases Perpetuating Systemic Racism at Work—And How to
Overcome
Them,
WORLD
ECON.
F.
(Aug.
19,
2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/08/cognitive-bias-unconscious-racism-moral-licensing/
[https://perma.cc/ZNQ2-RBX7] (highlighting how moral licensing, affinity bias, and confirmation
bias are three types of cognitive biases that factor into producing unequal outcomes for people of
color).
56. Cf. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 47 (1988) (showing that individuals disproportionately stick with the
status quo through a series of decisionmaking experiments); see also Amy Kristof-Brown, Murray
R. Barrick & Melinda Franke, Applicant Impression Management: Dispositional Influences and
Consequences For Recruiter Perceptions of Fit and Similarity, 28 J. MGMT. 27, 33–40 (2002)
(offering evidence that when making hiring decisions, interviewers will unconsciously favor
candidates whom they see as similar to themselves).
57. Bagalini, supra note 55.
58. Lincoln Quillian, Devah Pager, Arnfinn H. Midtbøen & Ole Hexel, Hiring Discrimination
Against Black Americans Hasn’t Declined in 25 Years, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/10/hiring-discrimination-against-black-americans-hasnt-declined-in-25years [http://perma.cc/P6QJ-X9TV] (finding little evidence that conscious and unconscious forms
of bias will diminish on their own).
59. Bagalini, supra note 55; see, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974) (discussing “anchoring” as one
of several key judgmental heuristics and the biases it produces).
60. Or even minority leaders, given the evidence that implicit bias affects everyone, including
Black people’s perceptions of other Black people. Theodore R. Johnson, Black-on-Black Racism:
(Dec.
26,
2014),
The
Hazards
of
Implicit
Bias,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/black-on-black-racism-the-hazards-ofimplicit-bias/384028/ [https://perma.cc/E9JB-7ZQ2] (“When blacks are asked about their
predilections, they express a solid preference for their group over whites, but, in general,
performance on the IAT [Implicit Association Test, an implicit bias test used by Project Implicit]
suggests they subconsciously hold a slight preference for whites over blacks.”).
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performance is high. 61 Employees who come from underrepresented
groups are consequently more likely to be negatively evaluated.
Additionally, mentors and promoters at firms who may be positioned to
elevate junior- and mid-level executives to positions of leadership may
be disinclined to do so. 62 For underrepresented groups, this means they
may face competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis their white counterparts
for promotion.
Another large factor impeded progress toward racial and gender
equality. With an increased emphasis on short-term stockholder
returns from institutional investors starting in the 1980s and
accelerating since, the share of corporate profits that went into wage
increases plummeted compared to previous generations. 63 This decline
in fair gainsharing hit Black Americans particularly hard, because they
had only gained labor rights in the 1960s, and were more likely to be
working and lower middle class. 64 Growing inequality resulted for all
61. Bagalini, supra note 55.
62. Id.
63. See Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis:
An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 27193, 2020), nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27193/w27193.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48B3-5PXV]; Lawrence Mishel, The Decline in Unions Has Hurt Nonunion
Workers Too, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-decline-inunions-has-hurt-nonunion-workers-too/ [http://perma.cc/7CX3-45BX]; LAWRENCE MISHEL & JORI
KANDRA, ECON. POL’Y INST., CEO COMPENSATION SURGED 14% IN 2019 TO $21.3 MILLION (Aug.
2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-surged-14-in-2019-to-21-3-million-ceosnow-earn-320-times-as-much-as-a-typical-worker/ [https://perma.cc/S4Q9-BTVE] (observing that
as stockholders have tied CEO pay to stock returns, CEO compensation has increased while
worker wages have stagnated); LAWRENCE MISHEL, LYNN RHINEHART & LANE WINDHAM, ECON.
POL’Y INST., EXPLAINING THE EROSION OF PRIVATE-SECTOR UNIONS (Oct. 2020),
https://files.epi.org/pdf/211305.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLL7-EQDF]; JOSH BIVENS, LAWRENCE
MISHEL & JOHN SCHMITT, ECON. POL’Y INST., IT’S NOT JUST MONOPOLY AND MONOPSONY: HOW
MARKET POWER HAS AFFECTED AMERICAN WAGES (Apr. 2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/145564.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6G6E-GMC7].
64. See David Leonhardt, Opinion, The Black-White Wage Gap Is as Big as It Was in the
1950s, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/opinion/sunday/racewage-gap.html [https://perma.cc/UN3T-GLZG] (documenting that both the racial wealth and
income gaps shrank after World War II because of rising wages due to strong unions, the inclusion
of formerly excluded jobs that many Black workers held at the minimum wage by the Great Society
legislation in 1966, and other policies that benefited all blue-collar workers, but that these gains
then reversed from the 1980s forward); G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power,
WHORULESAMERICA.NET, https://whorulesamerica.ucsc.edu/power/wealth.html (last updated Apr.
2017) [https://perma.cc/2V9B-JXBG] (showing that Black people are far behind white people in
income and that the gap is growing); Kristin McIntosh, Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn & Jay
Shambaugh, Examining the Black-White Wealth Gap, BROOKINGS (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/
[https://perma.cc/6558-Q4JP] (showing the same); see also Facts: Racial Economic Inequality,
INEQUALITY.ORG, https://inequality.org/facts/racial-inequality/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/U2C7-JH9N] (documenting median Black family net wealth of only $3,500
compared to white median family wealth of $147,000, and further noting that this gap has grown
considerably since the early 1980s); PHILIP MATTERA, GOOD JOBS FIRST & JOBS WITH JUST. EDUC.
FUND, GRAND THEFT PAYCHECK: THE LARGE CORPORATIONS SHORTCHANGING THEIR WORKERS’
WAGES
1,
14–15
(June
2018),
https://goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdfs/wagetheft_report_revised.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QV8Y-8DF8] (documenting that wage theft affects Black and Latino workers
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Americans, and the gains made by Black Americans during the period
when the New Deal/Great Society consensus was in place began to
reverse. 65 Public policy movements in the Friedman/Reagan direction
also freed corporations from pressure to address DEI issues more
assertively, a reality evidenced by the lack of progress in diversifying
the boardroom and C-suite. 66
Collectively, these obstacles are all widely understood to
contribute to sprawling differences in economic outcomes and
opportunities, a key concern of civil rights activists. Statistics compiled
by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 2018
indicate that among white people, the ratio of lower-paid service
workers and laborers compared with higher-paid senior-level
management is roughly 7 to 1. But for Black people, the ratio balloons
to 105 to 1. 67
These facts have a direct impact on racial wealth and income
inequality. The net worth in 2016 of the typical white family ($171,000)
was nearly ten times greater than that of a Black family ($17,150).
Meanwhile, the gulf in median household incomes between white and
Black Americans has grown after the Reagan era, with improvements
during the 1960s and 1970s being reversed, so that the gap of $23,800
in 1970 has now grown to roughly $33,000 in 2018 (as measured in 2018
dollars). 68 Part of the gulf can be attributed to what has been described
as the “Black Ceiling” that cuts career progression early. According to
recent industry analysis, Black males reach their peak incomes much
sooner than white males, at lower levels ($43,859 at ages 45–49 for
Black males and $66,250 at 50–54 for white males). 69
For all these reasons, there are increasing calls by advocates and
by corporate stakeholders themselves for corporations to address
disproportionately as they are overrepresented in the sectors that are the most penalized by courts
for wage theft).
65. Equality in the United States, including for Black Americans, was rising until the Reagan
Administration reversed the New Deal/Great Society consensus. See The Productivity–Pay Gap,
ECON. POL’Y INST., https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap (last updated Aug. 2021)
[https://perma.cc/355-NJ7S] (“Since the late 1970s, [U.S.] policy choices have led directly to a
pronounced divergence between productivity and typical workers’ pay.”).
66. See, for example, William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in the
Reagan Years (1980-89): The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 645
(1994), detailing the Reagan Administration’s impact in reducing the effectiveness of enforcement
of Title VII’s prohibition against racial and gender discrimination in employment.
67. Guynn & Schrotenboer, supra note 32.
68. Katherine Schaeffer, 6 Facts About Economic Inequality in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR (Feb.
7, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-facts-about-economic-inequality-inthe-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/355K-NJ7S].
69. DANA M. PETERSON & CATHERINE L. MANN, CITIGROUP, CLOSING THE RACIAL INEQUALITY
GAPS: THE ECONOMIC COST OF BLACK INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. 5 (Sept. 2020),
https://ir.citi.com/%2FPRxPvgNWu319AU1ajGf%2BsKbjJjBJSaTOSdw2DF4xynPwFB8a2jV1Fa
A3Idy7vY59bOtN2lxVQM%3D [https://perma.cc/DZ2R-VA8W].
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inequality by undertaking more assertive and more comprehensive DEI
policies that address all the important ways in which corporations affect
their workers, consumers, business partners, communities of operation,
and society as a whole. These demands are not just for symbolic actions,
but for a top-down and bottom-up approach that embeds a commitment
to equality in all aspects of corporate conduct. 70
II. DIVERSITY AND ITS CONNECTION TO SUSTAINABLE FIRM
PROFITABILITY AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE
For all of the attention now directed at DEI in corporate
America—and, as we shall later see, an increasing legislative and
regulatory preoccupation with the diversity of corporate boards—
Diversity is not usually talked about in terms of its relationship to longstanding corporate law principles. For those adopting the view of Milton
70. For a sample of some of the specific demands for corporate action and what they entail,
see Jennifer Liu, Companies Are Speaking Out Against Racism, but Here’s What it Really Looks
Like to Lead an Anti-racist Organization, CNBC: MAKE IT, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/15/whatit-means-to-be-an-anti-racist-company.html (last updated June 15, 2020, 1:27 PM)
[https://perma.cc/5EDB-R798] (urging organizations to acknowledge systemic racism in the
workplace and implement changes at all levels); HARRY BAKER, CHLOE SPETALNICK, JONATHAN
WILLMOT, KAJOL GUPTA & KEN MERRITT, DAYBLINK CONSULTING, CORPORATE DIVERSITY AND
RESPONSES
TO
THE
BLACK
LIVES
MATTER
MOVEMENT
4
(Aug.
2020),
https://www.dayblink.com/corporate-diversity-and-responses-to-the-black-lives-mattermovement/ [https://perma.cc/G7UD-KRB2] (analyzing corporate America’s response to the Black
Lives Matter Movement in the sixty days following George Floyd’s death); Peter Eavis, Want More
Diversity? Some Experts Say Reward C.E.O.s for It, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/business/economy/corporate-diversity-paycompensation.html [https://perma.cc/A3W8-2B5P] (reporting that “just 78 of roughly 3,000
companies said fulfilling diversity goals determined some portion of chief executives’ pay”); Nikhil
BLOG
(July
2,
2020),
Bumb,
Corporate
Silence
and
Anti-Racism,
FSG:
https://www.fsg.org/blog/corporate-silence-anti-racism [https://perma.cc/2Z2J-6YRD] (advocating
for meetings as one way to actively create spaces to listen to employees of color, customers of color,
and other stakeholders of color, rather than putting the burden on people of color to raise their
voices); Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That
ROUNDTABLE
(Aug.
19,
2019),
Serves
All
Americans,’
BUS.
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporationto-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/X9PF-EU7W] (statement of
the Business Roundtable redefining the purpose of a corporation and, in doing so, moving away
from shareholder primacy to include a commitment to all stakeholders); Lauren Weber, Companies
Have Promised $35 Billion Toward Racial Equity. Where Is the Money Going?, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
21, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-have-promised-billions-towardracial-equity-where-is-the-money-going-11608570864 [https://perma.cc/WJB6-SEJ8] (stating that
successful corporate initiatives require CEO commitment, among other things); and Judith Crown,
Supplier Diversity Needs to Focus on Industries of Today and Tomorrow, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Dec.
18, 2020, 7:26 AM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/equity/supplier-diversity-needs-focusindustries-today-and-tomorrow [https://perma.cc/2FUF-8ECK] (noting that previous supplier
diversity programs “pigeonholed [Black companies] in low-margin endeavors such as janitorial,
landscaping, delivery and construction” and arguing that supplier diversity programs must focus
on engaging Black companies in higher margin businesses).
For a thoughtful consideration of how society’s exclusion of Black Americans and women from
full equality may have distorted and narrowed the historical American debate over corporate
purpose and the role it should play in the current debate, see Veronica Root Martinez, A More
Equitable Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD
47 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds., 2021).
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Friedman, the pursuit of DEI is most commonly understood as an
external matter to the firm, unassociated with shareholder profits, that
should be addressed by external regulatory law, not internal corporate
action. Notably, this understanding of Diversity is not entirely
incongruous with that of many Diversity supporters to the extent to
which they view corporate Diversity as part and parcel of social justice
and fairness—and not (necessarily) a matter relevant to firm-level
performance. 71 Indeed, for some activists, associating Diversity with
business concepts like profits inherently cheapens the moral imperative
for reform. 72
Although we are sensitive to this latter argument and agree
entirely with the strong moral imperatives behind Diversity and public
law reforms, the case for Diversity has also had a strong business
rationale for many years. That rationale has only grown stronger as
societal concerns about equity and inclusion have entered the social and
political mainstream at a breathtaking pace after last year’s conscienceraising. 73 Generational moral moments like the one in which we find
ourselves have economic and legal repercussions for corporations
which, as we highlight later in the Article, also offer a corresponding
scope for moral action protected by the business judgment rule,
especially when that action also makes good business sense.
But first, in this Part, we canvass the most cited building blocks
of the business case for Diversity and its connection to firm success and
long-term value. We start with a survey of the empirical research
associating Diversity with financial performance and find a mixed
picture, albeit one that is still important for corporate decisionmakers
considering whether and to what extent to focus on DEI. We then turn
our analysis to comparatively stronger qualitative and analytical
arguments from the long-running literature in organizational
psychology identifying cognitive diversity (and Diversity more
generally) as a key ingredient for cognitively “smart” businesses. We
then end with what is, in our view, the easiest way to understand the
business argument for Diversity—its impact on the corporation’s
reputation with regulators and key stakeholders and, by extension, on
its cost of capital, access to talent and business partners, and its
71. See Aaron A. Dhir, Towards a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception of the Firm:
Canadian Corporate Governance, Law and Diversity, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 569, 591–99 (2010) (noting
that some scholars contest the argument that diversity increases firm performance); Lisa M.
Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales
for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795, 798–99 (noting that where rationales for
diversity move away from moral or social justifications, those rationales may be wrongly
interpreted as an acknowledgment of the illegitimacy of moral and social justifications).
72. Dhir, supra note 71, at 601 (“[B]y validating diversification initiatives with reference to
wealth aggregation, the implication is that the worth of these efforts is contingent on stock value.”).
73. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 70, at 2 (explaining how today’s modern civil rights
movement has been coined “Great White Awakening” and given corporations the opportunity to
make tangible efforts towards DEI).
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attractiveness to customers. Taken in total, this Part details what is
most critical for the connection between corporate law and DEI: the
rational basis for business leaders to conclude that attention to good
DEI practices makes good business sense in terms of improving the
likelihood that a corporation will be sustainably profitable.
A. The Empirical Debate
We start first with the numbers. Although Diversity has not
been a focus of critical inquiry within corporate law, it has attracted
substantial interest from scholars interested in its impact on the
financial performance of businesses. This literature is extensive and
can be summarized, albeit somewhat crudely, into two categories: (a)
recent studies from a growing number of researchers whose work
suggests that diversity has a positive impact on financial performance;
and (b) studies, typically less recent, that find the evidence to be more
ambiguous, or even conflicted. We begin with examples from the first
category.
Some of the most highly cited work finding a positive
relationship between Diversity and investment has come from top-tier
financial services firms and consultants. The Carlyle Group, for
example, has observed that its portfolio companies that had two or more
diverse directors—defined as female, Black, Hispanic, or Asian—had on
average earnings growth of 12.3% over the previous three years,
compared to 0.5% among portfolio companies with no diverse
directors. 74 McKinsey, too, has found that corporations with the most
ethnically diverse executive teams are 33% more likely to outperform
corporations than the least ethnically diverse teams in terms of
profitability. 75 Similarly, a Citi report found that companies in the top
quartile for both gender and ethnic diversity are 12% more likely to be
more profitable than companies in the lower quartiles and that the gap
increased by 36% compared to companies in the fourth quartile. 76 In
addition to Diversity, Deloitte’s research highlights the importance of
Inclusion, which it describes as the feeling of being treated “equitably
and with respect” and “feeling valued and belonging,” 77 in increasing
74. Jason M. Thomas & Megan Starr, Global Insights: From Impact Investing to Investing for
Impact, CARLYLE GRP. 5 fig.5 (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.carlyle.com/sites/default/files/202002/From%20Impact%20Investing%20to%20Investing%20for%20Impact_022420.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4P4C-A7Z2] (analyzing Carlyle U.S. portfolio company data).
75. VIVIAN HUNT, SARA PRINCE, SUNDIATU DIXON-FYLE & LAREINA YEE, DELIVERING
THROUGH
DIVERSITY,
MCKINSEY
&
CO.
1
(Jan.
2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/organization/our%20insight
s/delivering%20through%20diversity/delivering-through-diversity_full-report.ashx
[https://perma.cc/9JR7-MT76].
76. PETERSON & MANN, supra note 69, at 36.
77. Juliet Bourke & Bernadette Dillon, The Diversity and Inclusion Revolution: Eight
Powerful Truths, DELOITTE REV., Jan. 2018, at 82, 86.
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performance. 78 The research finds that organizations with inclusive
cultures are twice as likely to meet or exceed financial goals, three times
as likely to be high performing, six times more likely to be innovative,
and eight times more likely to achieve better business outcomes. 79
Perhaps the largest body of research has focused on gender. 80
Credit Suisse’s Research Institute has, for example, found over a series
of studies that companies with at least one woman on the board had on
average a sector-adjusted return on equity of 12.2%, compared to 10.1%
for companies with no female directors. 81 It also found in 2013 price-tobook values of 2.4x for companies with female representation on their
boards versus only 1.8x for those without, and a nine-year average for
boards with women directors of 2.3x versus only 1.8x for companies with
all-male boards. 82 Similarly, MSCI observed in an analysis of director
seats held by women over a five-year period in four global indexes that
once U.S. companies achieved a “tipping point” of at least three women
on their board, they experienced median gains in return on equity of
10% and earnings per share of 37%. 83 Meanwhile, companies that had
no female directors showed reductions in return on equity of -1%, and
reductions of -8% in EPS over the same five-year period. 84 Catalyst, a
nonprofit advocacy group, likewise found in a series of reports
comparing groups of firms that differed in the gender diversity of their
corporate boards that companies with three or more women on their
boards outperformed companies with none by 46% in terms of their
return on equity. 85 Other industry studies make similar claims. 86
78. Id. at 85.
79. Id.
80. This is in part, we suspect, because of the seemingly boundless data available to be culled:
women are, after all, everywhere, and in greater numbers than, say, African Americans, who may
be concentrated in a few select countries.
81. JULIA DAWSON, RICHARD KERSLEY & STEFANO NATELLA, CREDIT SUISSE, THE CS GENDER
3000: WOMEN IN SENIOR MANAGEMENT 16 (Sept. 2014), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/diversityforum-credit-suisse-report-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7BR-QJ9J].
82. Id.
83. MEGGIN THWING EASTMAN, DAMION RALLIS & GAIA MAZZUCCHELLI, MSCI, THE TIPPING
POINT:
WOMEN
ON
BOARDS
AND
FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE
6
(Dec.
2016),
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/fd1f8228-cc07-4789-acee-3f9ed97ee8bb
[https://perma.cc/A4GS-X5EU] (analyzing U.S. companies that were constituents of the MSCI
World Index for the entire period from July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2016).
84. Id.
85. Nancy M. Carter & Harvey M. Wagner, The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and
1–2
(2011),
Women’s
Representation
on
Boards
(2004–2008),
CATALYST
https://www.catalyst.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/the_bottom_line_corporate_performance_and_womens_representation_o
n_boards_2004-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNC2-WTM2] (analyzing gender diversity data from
Catalyst’s annual Fortune 500 Census of Women Board Directors report series for the years 2005
to 2009, and corresponding financial data from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database for the
years 2004 to 2008).
86. In 2020, McKinsey found “a positive, statistically significant correlation between
company financial outperformance and [board] diversity, on the dimensions of both gender and
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Some research from the academy has echoed these findings. A
Harvard study found that venture capital firms that increased their
proportion of female partner hires by 10% saw, on average, a 1.5% spike
in overall fund returns each year and had 9.7% more profitable exits—
a deceptively impressive figure given that only 28.8% of all VC
investments have a profitable exit. 87 Meanwhile, other studies from
scholars at Oklahoma State University have found significant positive
relationships between the fraction of women or minorities on the board
and firm value after controlling for size, industry, and other corporate
governance measures of Fortune 1000 firms. 88 Yet another inquiry
studying performance data and the percentage of women and minorities
on boards of directors for 127 large U.S. companies in 1993 and 1998
found the percentage of Caucasian females plus ethnic minority
directors on the board to be positively related to both return on equity
and return on assets. 89
But, as we highlighted, a second set of studies exists that has
not found the same positive empirical results. For example, an
international team of academic researchers in Germany found in a
meta-analysis of literature from twenty studies covering 3,097
companies that female representation on corporate boards has a “small
and non-significant” relationship with a company’s financial
performance. 90 Moreover, they found that firm financial performance is
not directly related, but depends on moderators, such as board size or
ethnicity,” with companies in the top quartile for board gender diversity “28 percent more likely
than their peers to outperform financially,” and a statistically significant correlation between
board gender diversity and outperformance on earnings before interest and taxation margin.
VIVIAN HUNT, SUNDIATU DIXON-FYLE, SARA PRINCE & KEVIN DOLAN, MCKINSEY & CO., DIVERSITY
WINS: HOW INCLUSION MATTERS 13, 48 (May 19, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/featuredinsights/diversity-and-inclusion/diversity-wins-how-inclusion-matters
[https://perma.cc/6Y4KW2RL] (analyzing 1,039 companies across fifteen countries for the period from December 2018 to
November 2019).
In 2019, Moody’s found that greater board gender diversity is associated with higher credit
ratings, with women accounting for an average of 28% of board seats at Aaa-rated companies but
less than 5% of board seats at Ca-rated companies. Press Release, Moody’s Invs. Serv., Corporate
Board Gender Diversity Associated with Higher Credit Ratings (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Corporate-board-gender-diversity-associated-withhigher-credit-ratings-PBC_1193768 [https://perma.cc/YQ3L-V97C] (analyzing 1,109 publicly
traded North American companies rated by Moody’s).
87. Paul Gompers & Silpa Kovvali, The Other Diversity Dividend, HARV. BUS. REV., July–
Aug. 2018, at 72, 75.
88. See, e.g., David A. Carter, Frank D’Souza, Betty J. Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, The
Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance 26 (Mar. 15, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=972763 [https://perma.cc/3AJU-8QXH]; see
also David A. Carter, Betty J. Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, Corporate Governance, Board
Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 50–51 (2003) (finding that Tobin’s Q is positively
related to both the percentage of female directors and the percentage of minority directors).
89. Niclas L. Erhardt, James D. Werbel & Charles B. Shrader, Board of Director Diversity
and Firm Financial Performance, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 102, 107–08 (2003).
90. Jan Luca Pletzer, Romina Nikolova, Karina Karolina Kedzior & Sven Constantin Voelpel,
Does Gender Matter? Female Representation on Corporate Boards and Firm Financial
Performance—A Meta-Analysis, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 1, 13 (2015).
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the time of data collection. 91 Similarly, another team (including one of
the Oklahoma researchers who had previously observed a positive
relationship in terms of gender and firm value) found in its analysis of
541 S&P 500 companies from 1998 to 2002 that financial performance
had no relationship to gender diversity or ethnic minority diversity,
positive or negative, when Tobin’s Q was used as the measure of
financial performance. 92
Other studies offer more nuanced appraisals and are at times
highly critical of the methodologies employed in the studies cited by
Diversity advocates. Alice Eagly, in particular, has criticized studies
like those produced by Catalyst and Credit Suisse for not revealing the
strength of the relation between the participation of women and
financial success and for lacking correlations relating the percentages
of women on corporate boards to corporate outcomes or simple scatter
plots of the relationships. 93 She also criticizes early studies for not
raising questions about reverse causation from financial success to the
inclusion of women and possible confounding of the percentage of
women on boards with omitted variables. 94 Consequently, a number of
unacknowledged correlations could be driving the data such as company
resources derived from performance and an ability to invest in
diversity. 95 Along similar lines, Renee B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira
criticize previous studies that are not robust to endogeneity and find in
their analysis of nearly two thousand S&P mid- and small caps from
1996 to 2003 that gender diversity can add to shareholder value, but
generally only where governance is weak. 96 Likewise, Corrine Post and
Kris Byron find a “near zero” relationship with a company’s market
performance, but a positive relationship with a company’s accounting
91. Id.
92. David A. Carter, Frank D’Souza, Betty J. Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, The Gender and
Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 18 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 396, 410 (2010) (analysis of 541 S&P 500 companies for the years 1998–2002).
93. Alice H. Eagly, When Passionate Advocates Meet Research on Diversity, Does the Honest
Broker Stand a Chance?, 72 J. SOC. ISSUES 199, 200–02 (2016) (noting that few researchers of the
connection between diversity and firm performance have addressed endogeneity in a manner that
allows claims about causation).
94. Id. at 202.
95. For an overview and commentary, see AARON DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM
HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY (2015); Lissa Lamkin Broome &
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV.
431, 432–33 nn.2–6 (2008) (reviewing studies); Dhir, supra note 71, at 591–99 (same); and Sabina
Nielsen, Morten Huse, Alessandro Minichilli & Alessandro Zattoni, Board Diversity and Firm
Performance: An Empirical Investigation of the Mediating Effects of Board Processes and Task
Performance, ACAD. MGMT. PROC., no. 1, Aug. 2008.
96. Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on
Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 291 (2009) (analyzing 1,939 S&P 500, S&P
MidCaps, and S&P SmallCap companies for the period 1996 to 2003, measuring company
performance by a proxy for Tobin’s Q (the ratio of market value to book value) and return on
assets).
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returns. 97 The U.S. Government Accountability Office, meanwhile, has
concluded that the mixed nature of various academic studies may be
due to differences in methodologies, data samples, and time periods. 98
Conflicting assessments like these can invite paralysis and
uncertainty and thus it is easy, but we think wrong, to interpret the
overall direction of the literature as collectively taking the conversation
on Diversity “nowhere.” Working with incomplete and imperfect data is
the job of most corporate leaders (and, apparently, academics). 99 CEOs
and boards make decisions every day with very little information, and
often without the benefits of charts or regressions, whatever their
statistical or scientific robustness. And in doing so, they take whatever
data are available, discount them, and apply that information to the
particulars of the firm they manage, and then act. That is why, in large
part, the business judgment rule exists: to ensure that business leaders
can proceed with confidence that their good faith decisions in a world of
uncertainty are not second-guessed in litigation with the
counterproductive effect of deterring them from managing their
businesses in an effective manner. 100
From this standpoint, it is worthwhile noting that there are
several studies suggesting that, at a minimum, diversity may have a
positive impact on the financial operations of a company. And CEOs
and boards are, in a world of incomplete information, entitled to also
take into account the studies by firms—paid to assist them in making
their companies more profitable—that take the clear position that
effective DEI policies are positively associated with protecting and
improving firm value. This may not mean much to academics, who may
97. Corinne Post & Kris Byron, Women on Boards and Firm Financial Performance: A MetaAnalysis, 58 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1546, 1558–59 (2014). In 2016, the same authors, based on a review
of the results for eighty-seven studies, found a weak but significantly positive correlation between
board gender diversity and corporate social responsibility. See Corinne Post & Kris Byron, Women
on Boards of Directors and Corporate Social Performance: A Meta‐Analysis, 24 CORP. GOVERNANCE
428 (2016). Commentators have cautioned, however, that “a significant correlational relationship
does not prove causality.” Research Review: Does Gender Diversity on Boards Really Boost
(May
18,
2017),
Company
Performance?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/will-gender-diversity-boards-really-boost-companyperformance/ [https://perma.cc/WB82-VN8N].
98. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-30, CORPORATE BOARDS: STRATEGIES TO
ADDRESS REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN INCLUDE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 5 (2015),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674008.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XTG-Z5HF] (noting that research
on the impact of gender diversity on firms is “mixed,” due in part to “differences in how financial
performance was defined and what methodologies were used”).
99. See Jens Frankenreiter, Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili & Eric Talley, Cleaning Corporate
P A.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
2),
Governance,
170
U.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3796628
[https://perma.cc/5CZ3-DV8R]
(noting that “several of the most heavily relied-upon governance datasets suffer from inaccuracies
so extensive as to call into question some of the landmark insights of the field”).
100. E.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313–14 (Del. 2015) (“[J]udges are
poorly positioned to evaluate the wisdom of business decisions and there is little utility to having
them second-guess the determination of impartial decision-makers with more information (in the
case of directors) or an actual economic stake in the outcome (in the case of informed, disinterested
stockholders).”).
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consider the views of business consultants and investment banks to lack
empirical rigor, especially when contrary evidence may also exist. But
it is important for decisionmakers and, for that matter, for the
operation of corporate law—a point we will return to in our detailed
discussion later of the business judgment rule. For now, suffice it to say
when faced with the body of the empirical work done thus far, a CEO
and board could rationally conclude that, whatever the literature’s
weaknesses, it shows that a business case for Diversity is present. And
the ability for the CEO and the board to do so rationally has enormous
stakes for the legal protections and discretion that they will have in
terms of the actions taken on that assessment.
Of course, corporate policy cannot be made in a vacuum
consisting of only statistically validated and replicated studies that
dictate with certainty the direction to take. Corporate leaders cannot
wait for an academic consensus about a complex issue in a fastchanging world in which action is required in the here and now. They
are expected to make the best judgment they can based on the
information available to them, however imprecise and imperfect. In
that calculus, they may also consider factors rationally contributing to
the business case for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion learned through
lived experience, both as citizens and business professionals.
B. Governance and Risk Management
In a world of limited quantitative evidence, analytical
arguments bolstered by organizational theory and case studies have
emerged as important building blocks substantiating the business case
for Diversity. For decades, organizational psychologists have held that
cognitive diversity, properly constructed, can lead to superior problem
solving and execution in groups and businesses. 101 Cognitive diversity
101. Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors,
76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1391 (2002). The organizational literature has long suggested that
heterogeneous groups tend to improve the quality of thinking where complex decisionmaking
requires creativity and judgment. See Taylor H. Cox, Sharon A. Lobel & Poppy Lauretta McLeod,
Effects of Ethnic Group Cultural Differences on Cooperative and Competitive Behavior on a Group
Task, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 827, 839 (1991) (finding higher levels of cooperation by groups with more
ethnic diversity); Janet A. Sniezek & Rebecca A. Henry, Accuracy and Confidence in Group
Judgment, 43 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 20 (1989) (finding that
“[t]he more disagreements that group members reported, the more accurate were their group
judgments”); David Rock & Heidi Grant, Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.
4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter [https://perma.cc/DUY7-XRY5]
(“In a nutshell, enriching your employee pool with representatives of different genders, races, and
nationalities is key for boosting your company’s joint intellectual potential.”). See generally Susan
E. Jackson, Consequences of Group Composition for the Interpersonal Dynamics of Strategic Issue
Processing, 8 ADVANCES STRATEGIC MGMT. 345, 354–56 (1992) (discussing group composition and
its relation to issue processing); ALAN C. FILLEY & ROBERT J. HOUSE, MANAGERIAL PROCESS AND
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 115–16 (1969) (explaining how “decisions are made within the unique
frame of reference or ‘psychological set’ of the decisionmaker”).

34

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1:1

can be understood as the variance among people in terms of their
perspective and how they process information—whether it be in terms
of decisionmaking, conflict resolution, problem analysis, or problem
solving. 102 It is not necessarily predicted by factors such as gender,
ethnicity, or age, though each of those factors can and often do shape
the ways members of that group process information as compared to
others outside the group. 103
One of the most popular case applications for cognitive diversity
in the business literature is in corporate governance. Corporate
governance manages the conflicts that arise among shareholders,
boards, and managers. In doing so, it enables an efficient flow of
information and rigor among decisionmakers, 104 increases
transparency and accountability so that performance is rewarded and
poor performance addressed, 105 and ensures that operations align with
the company’s mission. Governance is perhaps most commonly
associated with divisions of power between corporate managers and
owners. But it is not, however, only a structural feature of corporate
operations. It also includes the safeguards embedded in a firm’s
approach to addressing all the complex issues that arise when human
beings collaborate and when there is the potential for some to gain at
the expense of the larger enterprise, a subject some refer to as
managing human capital. 106 For example, corporate boards are largely
required to have a minimum number of independent directors alongside
inside directors. The idea is that independent directors are more likely
to be impartial and vigilant in monitoring C-suite actions than are
corporate insiders with dual roles as executives and directors. 107 Not
only are they able to bring their own expertise to bear, but the logic says
that they will be less directly beholden to the CEO in terms of their
careers and livelihoods.
102. Alison Reynolds & David Lewis, Teams Solve Problems Faster When They’re More
Cognitively Diverse, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/teams-solveproblems-faster-when-theyre-more-cognitively-diverse [https://perma.cc/JBJ4-4SBW].
103. Rachel D. Godsil, Why Race Matters in Physics Class, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 40,
47–49 (2016).
104. Maria Aluchna & Tomasz Kuszewski, Does Corporate Governance Compliance Increase
Company Value? Evidence from the Best Practice of the Board, 13 J. RISK & FIN. MGMT., Oct. 2020,
at 14 (showing “a negative correlation between compliance with the code provisions on board
practice and company value, . . . suggesting that investors do not find the adoption of board
practice a plausible solution for the principal-principal conflict in an environment of concentrated
ownership”).
105. Id.
106. Our own preference is to refer to human beings who labor for corporations as workers or
employees, but we understand the business reason for the term.
107. Gregorio Sánchez-Marín, J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler & M. Encarnación Lucas-Pérez, When
Much Is Not Better? Top Management Compensation, Board Structure and Performance in Spanish
Firms, 21 INT’L J. HUM. RES. MGMT. 2778, 2792–93 (2010) (finding that, generally, “when the
percentage of outsider directors is higher, the earnings of top managers are lower[, which] indicate
that it is positive to allow the board greater independence through the inclusion of outsiders, so
limiting the discretionary power of the top management team and moderating its earnings”).
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Similarly, cognitive diversity—and, for that matter, Diversity—
is often understood as a human-capital-based governance mechanism
premised on the usefulness of “outsider” perspectives and interests.
Most commonly, it is associated with reducing the social pathology of
groupthink. 108 Groupthink is a phenomenon that arises when the urge
to conform or the belief that dissent is itself harmful or unproductive
leads a group of well-intentioned people to make irrational or nonoptimal decisions. 109 In such circumstances, premature consensus and
decisionmaking can arise as individuals self-censor their true opinions
or ideas, and therefore the group accumulates few or no dissenting
views. 110
Groupthink is often explored in the context of corporate boards,
where members may feel pressure to agree with one another or with the
CEO. 111 In its classic iteration, members may not offer perspectives
necessary for the board to achieve the corporation’s strategic interests
or maximize shareholder value. 112 Instead, they submit themselves to
the influence of an autocratic CEO/Chairman, or find themselves
influenced by peer pressure inside the group. 113 As a result, board
members either succumb to apathy and simply go through the motions,
108. Irving Janis first defined “groupthink” in 1972 as “a mode of thinking that people engage
in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for
unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.” IRVING
L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOES 9 (1972). This, in turn, may lead to “incredibly gross miscalculations about both the
practical and moral consequences of their decisions.” Id. at iv.
109. Groupthink, PSYCH. TODAY, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/groupthink (last
visited Sept. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/33XC-6WNT].
110. Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance:
Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
489, 497–500 (1999) (developing a model that links board demography with firm performance); see
also Letter from Anne Simpson et al., Dir. of Glob. Governance, Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2015/petn4682.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RRV-W4BR] (letter from several state investment and pension plans to
the Securities and Exchange Commission stating that diverse boards are beneficial because they
“raise different ideas and encourage a full airing of dissenting views”).
111. But, as discussed below, psychologists examine groupthink in much more varied
situations, and the issue is widely understood even in a corporate context to be one that can
undermine decisionmaking from high-level executives to frontline workers. See, e.g., Marleen A.
O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1257–93 (2003)
(analyzing directors’ role in the Enron scandal to illustrate how intelligent individuals can
succumb to cognitive biases prevailing in corporate cultures); Melanie B. Leslie, Helping
Nonprofits Police Themselves: What Trust Law Can Teach Us About Conflicts of Interest, 85 CHI.KENT L. REV. 551, 564 (2010) (discussing the unique dangers of groupthink in nonprofits); Melissa
L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the Institutional Culture of Family
Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 55, 67–
82 (2010) (analyzing the institutional culture of family courts through the lens of groupthink).
112. Antoine Canet, Groupthink in the Boardroom: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly 3 (June
10,
2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2839855
[https://perma.cc/WX4D-6MWF]
(examining the phenomenon of groupthink in a corporate setting).
113. Id.

36

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1:1

or hubris comes to define their collective decisionmaking such that
members believe every decision they make as a group will indubitably
foster positive results. 114
Against this backdrop, researchers have identified cognitive
diversity, under the proper circumstances, as a prophylactic for
groupthink pathologies. In culturally homogenous spaces, Diversity can
help introduce competing interests, ideas, values, and perspectives into
a more creative and higher quality decisionmaking process. When faced
with complex strategic issues necessitating out-of-the-box thinking,
cognitively diverse groups will be able to leverage a broader range of
information and possible solutions for consideration than homogeneous
groups. 115 And where a board captured by groupthink may cut off early
dialogue and questioning, a Diverse board, comprised of different
personal, professional, and social backgrounds, might instead test
hypotheses and policies brought up by managers and subject all ideas
generated in the group to more rigorous review. 116 This in turn can lead
to vastly different interpretations of data points, along with more
nuanced debate and consideration of alternative strategies and courses
of action. 117 Researchers consequently find that Diversity can lead to
more communication on boards 118 and even more accountability of
management. 119 Similarly, within the organization, diverse opinions
114. PSYCH. TODAY, supra note 109.
115. Jackson, supra note 101, at 361.
116. This observation has been made in the greater finance literature as well, where stock
picking is viewed as at times highly complex art involving complex considerations. In one highly
cited series of experiments conducted in Texas and Singapore, scientists put financially literate
people in simulated markets and asked them to price stocks. The participants were placed in either
ethnically diverse or homogenous teams. The researchers found that individuals who were part of
the diverse teams were 58% more likely to price stocks correctly. Sheen S. Levine, Evan P.
Apfelbaum, Mark Bernard, Valerie L. Bartelt, Edward J. Zajac & David Stark, Ethnic Diversity
Deflates Price Bubbles, 111 PNAS 18524, 18528 (2014).
117. “Heterogeneous groups often invest more time resolving issues that require creativity and
consensus building because of their members’ diverse vocabularies, paradigms, and possible
objectives.” Dallas, supra note 101, at 1396; see also Donald C. Hambrick, Theresa Seung Cho &
Ming-Jer Chen, The Influence of Top Management Team Heterogeneity on Firms’ Competitive
Moves, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 659, 660–82 (1996) (arguing heterogeneity enhances a variety of
competitive behaviors). Variations of this theme have been echoed in the psychology literature,
suggesting that such productive cognitive rigor can arise in settings well beyond the boardroom.
For example, in a study published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, scientists
assigned two hundred people to six-person mock jury panels whose members were either all white
or included four white and two Black participants. The people were shown a video of a trial of a
Black defendant and white victims. They then had to decide whether the defendant was guilty. On
diverse panels, white participants raised more facts related to the case than homogenous panels
and made fewer factual errors while discussing available evidence. If errors did occur, they were
more likely to be corrected during deliberation. One possible reason for this difference was that
white jurors on diverse panels recalled evidence more accurately. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial
Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury
Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 597, 600–01, 606–07 (2006).
118. Dallas, supra note 101, at 1391 (suggesting that “heterogeneous groups share conflicting
opinions, knowledge, and perspectives that result in a more thorough consideration of [policy]”).
119. Studies have, for example, found that the presence of gender diversity can lead to a more
intense focus on whether management is improving the company’s profitability and stock price.
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and perspectives can power reflection and critical thinking on the front
lines of executing corporate policy.
Empirical evidence has also emerged that Diversity can serve as
a useful risk mitigation tool. 120 Studies have argued that Diverse firms,
especially those displaying gender Diversity on their boards, adopt less
risky financial policies than their homogeneous counterparts. 121
Researchers have also compiled data suggesting that gender Diversity
is correlated with a lower likelihood of illegal and fraudulent behavior,
fewer irregularities, and less opacity and vagueness in public filings
and disclosure. 122 Here again, Diversity may play a role through
alternative explanations. It is possible that firms with resources to
invest in gender Diversity may also have the resources (and inclination)
to invest in compliance 123 or that women, as members of
underrepresented groups, are more likely to have arm’s-length
relationships with CEOs and management, prompting more rigorous
scrutiny of financial reports and policy. 124
Perhaps a more direct role for cognitive diversity is in the area
of employment, where a commitment to good DEI practices can also
See, e.g., Maria Encarnación Lucas-Pérez, Antonio Mínguez-Vera, Juan Samuel Baixauli-Soler,
Juan Francisco Martín-Ugedo & Gregorio Sánchez-Marín, Women on the Board and Managers’
Pay: Evidence from Spain, 129 J. BUS. ETHICS 265, 278 (2014) (noting that gender diversity on
boards is associated with connecting executive pay to company performance); see also Adams &
Ferreira, supra note 96, at 292 (finding that “more diverse boards are more likely to hold CEOs
accountable for poor stock price performance”).
120. Gennaro Bernile, Vineet Bhagwat & Scott Yonker, Board Diversity, Firm Risk, and
Corporate Policies, 127 J. FIN. ECON. 588, 602–03, 608 (2018) (stating that homogeneity of
preferences and views among board members could lead to idiosyncratic decisions, free of scrutiny
within the board). Results of this study indicate that both operating performance and asset
valuation increase with board diversity, and the benefits of diverse perspectives among directors
outweigh the potential costs.
121. Id.
122. A study conducted by Cumming, Leung, and Rui in 2015 found that the presence of
women on boards was correlated with lower likelihood of securities fraud, and lower severity of
securities fraud, in Chinese capital markets. Douglas Cumming, T.Y. Leung & Oliver Rui, Gender
Diversity and Securities Fraud, 58 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1572, 1585–87 (2015). In another study, gender
diversity was correlated with more transparency in terms of public disclosure. Ferdinand A. Gul,
Bin Srinidhi & Anthony C. Ng, Does Board Gender Diversity Improve the Informativeness of Stock
Prices?, 51 J. ACCT. & ECON. 314, 336 (2011). Along similar lines, researchers have found that
companies with women directors commit fewer financial reporting mistakes and have fewer
“irregularity-type [financial] restatements, which tend to be indicative of financial manipulation.”
Aida Sijamic Wahid, The Effects and the Mechanisms of Board Gender Diversity: Evidence from
Financial Manipulation, 159 J. BUS. ETHICS 705, 721 (2019).
123. Wahid, supra note 122, at 722.
124. The management literature has found, for example, that gender-diverse boards “engage
in better discussions because women are more willing to discuss issues which seem unpalatable to
an all-male board.” Yu Chen, John D. Eshleman & Jared S. Soileau, Board Gender Diversity and
Internal Control Weaknesses, 33 ADVANCES ACCT. 11, 13 (2016). Diverse boards may as a result
exhibit fewer information asymmetries and as such provide fewer routes for company insiders to
engage in opportunistic behavior prior to public disclosure of material information. See Notice of
Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, 85 Fed. Reg.
80,472, 80,498–99 (Dec. 11, 2020).
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help reduce the likelihood of risks that can arise in the context of
employment discrimination. In 2019 alone, the EEOC reported 23,976
lawsuits on the basis of race and 23,532 claims of gender-based
discrimination. 125 The average employment lawsuit costs a company
$200,000, of which $80,000 goes to the employer’s attorneys’ fees,
$80,000 for the employee’s attorneys’ fees, and $40,000 in settlement to
the employee. 126 Moreover, employment discrimination can attract the
kind of publicity and community activism that may negatively affect
firm value through negative reputational feedback loops, a lesson
learned by commercial giants like Texaco, Coca-Cola—and most
recently, Tesla. 127
Employment discrimination may be less likely where there is a
strong culture of inclusion and a highly Diverse workforce. Scholars
have noted that initial reactions to allegations of racial discrimination
can be defensive, precluding meaningful discussion of the harmful
conduct or racial equity matters more generally. 128 Diverse corporate
staff with experience in addressing such frustrations can minimize this
risk. And to the extent to which DEI policies are written, reviewed, and
implemented by individuals with diverse personal backgrounds and
expertise in Diversity, they are more likely to be effective from the
standpoints of both firm culture and liability-reducing mechanisms.
A similar logic is easily applied to many other situations
involving racially insensitive and illegal behavior. By way of example,
some major companies have faced both criticism and lawsuits for
unlawful environmental practices because they have located operations
that generate the most hazardous pollutants to human health in Black

125. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2019
Enforcement and Litigation Data (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-releasesfiscal-year-2019-enforcement-and-litigation-data
[https://perma.cc/LG7F-W7Y4].
For
a
comprehensive list of summaries of significant cases regarding race and color discrimination
brought by the EEOC, see Significant EEOC Race/Color Cases (Covering Private and Federal
Sectors), U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/initiatives/erace/significant-eeoc-racecolor-casescovering-private-and-federal-sectors (last visited Dec. 30,
2021) [https://perma.cc/YPK6-6A9U].
126. What is the Average Employee Lawsuit Cost to a Company Business?, NAKASE L. FIRM,
https://nakaselawfirm.com/employer-lawyer-employer-defense-attorney-near-me/what-is-theaverage-employee-lawsuit-cost-to-a-company-business/
(last
visited
Dec.
30,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/K47P-2FLT].
127. Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the Directorial Duty
of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 395–97 (2002); see also Joe Hernandez,
Tesla Must Pay $137 Million to a Black Employee Who Sued for Racial Discrimination,
https://www.npr.org/2021/10/05/1043336212/tesla-racial-discrimination-lawsuit (last updated
Oct. 5, 2021, 1:56 PM) [https://perma.cc/C9XC-VWX8].
128. Wade, supra note 127, at 395–97; see also Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock,
Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 255, 257 (1999) (noting that
accountability leads people to overrationalize the rightness of actions to which they are
committed); Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 969 (2017)
(noting how assignments of blame often lead to intense denial and defensive bolstering, making
them seem unfair by the individual receiving the criticism).
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neighborhoods and other communities with poorer populations. 129
Likewise, major financial institutions have been criticized for selective
lending and banking practices that disadvantage Black consumers,
practices that can also expose them to liability under federal and state
statutes such as the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (“ECOA”). 130 Even industries that the public largely
approves of—like grocery chains—have faced adverse publicity for
failing to serve urban communities of color and rural communities in
poverty, thus depriving those communities of access to healthy, quality

129. Recently, the State of New Jersey filed twelve lawsuits against corporations, including
Unilever, whose actions allegedly disproportionately harmed the health and safety of minority and
lower-income communities. Press Release, Dep’t of L. & Pub. Safety, N.J. Off. of the Att’y Gen.,
Attorney General, DEP File 12 New “Environmental Justice” Lawsuits Targeting Polluters in New
Jersey’s
Lower-Income
and
Minority
Communities
(Aug.
27,
2020),
https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases20/pr20200827b.html [https://perma.cc/TEP2-MPHY]. In San
Francisco, three environmental groups filed a lawsuit against Corteva, formerly owned by Dow
Chemical, alleging that the company’s plant violated hazardous waste laws, contributing to the
high levels of asthma and cardiovascular disease of the residents in the mostly Black and Latino
communities near the plant. Press Release, Env’t Integrity Project, Groups File Federal Lawsuit
Against Chemical Plant for Violating Hazardous Waste Laws (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://environmentalintegrity.org/news/groups-file-federal-lawsuit-against-chemical-plant-forviolating-hazardous-waste-laws/ [https://perma.cc/4CQX-B4BG]. Residents near a Marathon
refinery in Detroit sued Marathon Oil Corporation and Marathon Petroleum Corporation, alleging
air, noise, and odor pollution from the refinery. Virginia Gordan, Residents Sue Marathon Refinery
RADIO
(Feb.
23,
2016,
4:55
PM),
over
Pollution,
MICH.
https://www.michiganradio.org/post/residents-sue-marathon-refinery-over-pollution
[https://perma.cc/QL54-QYRD]. The community residing in the area next to the refinery, which is
one of the most polluted areas in the country, is a low-income, minority community. Id.
130. See infra notes 181–175 and accompanying text. Bank of America agreed to pay $335
million to settle allegations brought by the Department of Justice that Bank of America’s
subsidiary, Countrywide, charged higher fees and interest rates to more than two hundred
thousand Black and Hispanic borrowers than white borrowers. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Justice Department Reaches $335 Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending
Discrimination
by
Countrywide
Financial
Corporation
(Dec.
21,
2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-335-million-settlement-resolveallegations-lending-discrimination [https://perma.cc/KY4E-UJE6]. Recently, Wells Fargo agreed
to pay Philadelphia $10 million to settle a lawsuit from 2017 that the city brought against the
bank, alleging that the bank violated the FHA by offering more expensive and riskier mortgages
to Black and Hispanic borrowers than to white borrowers, which led to foreclosures and reduced
city property taxes. Caitlin McCabe, Wells Fargo to Pay Philly $10 Million to Resolve Lawsuit
INQUIRER,
Alleging
Lending
Discrimination
Against
Minorities,
PHILA.
https://www.inquirer.com/real-estate/housing/philadelphia-settles-lawsuit-wells-fargoallegations-discriminatory-mortgage-lending-minorities-20191216.html (last updated Dec. 16,
2019) [https://perma.cc/846E-63M7].
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food choices. 131 The retail industry has also drawn fire for racial
discrimination and profiling practices against customers. 132
In each of these cases, it is rational to assume that the presence
of racially or ethnically diverse corporate staff, coupled with equitable
policies and an inclusive culture, might in many instances result in
different outcomes. Personal experiences affect what facts individuals
see and what problems they recognize. Individuals coming from racially
and geographically diverse communities can share perspectives that
might not be apparent for others. If they lived in, or had friends or
family who lived in, urban or rural food deserts, they could
communicate the human costs, as well as the potential economic upside
of serving affected communities. Individuals with personal experiences
with environmental racism, or racism more generally, might, by way of
examples, be quicker to raise objections to locating factories and
pollutants in Black and Brown communities, or recognize the likely
reputational fallout and risks to shareholder value where their
institutions employed lending or front-office practices that unfairly
disadvantaged or mistreated minority communities.
But gender and racial diversity are not always sufficient to
achieve superior outcomes in all situations. If minorities and women
share the same age, socioeconomic, educational, and geographic
backgrounds as other colleagues in their group, the group may not
necessarily be cognitively diverse enough to achieve superior solutions

131. A study of the fifty largest metropolitan areas in the United States found that 17.7% of
predominantly Black neighborhoods had limited access to supermarkets, while only 7.6% of
predominantly white neighborhoods had limited access. Nathaniel Meyersohn, How the Rise of
Supermarkets Left Out Black America, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/16/business/grocerystores-access-race-inequality/index.html
(last
updated
June
16,
2020,
3:15
PM)
[https://perma.cc/5LUQ-4QDW]. Critics have described this disparity as a result of “supermarket
redlining” by grocery chains. Id. Kroger faced a boycott upon closing its stores in certain
predominantly Black communities, following which these communities were at risk of becoming
food deserts. Alexander Coolidge & Sharon Coolidge, Jesse Jackson Calls to Expand Kroger Boycott
over
Its
Shuttering
of
Stores
in
Minority
Neighborhoods,
USA
TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/nation-now/2018/04/10/jesse-jackson-krogerprotest/502688002/ (last updated Apr. 10, 2018, 7:24 PM) [https://perma.cc/L99S-BT6L].
132. Aimee Green, ‘Shopping While Black’ Lawsuits Accuse Portland Area Retailers of
Discrimination,
OREGONIAN,
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2018/06/shopping_while_black_lawsuits.html (last updated
Jan. 30, 2019, 12:35 AM) [https://perma.cc/C5MH-CYZM] (reporting that a Black man filed a racial
discrimination lawsuit against Walmart, alleging that the store clerk accused him of stealing);
Neil Vigdor & Elisha Brown, Walmart Says It Will No Longer Lock Up African-American Beauty
Products, N.Y. TIMES , https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/business/walmart-black-hair-beautyproducts.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/BV5B-8SZP (explaining that Walmart
was also hit with a federal discrimination lawsuit for locking up beauty care products for Black
women in glass cases, following which the company stated that it will end this practice); Nadra
Nittle, Moschino Has Been Accused of Using the Code Word “Serena” to Refer to Black Shoppers,
VOX (Jan. 16, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2019/1/16/18185696/moschino-codeword-serena-black-shoppers-racism [https://perma.cc/BAX2-YA7E] (describing a former
employee’s racial discrimination lawsuit against Moschino, alleging that the staff used code words
for Black customers).
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for certain problems. 133 It is for that reason we embrace Diversity in its
fullest sense of drawing on the full range of talents in society, including
white people from working and middle-class backgrounds and
Americans from urban, suburban, and rural communities. Put simply,
many kinds of diversity might be important, from socioeconomic status
to professional training and education. Moreover, Diversity can only be
operationalized as an organizational feature if it is accompanied by an
equitable and inclusive culture. Only where people feel like their views
are respected and welcome will they be willing to speak. In the absence
of leadership and corporate structures to support the free exchange of
ideas, members of underrepresented groups can be easily marginalized,
especially when their presence in a large group is modest. In such
circumstances, their very presence can be reduced to tokenism, and
stereotyping could result in barriers to exert influence on decisions in
the group as well as self-doubt. 134 In the absence of an inclusive culture,
a corporation may have Diverse cognitive capital at its disposal, but it
will not be able to deploy that capital in ways that maximize its
success. 135
C. Corporate Reputation
The empirical literature highlighting Diversity and shareholder
value is at times useful, but the evidence is mixed, and how cognitive
diversity relates to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion can be context
dependent. Against this backdrop, it is plausible that a third business
case for Diversity—that of reputational enhancement in light of an
increasingly diverse world—is the most uncontroverted and compelling
for corporate directors and managers. According to this view, many
investors, customers, and employees value Diversity greatly, so much
so that it informs their behaviors. Corporations should thus attempt to
secure strong reputations in Diversity in order to help lower their cost
of capital, secure top talent, and grow revenue. 136
Considerations of shareholder value often begin with a
corporation’s reputation, and for good reason. An important body of
research indicates that “[r]eputation was, is, and always will be of
immense importance to organizations, whether commercial,

133. See Adams & Ferreira, supra note 96, at 306.
134. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 238–40 (1977).
135. See John G. Oetzel, Self-Construals, Communication Processes, and Group Outcomes in
Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups, 32 SMALL GRP. RSCH. 19, 42, 44 (2001).
136. Damion Waymer & Sarah VanSlette, Corporate Reputation Management and Issues of
Diversity, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION AND CORPORATE REPUTATION 471, 473 (Craig E.
Carroll ed., 2013) (noting that the benefits of a favorable reputation include the ability for
corporations “to charge premium prices, attract better applicants, enhance their access to capital
markets, and attract investors”).
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governmental, or not for profit.” 137 Reputations are the means by which
stakeholders interpret corporate brands—and the concomitant
attractiveness of a company’s goods and services to its customers and
clients. 138 They inform how individuals investigate investment
opportunities. 139 And they affect how many prospective employees
judge employers, 140 where customers want to spend dollars, and the
willingness of other businesses to form important alliances. In short,
strong reputations can enable corporations to set premium prices,
attract better job applicants, enhance their access to capital markets,
and attract investors. Reputations thus have important implications for
the profitability of corporations. 141
Diversity, or the lack thereof, comprises one element of a
company’s reputation. 142 The reasons why companies may seek a
reputation as being Diverse, Equitable, and Inclusive are varied, but
many researchers often focus on the signaling function it may provide,
especially to prospective employees. Having a diverse board or
management may convey otherwise unobservable information to the

137. Tom Watson, Reputation Models, Drivers, and Measurement, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK
PUBLIC RELATIONS 339, 339 (Robert L. Heath ed., 2010) (positing that reputation paves the
organizational path to acceptance and approval by stakeholders).
138. “Reputation is[, critically,] multidimensional and can be rooted in a variety of different
performance criteria.” Mary-Hunter McDonnell & Brayden G. King, Order in the Court: How Firm
Status and Reputation Shape the Outcomes of Employment Discrimination Suits, 83 AM. SOCIO.
REV. 61, 64 (2018) (citing Hayagreeva Rao, The Social Construction of Reputation: Certification
Contests, Legitimation, and the Survival of Organizations in the American Automobile Industry:
1895–1912, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE: COMPETITIVE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR) 29,
30 (1994)). “The same organization can have a positive reputation in one domain, such as product
quality, and yet have a weak or negative reputation in another domain, such as treatment of
employees.” Id.; see also Michael L. Barnett, John Jermier & Barbara A. Lafferty, Corporate
Reputation: The Definitional Landscape, 9 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 26, 34 (2006) (synthesizing
prior definitive statements of corporate reputation to define corporate reputation explicitly and
narrowly, distinguished from corporate identity, corporate image, and corporate reputation
capital).
139. Scott Shane & Daniel Cable, Network Ties, Reputation, and the Financing of New
Ventures, 48 MGMT. SCI. 364, 370–71 (2002) (holding that an entrepreneur’s reputation mediates
the effects of social ties on venture finance decisions); Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter,
Investment Banking, Reputation, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON.
213, 217 (1986) (demonstrating that investment bankers, who have reputation capital at stake,
enforce the underpricing equilibrium).
140. See, e.g., Daniel B. Turban & Daniel W. Greening, Corporate Social Performance and
Organizational Attractiveness to Prospective Employees, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 658, 660 (1997) (noting
that the image of an organization affects potential applicants’ initial job decisions).
141. See Waymer & VanSlette, supra note 136, at 479 (finding that the damage to reputation
sustained by companies embroiled in diversity scandals is significant by conducting case studies
of Deloitte, Lowe’s, and Abercrombie & Fitch). This is a point not lost in the literature. See John
C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listing and Stock Market
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002) (discussing
how companies can signal sounder corporate governance by listing in the United States to achieve
higher valuations).
142. See Waymer & VanSlette, supra note 136, at 472.
OF
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public, like how receptive the company is to a diverse workforce, or how
open and inclusive the company’s culture may be. 143
These kinds of signals are important for securing top talent.
Industry surveys consistently show that workplace Diversity ranks
high on job seekers’ list of priorities when looking for a job, with nearly
half of all Americans indicating that diverse workplaces are important
to them. The pull of diversity is, however, strongest among Millennials
and Generation Xers, who together account for over two-thirds of
today’s labor force. 144 In one recent survey by ZipRecruiter, 86% of
respondents identified workplace diversity as a top consideration,
placing it among the top three job search criteria, along with salary and
schedule flexibility. 145 Millennials are even likely to stay nearly twice
as long as their average 2.8-year tenure at a company that fosters
DEI. 146 To some extent, this reflects the greater Diversity of youngeraged people in the United States, though not entirely. Although women
tend to favor workplace Diversity more than men, and Black, Latino,
and Asian employees more than whites, clear majorities of men and
whites have been found in studies to consider DEI to be important
workplace considerations. 147
Reputations for strong Diversity can also be helpful in securing
and keeping customers and clients. At least part of many consumers’
purchasing decisions comes from one’s perception as to whether the

143. For a general overview of signaling theory, see Brian L. Connelly, S. Trevis Certo, R.
Duane Ireland & Christopher R. Reutzel Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment, 37 J. MGMT.
39, 40 (2011). But see Broome & Krawiec, supra note 95, at 448 (concluding that the signaling
rationale for board diversity is at its strongest under particular conditions that may not exist in
all corporations at all times).
MILLENNIAL
CAREERS:
2020
VISION
3
(2016),
144. MANPOWERGROUP,
https://www.manpowergroup.com/wps/wcm/connect/660ebf65-144c-489e-975c9f838294c237/MillennialsPaper1_2020Vision_lo.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
[https://perma.cc/E6ALT4S7] (studying nineteen thousand working Millennials and one thousand five hundred hiring
managers across twenty-five countries between February and April 2016).
145. Over 86% of Job Seekers Say Workplace Diversity Is an Important Factor When Looking
for Job, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Nov. 25, 2019, 11:00), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/over-86-of-job-seekers-say-workplace-diversity-is-an-important-factor-when-looking-fora-job-300964115.html [https://perma.cc/6CB4-6ETN]; see also Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis &
David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial
Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1295–98 (2020) (arguing that Millennials also want
to work for companies whose values they share and are acting as employees to call for their
companies to improve their commitment to social responsibility).
146. CISION PR NEWSWIRE, supra note 145.
147. In one Glassdoor survey, for example, 72% of women consider workforce diversity
important versus 62% of men. It also found that 89% of Black respondents, 80% of Asians and 70%
of Latinos said it was important to them. What’s more, a large majority of white respondents say
workforce diversity is important. Press Release, Glassdoor, Two-Thirds of People Consider
Diversity
Important
When
Deciding
Where
to
Work
(Nov.
17,
2014),
https://www.glassdoor.com/about-us/twothirds-people-diversity-important-deciding-workglassdoor-survey-2/ [https://perma.cc/4F3V-7SWJ].
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product or services provider aligns with their values. 148 This has become
more important in today’s world of social activism and with the younger
consumers who are more likely to be “values-driven, not valuedriven.” 149 In a recent survey by Deloitte of both Millennials and Gen
Zers, for example, nearly one-third of Millennial customers stated they
have deepened or initiated relationships with retailers who balance
doing “good” and making a profit. 150
Conversely, bad reputations can be damaging to the firm and
shareholder value. Often this is reflected in lawsuits, a point long
emphasized in the antidiscrimination literature. Litigation arising from
contravening the values of Diversity can lead to the disrepute of the
corporation, which undermines its ability to increase its sustainable
profitability. Verdicts of culpability and liability shape public
perceptions of a firm’s commitment to equality. The publicity that flows
from the very process of regulatory investigations and litigation
produces information on the behavior of the corporation—and parties
to the dispute. 151 This information reaches third parties and affects the
way that outsiders view the corporation and relevant actors regardless
of and beyond the effects of direct legal outcomes. In other words, this
information helps shape the market reaction to alleged misbehavior,
even if the outcome is eventually favorable to the company. 152 Savvy
jobseekers research the company before applying, and workplaces
facing several discrimination lawsuits often observe a chilling effect on
recruiting as top candidates look to less controversial or more
accommodating employers. 153 Investors may decide not to purchase
shares of the company out of principle. Prospective customers may
decide to take their business elsewhere. Other corporations may steer
clear of joint ventures.
148. Olivia Valentine, The Growing Importance of Brand Responses to Equality and Diversity,
WE ARE SOC.: BLOG (July 30, 2020), https://wearesocial.com/blog/2020/07/the-growing-importanceof-brand-responses-to-equality-and-diversity [https://perma.cc/853W-HZEP] (showing that at
least part of consumers’ purchasing decision comes from consideration of whether a brand aligns
with their values).
149. Barzuza et al., supra note 145, at 1284 (arguing that a three-dimensional Millennial
effect—as investors, customers and employees—is an important development with the potential
to provide a counterweight to the wealth-maximization paradigm of corporate governance, and
specifically arguing that institutional investors recognize that attention to issues like Diversity is
attractive to the new generations whose capital they seek to attract).
150. The
Deloitte
Global
Millennial
Survey
2020,
DELOITTE
21
(2020)
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-Deloitte/deloitte-2020millennial-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DZ6-AX76] (exploring the views of more than 27,500
Millennials and Gen Zers to understand their perspectives on business, government, climate, and
the pandemic, among other issues).
151. Roy Shapira, A Reputational Theory of Corporate Law, 26 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 1, 12
(2015).
152. Id.
153. Tia Benjamin, The Ways Discrimination Negatively Affects Businesses, SMALL BUS.
CHRON.
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/ways-discrimination-negatively-affects-businesses36925.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6LMB-WR6P].
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Bad reputations do not, of course, only result from regulatory
actions and litigation. Deloitte’s surveys also made clear that young
consumers will not “hesitate to penalize companies whose stated and
practiced values conflict with their own.” 154 And this is far from an
empty threat in today’s age of social media, where anyone can
congregate and organize against firms, sometimes to devastating effect.
Perhaps one of the most obvious instances of the harm that can possibly
arise was observed in 2018 when Papa John’s founder used a racial
epithet on a conference call and criticized Colin Kaepernick and other
athletes for protesting police brutality; the pizza chain’s sales began to
decline. 155 Competitors, such as DiGiorno and Pizza Hut, engaged in
“Twitter wars” attacking Papa John’s, and a white supremacist website
crowned Papa John’s as the “official pizza of the alt-right,” bringing
even more negative attention to the worsening reputation of Papa
John’s. 156 Sales dropped 7.1% for the year, and fourth quarter income
dropped from $22.8 million the prior year to $4.6 million. 157 It was not
the first time that year that reputational consequences would come to
cost a major company: just three months prior, Starbucks had to delay
a marketing push after two Black men were arrested in Philadelphia
after wishing to use the restroom, an event watched over eight million
times on Twitter. The ensuing criticism prompted the company to close
its stores and conduct sensitivity training across many of its locations,
hurting same-store sales and driving profits down over 9%. 158
Domestic demographic changes have worked with globalization
and the free flow of information to increase reputational and business
stakes. The U.S. population—the country’s domestic consumer pool and
workforce—is expected to become more racially and ethnically diverse,
without a single racial majority or ethnic majority by 2055, 159 with
Millennials and Gen Zers comprising the most diverse generational
154. DELOITTE, supra note 150, at 3.
155. Barzuza et al., supra note 145, at 1298.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1299.
158. Tonya Garcia, Starbucks Says Racial Bias Incident Delayed Its Marketing Push, Hurt
WATCH
(June
21,
2018,
8:20
AM),
Same-Store
Sales,
MKT.
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/starbucks-says-racial-bias-incident-delayed-its-marketingpush-hurt-same-store-sales-2018-06-20 [https://perma.cc/E2Z3-G9MG]; see also Jason Del Rey,
Amazon Employees Are Outraged by Their Company’s Opposition to a Plan to Add More Diversity
to its Board, VOX (May 8, 2018, 12:09 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/5/8/17328466/amazon-jeffbezos-board-diversity-proposal-shareholder-vote [https://perma.cc/6TS4-DX6Z] (reporting that
Amazon was the subject of recent criticism when its board recommended a vote against a proposal
to implement a “Rooney Rule,” which requires the initial list for new director nominees to include
qualified women and minority candidates, citing complex considerations in the process for
nominating director).
159. D’Vera Cohn & Andrea Caumont, 10 Demographic Trends Shaping the U.S. and the
World in 2016, PEW RSCH CTR. (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/03/31/10-demographic-trends-that-are-shaping-the-u-s-and-the-world/
[https://perma.cc/ME5B-Z2YN].
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cohort in U.S. history. 160 Furthermore, the North American workforce
is expected to fall from 5 to 4% of the global workforce in the next two
decades while the populations in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America are set to explode. 161 Experts consequently connect the pursuit
of Diversity with not only cultivating new domestic consumers, workers,
and investors, but also with engaging new foreign stakeholders with
varied cultural values, experiences, and interests.
There is also a growing recognition that collective action by the
business sector to include more Americans in our economy’s benefits
can fuel overall growth for the economy and drive demand in a way that
will increase corporate profits. Citi’s report finds that if racial gaps had
been closed twenty years ago, the U.S. economy could have benefited
from as much as $16 trillion of additional GDP. 162 Based on this
calculation, the report estimates that the closing of the gaps could add
roughly $5 trillion to U.S. GDP through 2025. 163 From a global
perspective, Accenture similarly estimates that if the perception gap of
gender equality between employers and employees was cut in half,
global profits would increase by 33%, including an increase of over $1
trillion by U.S. companies. 164 The businesses in the vanguard of driving
this positive change are the ones most likely to improve their
reputations and secure a larger share of the resulting gains. The
acknowledgement of Diversity as a reputational asset is abundant.
Magazines, from DiversityInc to Working Mother, release surveys sent
to leading corporations from which they derive annual rankings on
issues including recruitment and retention, specific ethnic groups,
LGBTQ+ communities, work-life balance, and more. 165 And major
companies submit materials to be evaluated by these independent
raters and boast when they score well. 166
The importance of independent raters and high Diversity
reputations has grown as institutional investors increasingly focus on
social issues like DEI. As society has become more socially conscious,
new investment funds have emerged, epitomized by the EESG
movement, which attempts to identify corporations that, while
profitable, embrace positive social values like DEI—and adjacent areas
160. Kasey Lobaugh, Bobby Stephens & Jeff Simpson, The Consumer Is Changing . . . but
Perhaps Not How You Think, DELOITTE REV., July 2019, at 102.
161. Patricia Buckley & Daniel Bachman, Meet the US Workforce of the Future, DELOITTE
REV., July 2017, at 47, 57.
162. PETERSON & MANN, supra note 69.
163. Id. at 7.
164. Julie Sweet & Ellyn Shook, The Hidden Value of Culture Makers, ACCENTURE (2020),
https://www.accenture.com/us-en/about/inclusion-diversity/_acnmedia/Thought-LeadershipAssets/PDF-2/Accenture-Getting-To-Equal-2020-Research-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8AVFQHM3].
165. Waymer & VanSlette, supra note 136, at 473 (noting Coca-Cola’s past featuring of its
Diversity rankings on its “About Us” tab on its webpage).
166. Id. at 474.
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such as fair worker treatment, environmental responsibility, and sound
governance. Spurred by high-net-worth clients and pension funds, fund
managers have created offerings designed to allocate assets to
investment funds that make a difference, usually with Diversity as one
of the metrics for assigning scores of portfolio companies. 167 And in the
future, the weighting of Diversity is likely to only increase. 168
Part of the impetus behind the EESG sector’s growth has been
financial: the returns thus far have been positive, with EESG funds
largely outperforming the market. 169 But this growth also reflects an
awareness that because investor preferences are themselves diverse,
moral-driven choices can drive market activity and shareholder
returns. Things once considered immaterial, like new information being
introduced into the market concerning a company’s Diversity
performance, can push a company’s stock price higher. 170
167. George Sarafeim, Investors As Stewards of the Commons?, 30 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 10
(2017) (noting that when investors’ pressures are not satisfied through private mechanisms, the
investors will often engage publicly by filing shareholders’ proposals: in 2015, 34% of all
shareholder proposals were EESG related, led by socially responsible investment funds and public
pension funds, followed by activist hedge funds and index funds); JENNA WEINBERG & SIMON
GREER, DIVERSE ASSET MANAGERS INITIATIVE, FIDUCIARY GUIDE TO INVESTING WITH DIVERSE
ASSET MANAGERS AND FIRMS (Apr. 2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/amac-background-damifiduciary-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BWL-NSQH]. But see Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H.
Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG
Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 386 (2020) (arguing that a trustee can engage in ESG
investing only if “(1) the trustee reasonably concludes that the ESG investment program will
benefit the beneficiary directly by improving risk-adjusted return; and (2) the trustee’s exclusive
motive for adopting the ESG investment program is to obtain this direct benefit”).
168. See Lizzy Gurdus, Diversity, Inequality Metrics Will See ‘A Lot of Scrutiny’ Next Year as
ESG
Investing
Grows,
MSCI
Says,
CNBC
(Dec.
19,
2020,
10:26
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/diversity-under-scrutiny-as-esg-investing-grows.html
[https://perma.cc/M9PB-CZUG] (noting how companies are going to get more creative about how
they can better beef up their social credentials with investors).
169. Emiliano Rabinovich, ESG Equity Index Performance in the US: Outperformance vs. the
Benchmark During Market Volatility, ETF TRENDS (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.etftrends.com/esgchannel/esg-equity-index-performance-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/VW7C-HCVP] (noting that
although the magnitude of the outperformance varies among the different ESG index providers, it
is important to note that each has beaten the benchmark over time and has done so consistently,
regardless of ESG methodology or ESG data provider).
170. One Stanford study canvassed shareholder reactions to nearly sixty gender Diversity
announcements that publicly traded firms in the technology and finance sectors made between
2014 and 2018. The study measured each firm’s stock returns on the day of the diversity
announcement, controlling for total U.S. market returns:
In both sectors, stock prices increased more when announcements revealed a higher
level of Diversity. Among tech companies, investors reacted even more positively when
the Diversity numbers trumped those of Google, which researchers identified as the
industry leader. “The results put hard evidence to something a lot of people have
suspected but hadn’t had the data to back up . . . .”
Katia Savchuk, Do Investors Really Care About Gender Diversity?, STAN. BUS. (Sept. 17, 2019)
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/do-investors-really-care-about-gender-diversity
[https://perma.cc/M6ZX-VAT8]; see also David Daniels, Jennifer Dannals, Thomas Lys & Margaret
Neale, Do Investors Value Gender Diversity In Firms?: Evidence from the Field and Lab, SOC’Y FOR
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING (2019), https://www.sjdm.org/presentations/2019-Talk-DannalsJennifer-diversity-event-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/NE73-DCAP]. It also tends to contradict long-
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With demand for socially conscious offerings growing, EESG
ratings have proliferated, and corporations face growing pressure to
achieve and then maintain strong rankings or “scores.” 171 If a company’s
stock is designated an “unsustainable asset” due to its failure to adopt
measures consonant with EESG credentials or priorities like Diversity,
corporate officers and directors face the prospect of their company’s
stock being excluded from investment portfolios. 172 And for many
companies, the consequences could be material. If a sufficient number
of investors are then excluded from accessing the fund, or if a sufficient
number of funds act in concert based on a score, or series of scores, the
price of a company’s stock can fall as demand falls—or other investors
could even short the company’s stock, putting downward pressure on its
share price. 173
*
*
*
For all the reasons we have addressed, we therefore believe that
a plausible, indeed sound, business rationale exists for businesses to
cultivate collaboration by diverse minds; value merits-based factors
instead of social origins; and welcome working with customers,
communities, and partners from all segments of society and the globe.
These businesses will be better positioned to thrive in what is itself an
increasingly diverse world economy.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT REFORMS TO ENCOURAGE CORPORATE
DIVERSITY, EQUITY, AND INCLUSION
The private sector’s growing awareness of the business
advantages of Diversity, the ethical values of business leaders, and the
anticipation of the demographic changes coming in the United States
have already led some corporations to adopt voluntary DEI policies. But
it has been above all the national reckoning with the death of George
Floyd and the disparate effects of the COVID-19 pandemic that have
led to concrete policy initiatives being announced across the country
aimed at increasing Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion within corporate
organizations. Widespread moral outrage and a cultural awakening has
standing arguments that social disclosures are merely “therapeutic” and not useful to investors.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1797 (2011).
171. Richa Joshi, Board Diversity: No Longer Optional, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Oct. 11, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/11/board-diversity-nolonger-optional/ [https://perma.cc/3XWP-BW97] (discussing results of pressure to improve board
diversity through recent laws and institutional investors).
172. See Robert Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. B. REV., May–
June 2019, at 106 (observing that as it “becomes clear that the people who decide whether to buy
or sell a company’s stock have internalized ESG into their calculations, the business leaders will
be forced to do the same within their companies”).
173. See Chris Sloley, How Ethical Is It to Short the Bad Boys of ESG?, CITYWIRE SELECTOR
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://citywireselector.com/news/how-ethical-is-it-to-short-the-bad-boys-ofesg/a1283784 [https://perma.cc/Z5KE-E395] (examining whether investors should actively short
such stocks to further punish socially problematic players).
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catalyzed both new government activism and corporate action to
improve the DEI of corporate America.
In this Part, we survey the most high-profile efforts to jumpstart
DEI within corporate America. We start, however, with an analysis of
the limitations of legacy antidiscrimination laws geared towards
advancing racial and economic equality. We then catalogue a growing
number of corporate Diversity initiatives: California state reforms
aiming for diversity, Nasdaq’s board diversity initiative, and capital
markets initiatives spearheaded by pension and investment funds. As
will be seen below, most reforms are aimed at either reforming
perceived inadequacies in corporate law to reflect the potential value of
Diversity or leveraging securities law to enable greater transparency of
board-level Diversity. We explain, however, that although these
initiatives represent fresh and much-needed thinking about the
demographic dilemma facing corporations, they offer in practice limited
and incomplete answers to the profound challenge of corporate
inequality and fail to address the full range of DEI issues involved in
corporate conduct toward all stakeholders.
A. Federal Antidiscrimination Laws
Calls for reform of corporate entities are not arising in a vacuum,
and it is important to understand the preexisting legal backdrop
against which they operate. Critically, a range of federal laws require
corporations, as a matter of basic compliance, to implement policies and
practices that attend to DEI, which are supplemented by comparable
state laws. 174 For example, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), which
amended the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, prohibits employers
from sex-based wage discrimination between men and women who are
in substantially equal positions. 175 One year later, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 which further broadened the scope of federal
antidiscrimination laws and banned practices that have a disparate
impact on protected groups, unless these practices can be justified by a
legitimate business reason. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”) in particular prohibits discrimination not only based on sex
but also based on race, color, religion, or national origin, and applies to
any employer who has fifteen or more employees. 176 In addition, Title II
174. Most states, and some cities, have their own antidiscrimination laws, which extend
prohibitions against discriminatory conduct to additional categories of protected persons. The New
York State Human Rights Law, for example, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, military status, familial status, marital status, domestic violence victim status, and
arrest and conviction status. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2021).
175. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Substantially equal positions are
positions that require “equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions.” Id.
176. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race,
color, religion, or national origin that denies a person “the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” 177 Public
accommodation is defined broadly to include facilities such as hotels,
restaurants, and theaters. 178
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 then strengthened
antidiscrimination laws in the wake of several controversial
decisions, 179 giving plaintiffs the right to trial by jury and compensatory
and punitive damages for intentional discrimination under Title VII. In
addition to federal laws, employers must adhere to the
antidiscrimination laws that have been adopted by most states. 180
In response to systemic racial segregation and in the wake of
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s, assassination, Congress passed the FHA in
1968 to prohibit discrimination in housing transactions based on race,
color, religion, and national origin, and, as amended, sex, disability, and
family status. 181 The U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) enforce the
FHA, and individuals may file lawsuits under the FHA as well. 182 In
addition to the FHA, Congress passed the ECOA in 1974, which, as
amended, prohibits creditors from discriminating against applicants
based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, family status, or
age. 183 Despite the FHA and ECOA, housing discrimination against
Black Americans continued as financial institutions used the deposits
they accepted from inner cities to lend and invest in other
neighborhoods. 184 The practice of denying credit to an eligible applicant
based on the neighborhood in which the applicant resided, referred to
177. Id. § 2000a(a).
178. Id. § 2000a(b).
179. An analysis of the Supreme Court cases is beyond the scope of this Article, but for a brief
history on the genesis of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief
Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994); and David A.
Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 8 LAB. LAW. 849 (1992).
180. For a state-by-state summary of antidiscrimination laws, see State Employment-Related
Discrimination
Statutes,
NAT’L
CONF.
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(July 2015), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/employ/Discrimination-Chart-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MB3A-EWDQ].
181. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (also known as Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968); History of Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history (last visited Dec.
30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/S7FD-8FTC]. For a discussion on the effectiveness of the FHA since its
enactment in 1968, see Paula A. Franzese & Stephanie J. Beach, Promises Still to Keep: The Fair
Housing Act Fifty Years Later, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1207 (2019).
182. Aleatra P. Williams, Lending Discrimination, the Foreclosure Crisis and the Perpetuation
of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Homeownership in the U.S., 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 601,
612 (2015).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
184. See Griffith L. Garwood & Dolores S. Smith, The Community Reinvestment Act: Evolution
and Current Issues, 79 FED. RSRV. BULL. 251, 251 (1993) (discussing the historical background
leading to the CRA’s enactment).
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as “redlining,” led to the enactment of the Community Reinvestment
Act (“CRA”) in 1977 to encourage financial institutions to meet the
credit needs of the communities in which they are located. 185
Notably, the damages from violating these rules can be
substantial. Most employment discrimination cases under Title VII, for
example, can be brought under traditional class actions under Rule 23
of the Federal Procedure Act along with violations of ECOA. 186
Meanwhile, violations of the EPA are brought as collective actions,
which though requiring that all plaintiffs consent, can be larger
monetarily, as can administrative actions taken by agencies like the
EEOC to punish actors for systemic discrimination. 187
For the purposes of corporate diversity, however, the reach of
federal civil rights laws is subject to considerable constraints, especially
as it pertains to corporate boards. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964
makes it illegal to discriminate in employment practices, it does not
apply to corporate board membership because board members, with the
exception of the corporate insiders who serve, 188 are usually not
employees. 189 In fact, courts routinely hold that the statute does not
apply to corporate directors. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has put it: “Directors are traditionally employer rather
than employee positions.” 190
The upshot is that nondiscrimination laws apply to firms, and to
hiring and promotion, but as one moves toward top-level corporate
governance, where in some instances board Diversity may be most
important, it ceases to have as much applicability. It does, however,
apply to the C-suite, though as discussed above, other issues including
185. See id.
186. For a summary of selected actions brought by the EEOC alleging systemic discrimination
in hiring, see Selected List of EEOC Systemic Hiring Resolutions and Filings Since 2005 (as of
4/18/12), U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/selected-list-eeocsystemic-hiring-resolutions-and-filings-2005-41812
(last
visited
Dec.
30,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/2A2W-ZMME].
187. For data on the total number of EPA charges filed with the EEOC, see Equal Pay Act
Charges (Charges Filed with EEOC) (Includes Concurrent Charges with Title VII, ADEA, ADA,
and GINA) FY 1997 – FY 2020, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/equal-pay-act-charges-charges-filed-eeoc-includes-concurrentcharges-title-vii-adea-ada (last visited Dec. 30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/749H-5C27].
188. James A. Fanto, Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Justifying Board Diversity, 89
N.C. L. REV. 901, 902 (2011).
189. As Fanto et al. have noted, the Supreme Court has set forth guidelines for determining
when a board member should be considered an employee. Id.; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology
Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449–51 (2003). A typical board member will not be considered
an employee. See Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Who Counts?: The United States
Supreme Court Cites “Control” as the Key to Distinguishing Employers from Employees Under
Federal Employment Antidiscrimination Laws, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 761, 787 (“The language
in the EEOC guidance indicates that principals must overcome a presumption that they are
employers.”).
190. Chavero v. Loc. 241, Div. of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 787 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th
Cir. 1986).
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social networking and internal advancement obstacles have been found
to stymie women and ethnic minorities as a group in terms of both
getting hired by, and climbing, corporate hierarchies.
In response to these gaps, Congress has weighed in on the
importance of improving board transparency on DEI issues. In 2017,
Representative Carolyn Maloney introduced the Gender Diversity in
Corporate Leadership Act of 2017, which would require public
companies to provide proxy disclosure regarding the gender Diversity
of directors and nominees. 191 In November 2019, the U.S. House of
Representatives, with bipartisan support, passed the Corporate
Governance Through Diversity Act of 2019, which requires certain
registrants to annually disclose the racial, ethnic, and gender
composition of their boards and executive officers, as well as the veteran
status of any of those directors and officers, in their proxy
statements. 192 The bill also requires the disclosure of any policy, plan,
or strategy to promote racial, ethnic, and gender Diversity among these
groups. Legislators have proposed a companion bill in the U.S.
Senate. 193
B. SEC Board Diversity Disclosure Rules
Like Congress, the SEC has attempted to address the issue of
DEI in corporate governance. In 2009, the SEC adopted a rule designed
to assess individual companies’ commitment to establishing and
maintaining Diversity on their board. 194 Under the rule, public
companies are required to disclose whether diversity is a factor in
considering candidates for nomination to the board of directors and how
the company assesses how effective the policy has been. 195 But, as
Laurence Trautman has explained, companies and the SEC diverged in
terms of their interpretations of the rule, with the majority of
companies differentiating “consideration” of Diversity and Diversity
“policy.” 196
191. Gender Diversity in Corporate Leadership Act of 2017, H.R. 1611, 115th Cong. § 2(b)
(2017).
192. Improving Corporate Governance Through Diversity Act of 2019, H.R. 5084, 116th Cong.
§ 2 (2019).
193. Improving Corporate Governance Through Diversity Act of 2019, S. 360, 116th Cong.
(2019).
194. For an excellent overview of the 2009 rule, see Laurence Trautman, Corporate Boardroom
Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking About This?, 17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC.
JUST. 219 (2015).
195. Id.; see also Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Speech at the
Hispanic Association of Corporate Responsibility—Corporate Directors Summit: An Update on
Diversity
and
Financial
Literacy
(Apr.
30,
2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch043011laa.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q2DU-6GX5]
(discussing the 2009 Rule).
196. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lissa Lamkin Broome, Board Diversity and Proxy Disclosure, 37 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 39, 74 (2011).
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A decade later, the Commission revisited the rules by
establishing new Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations
(“C&DI”). 197 The revisions did not, however, provide a definition of
Diversity, leaving issuers free to refrain from disclosing the race,
ethnicity, or gender of their directors or nominees. 198 Instead of
identifying what criteria constitute Diversity, a non-exhaustive list of
examples of Diverse characteristics was provided, including “race,
gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, disability, sexual orientation, or
cultural background.” 199 Meanwhile, the issuer’s description of a
company’s Diversity policy would be relied on as an explanatory tool
providing “a discussion of how the company considers the self-identified
diversity attributes of nominees as well as any other qualifications its
diversity policy takes into account, such as Diverse work experiences,
military service, or socioeconomic or demographic characteristics.” 200
Currently, Item 401(e)(1) of Regulation S-K requires a company
to “briefly discuss the specific experience, qualifications, attributes or
skills that led to the conclusion that the person should serve as a
director.” 201 The C&DI clarifies that if a board considered a director’s
self-identified Diversity characteristics (e.g., race, gender, ethnicity,
religion, nationality, disability, sexual orientation, or cultural
background) during the nomination process, and the individual
consents to disclose those Diverse characteristics, the Commission
“would expect that the company’s discussion required by Item 401
would include, but not necessarily be limited to, identifying those
characteristics and how they were considered.” 202
Along with requiring companies to indicate whether Diversity is
considered when identifying director nominees (and if so, how), Item
407(c)(2)(vi) of Regulation S-K requires companies to indicate if the
board or nominations committee has adopted a Diversity policy,
describe how the policy is implemented, and assess its effectiveness. 203
The Commission’s logic was one that sought maximum flexibility for
firms given the fact that
companies may define diversity in various ways, reflecting different perspectives. For
instance, some companies may conceptualize diversity expansively to include differences
of viewpoint, professional experience, education, skill and other individual qualities and
197. For an overview of the C&DI, from which this discussion is partially based, see Notice of
Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Exchange Act
Release No. 90547, 2020 WL 7226158 (Dec. 4, 2020).
198. Id.
199. Regulation S-K: Compliance & Disclosure Interpretations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/regs-kinterp.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/8AVH-QDNJ].
200. Id.
201. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(e)(1) (2019).
202. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 199.
203. Id.
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attributes that contribute to board heterogeneity, while others may focus on diversity
concepts such as race, gender and national origin. 204

In the view of the Commission, and in light of such diversity in
Diversity, companies should be allowed to define Diversity in ways that
they consider appropriate.
Critics have, however, asserted that the flexibility provided
under the rule has rendered it, if not meaningless, then gravely
ineffective. For one, the self-executing nature of the disclosures,
combined with the substantive voluntariness of embracing Diversity
policies, has meant that the data reported have been unreliable and of
minimal utility to investors. Not only have public companies failed to
disclose much information about their boards, but there has been little
uniformity in what is reported or the definitions of Diversity
characteristics across companies. Some policymakers have, as a
consequence, urged reforms of Regulation S-K to require data and
reporting regarding gender and racial diversity on corporate boards. 205
C. State Law Initiatives
In addition to federal rules, states have turned their attention to
laws that go beyond antidiscrimination. The legislatures in
Michigan, 206 Pennsylvania, Hawaii, and Massachusetts are working on
bills that, if passed, would nudge (and in some instances require)
employers to increase Diversity in leadership positions, especially
boards of public corporations. Only two states, California and New
York, have passed legislation imposing such duties. Below, we examine
their key features.
1. California’s Board Diversity Laws
California has passed two separate board diversity statutes, one
aimed at gender diversity, the other focused on racial, ethnic, and
sexual orientation diversity. First, on September 30, 2018, thenCalifornia Governor Jerry Brown approved Senate Bill 826 (“SB 826”),
which mandated “female representation on California-based

204. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,344 (Dec. 23, 2009) (codified at
17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401, .402, .407).
205. See Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Council of
Institutional Investors Fall 2020 Conference: Diversity Matters, Disclosure Works, and the SEC
Can Do More (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-cii-2020-conference-20200922
[https://perma.cc/T8DR56UA] (arguing that the materiality-based disclosure system is “not
standardized, not consistent period to period, not comparable across companies, and not
necessarily reliable”).
206. S. 115, 2019 Leg., 100th Sess. (Mich. 2019) (“[A] publicly held domestic corporation or
foreign corporation whose principal executive offices, according to the corporation’s SEC 10-K
form, are located in this state must have a minimum of 1 female director on its board.”).
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companies’ corporate boards.” 207 Two years later, California Governor
Gavin Newsom approved Assembly Bill 979 (“AB 979”), mandating a
similar requirement whereby public companies headquartered in
California must “diversify their boards of directors with directors from
‘underrepresented communities.’ ” 208 Both SB 826 and AB 979 apply to
publicly held companies which are headquartered in the state of
California, and both impose mandatory Diversity requirements beyond
merely disclosing board composition.
SB 826 requires that, by the end of 2021, every
publicly held domestic or foreign corporation whose principal executive offices . . . are
located in California . . . adhere to a schedule whereby boards of six or more have three or
more female directors; boards of five have two or more female directors, and boards of four
or fewer have one or more female directors. 209

The legislation grants the California Secretary of State authority to
enforce violations of the law by either (1) publishing a list of companies
who are compliant or non-compliant or (2) imposing fines on companies
who failed to disclose board composition. In the case of monetary fines,
the quantum to be assessed for an initial violation is $100,000; $300,000
is to be assessed for every subsequent violation. 210
AB 979 is a parallel law with similar provisions, though with a
broader scope. Specifically, AB 979 defines “director from
underrepresented community” as “an individual who self-identifies as
Black, African American, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander,
Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaska Native, or who selfidentifies as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender.” 211Its mandatory
quotas state that
[publicly held corporations with executive offices in California] must have at least one
director from an underrepresented community on their boards by December 31, 2021. By
December 31, 2022, covered corporations with boards of nine or more directors must have
a minimum of three directors from underrepresented communities on their boards, and
covered corporations with boards of more than four but less than nine directors must have
a minimum of two directors from underrepresented communities. 212

AB 979’s two enforcement mechanisms are identical to those of SB 826.

207. Christopher J. Riley, An Equal Protection Defense of SB 826, CALIF. L. REV.: BLOG (July
2020),
https://www.californialawreview.org/equal-protection-defense-sb826/
[https://perma.cc/7L38-VCF2].
208. Amy Frenzen & Michael Thomas, AB 979 Requires California-Based Publicly Held
Corporations To Diversify Their Boards of Directors, JD SUPRA (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ab-979-requires-california-based-17002/
[https://perma.cc/LT97-BDA4].
209. Riley, supra note 207 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id.
211. Frenzen & Thomas, supra note 208.
212. Id.
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2. New York’s Board Diversity Study and Disclosure Mandate
In December 2019, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed
Senate Bill 4278 (“SB 4278”), which enacts the “Women on Corporate
Boards Study.” 213 Similar to the California bills, SB 4278 mandates that
“domestic and foreign corporations ‘authorized to do business’ [in New
York]” abide by board composition reporting mandates. Under the law,
both private and public corporations—regardless of whether they are
headquartered in the state—must disclose the number of directors they
appoint to their board and how many of those directors are female. “The
information will be collected as part of the corporation’s filing statement
required by the Business Corporation Law.” 214 New York’s Department
of State and Taxation and Finance Departments are then charged with
studying the number of women directors who serve on each board of
directors of domestic corporations and foreign corporations licensed to
do business in New York state.
The initial results of the study will be published on February 1,
2022, likely leading to more concrete action. In its current state, the bill
does not impose any quotas and does not mandate a specific number of
women to be on the boards of corporations that do business in New
York.
D. Market “EESG” Initiatives
Private market participants are also driving the debate on
corporate Diversity. As shown, people have shown increasing interest
in participating in markets—as either consumers or investors—in ways
that conform with their values. 215 This interest has in turn pushed
varying market participants to adopt practices and stances that reflect
these changing, and intensifying, preferences, especially given the datadriven nature of investment products such as Diversity-specific indices
and broader EESG funds. 216
213. Teri Wilford Wood & Anna Broccolo, New York Enacts Legislation Related to Board
Diversity, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-york-enactslegislation-related-to-board-diversity [https://perma.cc/A75Q-5REP].
214. John Whittaker, Act Requires Report Stating No. of Women on Boards, POST-J. (July 15,
2019),
https://www.post-journal.com/news/page-one/2019/07/act-requires-report-stating-no-ofwomen-on-boards/ [https://perma.cc/B7QQ-26K6].
215. Barzuza et al., supra note 145, at 1249–50:
When it comes to investment preferences, Millennials are markedly different than their
predecessors. The literature and market research unanimously concludes that,
compared to prior generations, Millennials are less interested in investment returns
and more interested in their investments reflecting their social values;
id. at 1289–94 (citing studies supporting this conclusion).
216. Dave Michaels, SEC Urged to Help Diversify Asset-Management Industry, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-criticized-for-inaction-in-diversifying-asset-managementindustry-11594945813 (last updated July 16, 2020, 8:37 PM) [https://perma.cc/Y7F2-D5EC].
Notably, however, other compelling theories are emerging as to just why funds should consider
Diversity as a matter of portfolio theory. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Stewardship 34 (Eur.
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1. Investment Company Initiatives
Pension funds and investment companies have shown
increasing interest in the topic of Diversity during this century,
especially as to gender. 217 As early as 2009, the SEC sought comment
on whether to amend Item 407(c)(2)(vi) of Regulation S-K to require
disclosure of whether a nominating committee considers Diversity
when selecting a director for a position on the board. 218 Of the more
than 130 comment letters on its proposal, most were submitted in favor
of the proposal by groups with a specific interest in Diversity or by
institutional investors, including mutual funds, pension funds, and
socially responsible investment funds. 219 Several years later, in 2015,
nine large public pension funds who at the time collectively supervised
$1.12 trillion in assets petitioned the SEC to require registrants to
disclose information related to, among other things, the gender, racial,
and ethnic Diversity of the registrant’s board nominees. 220 In 2017,
Human Capital Management Coalition, which described itself as a
group of institutional investors with $2.8 trillion in assets at the time,
made a similar petition to the Commission. 221

Corp.
Governance
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
566/2021,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3782814
[https://perma.cc/ML5U-8GEU]
(observing that “[h]igh end talent is valuable and scarce; elimination of barriers to its discovery
and utilization will create value across a portfolio”).
217. The reality is that it took the sad events of 2020 to move the major institutional investors
to make a focus on racial Diversity a priority. See, e.g., Larry Fink & Rob Kapito, Our Actions to
(June
22,
2020),
Advance
Racial
Equity
and
Inclusion,
BLACKROCK
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/social-impact/advancing-racial-equity
[https://perma.cc/GQA9-ZWJA]; Letter from Richard F. Lacaille, Glob. Chief Inv. Officer, State St.
Glob. Advisors, to Ronald P. O’Hanley, Bd. Chairman, State St. Glob. Advisors (Aug. 27, 2020),
https://www.ssga.com/library-content/pdfs/global/letterhead_racial_equity_guidance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EQ7W-P77Z]; Vanguard Investment Stewardship Insights: Diversity in the
(Dec.
2020),
https://about.vanguard.com/investmentWorkplace,
VANGUARD
stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/ISWORK_122020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4M6MH6KH]. The reasons for this lag warrant exploration, but for present purposes, we just note the
positive development that racial Diversity has now emerged as a stated institutional-investor
priority. We also note, however, that there is still more work that institutional investors should do
to combat racial injustice, such as casting their proxies for proposals requiring corporations to
disclose political spending, as such spending often supports candidates and political issues that
are contrary to the interests of minorities. See Eleanor Bloxham & Bruce F. Freed, It’s Time for
Boards and Institutional Investors to Act on Racial Justice, BARRON’S (June 19, 2020: 7:00 AM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/its-time-for-boards-and-institutional-investors-to-act-on-racialjustice-51592527239 [https://perma.cc/9TRU-NZ4X].
218. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2021).
219. See Hazen & Broome, supra note 196, at 51 & n.82 (citing the comment letters).
220. Letter from Anne Simpson et al. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 110.
221. See Letter from Meredith Miller, Chief Corp. Governance Officer, UAW Retiree Med.
Benefits Trs., on behalf of the Hum. Cap. Mgmt. Coal., to William Hinman, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin.,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 6, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2017/petn4-711.pdf
[https://perma.cc/62VY-928Y] (petition for rulemaking “to require issuers to disclose information
about their human capital management policies, practices and performance”).
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Nearly a half decade later, pressured by not only its members
facing investor pressure and enhanced interest in EESG funds, but also
by ratings companies seeking to design systems for categorizing firms,
the investment community is once again calling for more information
on diversity from companies. In October 2020, the Illinois Treasurer
spearheaded an initiative along with twenty other investor
organizations, calling on all companies in the Russell 3000 Index to
disclose the composition of their board, including each board member’s
gender, race, and ethnicity. 222 That same month, BlackRock Inc., the
world’s largest asset manager, announced plans for 2021 to push
companies for greater ethnic and gender Diversity for their boards and
workforces, and disclosed that it will vote against directors who fail to
act to promote that goal. The money manager, which oversees more
than $7.8 trillion of assets, is asking U.S. companies to disclose the
racial, ethnic, and gender makeup of their employees—data known as
EEO-1—as well as measures they’re taking to advance diversity and
inclusion. 223 It will also make explicit pushes for Diversity in select
jurisdictions. 224 Meanwhile, Vanguard—with over $7.2 trillion in assets
under management—has said it plans to vote against company
directors who fail to push for greater racial and gender diversity on
their boards. 225 State Street Global Advisors, which manages about $3
trillion for clients, has committed to ask companies about their metrics
and goals to boost racial Diversity within their ranks.
Against this backdrop, the ICI, the trade association for U.S. and
international investment companies like mutual funds, closed-end
funds, exchange-traded funds, and unit investment trusts, has likewise
announced plans to push for greater Diversity. Initial priorities include
measuring industry demographics at both the board and workforce
222. See Press Release, Off. of the Illinois State Treasurer, Illinois State Treasurer Frerichs
Calls on Russell 3000 Companies to Disclose Board Diversity Data (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://illinoistreasurergovprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/twocms/media/doc/october2020_russe
ll3000.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLS6-BCNB].
223. Saijel Kishan, BlackRock to Push Companies on Racial Diversity in 2021, BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-10/blackrock-plans-to-push-companies-onracial-diversity-in-2021?sref=rBZIhbhK
(last
updated
Dec.
10,
2020,
9:06
AM)
[https://perma.cc/DJ95-YU9V]; see also Fiona Hathorn, Cultural Diversity on Boards Is a Global
Issue, WOMEN ON BDS. (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.womenonboards.net/en-au/impactmedia/news/cultural-diversity-on-boards-is-a-global-issue [https://perma.cc/WS6F-TDV8].
224. For example, BlackRock U.K. companies are to adopt the Hampton-Alexander Review
target for female directors in the U.K.’s top businesses—the minimum threshold for this target is
33% female board composition or greater. Tessa Hastie & Ariel White-Tsimikalis, Findings of the
SUPRA
(Feb.
25,
2021),
Final
Hampton-Alexander
Review,
JD
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/findings-of-the-final-hampton-alexander-1380319/
[https://perma.cc/USS6-A69F].
225. Saijel Kishan, Vanguard to Push Companies on Racial Diversity Next Year, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 15, 2020, 10:47 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-15/vanguard-topush-companies-on-racial-diversity-next-year [https://perma.cc/8HVW-G6M5]; see also John
Galloway, A Continued Call for Boardroom Diversity, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Dec. 19, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/19/a-continued-call-for-boardroomdiversity [https://perma.cc/47FC-AQCJ].
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levels through mandatory surveys of members. 226 This information will
then be used to develop benchmarks to improve Diversity in the future.
Once these benchmarks are eventually implemented, it is expected that
there will be more explicit reporting guidelines, and perhaps
requirements, for board diversity similar to those proposed by other
securities industry participants.
2. Nasdaq Listing Requirements
Nasdaq’s new rule (the “Rule”) mandates certain board diversity
requirements for public companies listed under its exchange. 227 The
Rule was submitted on December 1, 2020, for SEC approval, and the
SEC approved the rule August 4, 2021. 228 Under the Rule, each Nasdaqlisted company faces two sets of requirements. First, each listed
company would have to annually disclose in a uniform format, either in
the company’s annual proxy statement or on the company’s website,
statistical information regarding its directors’ self-identified gender,
race, and self-identification as LGBTQ+. Additionally, companies listed
on the Nasdaq Global Select tier or Global Market tier would have to
have (or explain why they do not have) at least one Diverse director
within two years of SEC approval, and at least two Diverse directors
within four years of SEC approval. Smaller-cap companies listed on the
Nasdaq Capital Market tier must have (or explain why they do not
have) at least one Diverse director within two years of SEC approval,
and at least two Diverse directors within five years of SEC approval.
Nasdaq’s rule would presumably have a broad impact,
encouraging thousands of companies listed on its stock exchange to
include women, racial minorities, and LGBTQ+ individuals on their
boards, in what is one of the most forceful moves yet to bring greater
diversity to U.S. corporations. Notably, more than three-quarters of its
listed companies would, in the absence of changes to their board, fall
short of the proposed requirements. 229 Although 80 to 90% of companies
have at least one female director, only approximately one-quarter had
at the time of the rule’s initial proposal a second director who would
226. See Hathorn, supra note 223 (calling for a “new government-led review” to “ensure a
renewed impetus to continue progress on both ethnicity and gender”).
227. Ron S. Berenblat & Elizabeth Gonzalez-Sussman, Nasdaq Proposes New Listing Rules
Relating to Board Diversity, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 13, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/13/nasdaq-proposes-new-listing-rules-related-to-boarddiversity/ [https://perma.cc/7Y6Q-JNNQ].
228. Alexander Osipovic, Nasdaq’s Board-Diversity Proposal Wins SEC Approval, WALL ST.
J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaqs-board-diversity-proposal-faces-sec-decision11628242202 (last updated Aug. 6, 2021, 3:48 PM) [https://perma.cc/XL5W-YNGV].
229. Alexander Osipovich & Akane Otani, Nasdaq Seeks Board-Diversity Rule That Most
Listed Firms Don’t Meet, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaq-proposes-boarddiversity-rule-for-listed-companies-11606829244 (last updated Dec. 1, 2020, 5:26 PM)
[https://perma.cc/3QGK-5QNT].
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meet the Diversity requirements. 230 Overall, smaller companies tended
to have less Diverse boards and will need to do more to respond to the
Rule. 231
3. The Goldman Sachs IPO Pledge
In February 2020, Goldman Sachs announced that it will only
underwrite IPOs for U.S. and European private companies that have at
least one Diverse board member. 232 This rule became effective on July
1, 2020, and starting in 2021, Goldman Sachs will raise its target to
“two diverse candidates for each of [its] IPO clients.” 233 The Diversity
requirement is mandatory, but it is implied that there is discretion as
to what qualifies as “Diverse.” The commitment statement cites
Goldman Sachs’ own board of directors, where the lead director is a
Nigerian man and four of the eleven board seats are held by women.
E. The Limitations of External Regulation and the Corresponding
Need for Corporate Action
Collectively, current U.S. proposals designed to increase
corporate Diversity do so in largely unprecedented ways, with
particular emphasis falling most squarely on corporate boards. They do
so along two basic dimensions: either (a) state law reforms or (b)
reforms that leverage capital markets infrastructures and services
providers.
There are, however, a number of important limitations with the
current trajectory of reforms. First are possible constitutional
challenges. 234 California’s SB 826 has already been challenged on equalprotection grounds in several lawsuits. 235 “In Meland v. Padilla, a

230. Though even here, the data were reportedly difficult to measure because of
inconsistencies in the way companies report such data. Id. Nasdaq defined underrepresented
minorities as individuals self-identifying as Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, or belonging
to two or more races or ethnicities. Id.
231. Id.
232. Goldman Sachs’ Commitment to Board Diversity, GOLDMAN SACHS (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-lending/launch-withgs/pages/commitment-to-diversity.html [https://perma.cc/6CZK-2Z7M].
233. Id.
234. For a summary of possible constitutional challenges to statutes of this kind, see generally
Joseph A. Grundfest, Mandating Gender Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom: The Inevitable
Failure of California’s SB 826 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stan. Univ., Working Paper No.
232, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248791 [https://perma.cc/K4MC-NRWT] (analyzing
constitutionality of AB 826). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, California Corporate-Board Quota
Law Unlikely to Survive a Constitutional Challenge, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.wlf.org/2018/10/02/wlf-legal-pulse/california-corporate-board-quota-law-unlikely-tosurvive-a-constitutional-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/MT8J-PWMW] (arguing that AB 826 is
unconstitutional under the internal affairs doctrine).
235. David A. Bell, Dawn Belt & Jennifer J. Hitchcock, New Law Requires Diversity on Boards
of California-Based Companies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 10, 2020),
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conservative legal organization [unsuccessfully] claimed on behalf of a
public company shareholder that, in requiring a female board member,
the law prevented that shareholder from voting as he desired.” 236 In
another case, Crest v. Padilla, the plaintiff sought to prevent the
California Secretary of State, Alex Padilla, “from spending taxpayer
money to enforce the law on the grounds that it violated the California
constitution by imposing an unconstitutional gender-based quota. In
June, [2020,] a state Superior Court judge overruled Padilla’s argument
that the plaintiffs lacked standing.” 237 The matter is currently in
ongoing litigation, and the Secretary of State’s office will be required to
answer the complaint.
AB 979 will likely be challenged on similar grounds. 238
Opponents of the laws may argue that male candidates, or non-Diverse
candidates, are denied fundamental rights under the Equal Protection
Clause as a result of mandatory diversity quotas. Notably, these
challenges will likely trigger strict scrutiny of these race- and genderbased laws and thus, though remedial in nature and designed to
address a long-standing history of discrimination, the laws will, as we
discuss below, face an uncertain future before the right-wing majority
of the U.S. Supreme Court, and that reality will create dilemmas for
corporate decisionmaking. To the extent to which the law imposes
substantive board requirements on corporations that may be
headquartered in California but incorporated elsewhere, the law could
additionally be challenged on the basis of the internal affairs doctrine,
which provides that the state of incorporation should have the authority
to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs (such as corporate
governance and composition and election of boards).
The Nasdaq reforms create far less uncertainty insofar as they,
although expressing clear objectives, do not introduce mandatory
reforms to boards. Instead, listed firms are required to comply or
explain why they did not meet listing standards. Theoretically,
however, challenges could nonetheless arise if a qualified candidate
seeking a position on a public company’s board argued that he was
deprived of a property interest by being denied a board position
primarily for not meeting “Diverse” criteria under the Rule.
Alternatively, the Rule might be challenged under the internal affairs
doctrine. Under this logic, Nasdaq should not be able to impose federal
guidelines about board composition when state corporate law should
govern its makeup.

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/10/new-law-requires-diversity-on-boards-of-californiabased-companies/ [https://perma.cc/L8HN-XA9P].
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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Still, the most obvious limitation of Nasdaq’s new listing rules—
along with that of the ICI—is that they are ultimately not mandatory.
Instead, a company can choose whatever course of action it wants,
unless other legal constraints arise in some other corner.
Additionally, Nasdaq’s rules, along with the engagement of the
ICI and Goldman Sachs, apply exclusively to public companies. None
apply to private companies. From a public policy perspective, and from
the standpoint of racial equity, this limited scope is problematic. There
are only about half as many public companies in the United States
today as there were in the late 1990s. 239 And promising start-ups are
tending to stay private longer, with elite investors capturing even more
of the biggest gains. 240 By extending only to public companies, the
capital markets–based reforms miss companies where the most value
is created. They also fail to affect firms at a point in time when the
introduction of Diverse boards might likely prove most transformative.
Diversity experts agree that the easiest means of ensuring that firms
are diverse is by making sure that they take steps toward diverse hiring
early on. 241 It is, in short, much easier to ensure Diversity by hiring
Black and Brown people early on, than it is to achieve by scaling and
then taking on Diverse board members with the hope that they can
retroactively change the demographics and culture of the firm. 242
Critically, Nasdaq’s reforms, like virtually all of the major
reforms thus far introduced, focus exclusively on boards. None target
the Diversity of senior and middle management—or the broader
workforce as a whole. The most charitable reading of their scope would
be that they speak to the holes in federal employment discrimination
law. But the bulk of opportunity that corporations provide for
Americans to improve their lives, engage in fulfilling work, and interact
with customers and communities is at the other levels of the firm—
where line workers, middle managers, and contracted workers
collaborate to serve the company’s customers. For reforms at the board
level alone to effectively change corporate demographics at all, they
would at best involve slow, incremental, and not transformational
change—and for even that to occur, consistent board oversight and
involvement must drive the deeper and more comprehensive action
required to ensure that corporate policies toward all stakeholders
embrace respect for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion.
239. Tara Siegel Bernard, Opening the Door to Unicorns Invites Risk for Average Investors,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/your-money/investing-privatemarket-startups.html [https://perma.cc/MP4K-UBQA].
240. Id.
241. See Brian Nordli, How to Make Diversity A Hiring Priority at the Startup Stage, BUILT
IN, https://builtin.com/diversity-inclusion/small-business-diversity-and-inclusion-hiring-strategy
(last updated July 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/XW48-2R7E] (“It’s so hard to course correct once you
go from 50 people to 150-300 . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
242. Id.
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Many of the reforms rely on quotas as drivers of reform. And
while we applaud decisive action at establishing clear goals for
organizations and compelling corporate boards to open long-denied
doors of opportunity, the threat of constitutional challenge is clear. 243
And the outcome, given recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, is
uncertain. 244 Quotas are also gameable. In many instances, the
numerical thresholds are minimal—sometimes just one Diverse
director—and the capaciousness and sheer number of factors that
qualify as Diverse present the opportunity for employers to selectively
target people coming from groups that may be more socially or
personally palatable to hirers instead of from those who are most
historically or demographically underrepresented. Thus, to the extent
they represent check-the-box exercises, quotas allow companies to meet
minimal numerical thresholds and, upon doing so, can unintentionally
encourage them to relax or disengage from further board reform. 245 As
at least currently contemplated, they risk being “half measures.”
Finally, none of the reforms speak to closely allied, but
importantly distinct, concepts of Equity and Inclusion, the “E” and “I”
in DEI. 246 As a result, the reforms do not provide the tools to address
243. A learned colleague posed this hypothetical: Imagine a California-based corporation that
is subject to the “at least three women requirement,” and that has only two women on the board.
A vacancy arises. May or must the board limit its search to only women candidates? Even
assuming it may do so without running afoul of antidiscrimination statutes because directors are
likely not employees covered by those statutes, may the board do so consistent with the federal
Constitution if it is doing so by mandate of state law? As a matter of law compliance, the board
would have to consider its obligations not just under state law, but under federal constitutional
law, and make a difficult calculus about whether these statutes can be applied validly in a context
like this where compliance would literally require only considering women candidates to the
exclusion of all males. And, of course, similar situations could arise to the extent that statutes
were to require a certain percentage of minority representation, or of a particular minority, such
as Black people.
244. As a matter of recent constitutional jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has displayed
little tolerance for federal and state law efforts to remediate past discrimination. Prominent
examples include its decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), striking down key
provisions of the Voting Rights Act that had been extended by overwhelming bipartisan majorities,
and its decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007), striking down a school district’s plan to continue efforts to promote desegregation
and racial balance in its schools after being relieved of federal court supervision. Shelby, 570 U.S.
at 556–57 (holding that the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula and preclearance requirement,
which required covered jurisdictions to demonstrate that proposed voting law changes were not
discriminatory, was unconstitutional); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 729–32 (plurality opinion)
(finding that the use of racial classification to create a racially diverse environment was racial
balancing and thus unconstitutional).
245. We stress, however, that how and under what context quotas are applied matters.
Leaving the constitutional question aside, quotas can plausibly serve to forward a number of
Diversity goals because it is often difficult to make progress on a long-standing inequity without a
reasonable target to aim for and against which to measure the effectiveness of efforts. The
application of strict numerical goals thus far leaves, however, open questions as to whether or not
ostensibly muscular measures like quotas would over time make a measurable impact on the
representation of the most historically underrepresented or persecuted groups.
246. As Nancy Leong recognizes in a similar context, “striving for numerical diversity, without
more,” may result in awareness of diversity “only in its thinnest form—as a bare marker of
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issues beyond board personnel, like ensuring an inclusive environment
to support communication and innovative ideas from Diverse pockets of
the workforce. Goldman Sachs has taken the laudable step of effectively
constraining itself via a voluntarily adopted quota system in which it
will only assist companies with IPOs that meet a basic board-level
diversity threshold. 247 But this new positive standard does not address
less quantifiable issues of corporate culture toward DEI. For example,
Goldman Sachs advised the highly successful crypto exchange Coinbase
in going public, despite moves by Coinbase to limit Black Lives Matter
protests and other communications about racial equity issues within its
workplace, 248 and despite evidence published about the widespread pay
inequity allegedly suffered by Coinbase’s Black and female
employees. 249
Our point is that it is, of course, useful and important to increase
the Diversity of corporate boards and the C-suite. But these issues are
just the beginning, not the end, of the conversation. Unfortunately,
legislating bright line, ex ante commitments to workforce-wide
inclusion, to fairness and equity, to treating fellow employees and
customers with respect regardless of their identity, and to providing
equal service to all communities is difficult. And, perhaps for that
reason, the pending reforms also do not even purport to address issues
like these. They are also silent on other important issues such as the
willingness of corporations to provide their services and products to all
communities who can benefit from them, be they urban communities
with major minority populations or struggling, predominately white
rural communities. 250 They evade any interrogation of issues like
difference and a signal of presence.” Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151,
2155 (2013). Diversity could then be merely a useful word for nondiverse corporations to use to
“acquire social and economic benefits” of listing or incorporation while “avoiding more difficult
questions of racial [and gender] equality.” Id.; see also Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003) (arguing that diversity can be used in ways to avoid questions
on race and class); Stephen M. Rich, What Diversity Contributes to Equal Opportunity, 89 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1011, 1098 (2016) (arguing that the rationale of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003),
underserves equal opportunity “by deferring to institutional constructions of diversity’s benefits,”
naively equating the achievement of numerical diversity with the accomplishment of those
benefits).
247. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 232.
248. Eric Volkman, Goldman Sachs Reportedly Picked to Lead Coinbase IPO, NASDAQ (Dec.
19, 2020, 1:23 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/goldman-sachs-reportedly-picked-to-leadcoinbase-ipo-2020-12-19 [https://perma.cc/3MFz-G5DY]; Gregory Barber, The Turmoil Over ‘Black
Lives Matter’ and Political Speech at Coinbase, WIRED (Oct. 5, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/turmoil-black-lives-matter-political-speech-coinbase/
[https://perma.cc/39RY-PQV5].
249. Nathaniel Popper, Cryptocurrency Start-Up Underpaid Women and Black Employees,
(Apr.
15,
2021),
Data
Shows,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/coinbase-pay-employees.html
[https://perma.cc/2455-BC4A] (“[W]omen at Coinbase were paid an average of $13,000, or 8
percent, less than men at comparable jobs and ranks within the company” and “[Black employees]
were paid $11,500, or 7 percent, less than all other employees in similar jobs.”).
250. See supra Part III.
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corporate recruitment policies, and whether and how corporations
should extend searches to not only historically Black universities but
also to community colleges. And they do not begin to contemplate DEI
commitments corporations should expect or require of the businesses
that they contract with.
For all these reasons, we find it improbable that external law
alone will induce the full scope of required corporate action. At least as
currently conceived, external regulation does not have a method to bake
into the bones of corporations a deep commitment to equality, inclusion,
and tolerance or an ethos of valuing all employees, customers, business
partners, and communities, regardless of race, gender, religion, or
sexual orientation. 251 At best, they encourage boards themselves to be
a bit more representative, which is worthy but should not be oversold
as close to sufficient.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY GOVERNING
CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
As iconic scholars like Adolf Berle and cutting-edge thinkers like
Elizabeth Anderson have made clear, corporations occupy a central role
in the lives of most Americans. 252 Much of our lives are spent under the
dominion of our employers. 253 Whether we are respected and are treated
as worthy of equal respect with each other during our time at work is
critical to whether we have a life that is fulfilling. Likewise, for better
or worse, the United States is a commercial nation, and the respect with
which we are treated by the businesses we depend on for products and
251. Although the purpose of this Article is not to spell out the positive actions corporations
can take across these important dimensions, we note that there is a growing body of
recommendations that corporate leaders can take advantage of. See, e.g., Greg Hills, Lakshmi Iyer,
Michael McAfee, Josh Kirschenbaum & Martin Whittaker, A CEO Blueprint for Racial Equity,
POLICYLINK
&
JUST
CAP.
(July
2020),
FSG,
https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/CEO_Blueprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EJ6-N2KY];
SUNDIATU DIXON-FYLE, KEVIN DOLAN, VIVIAN HUNT & SARA PRINCE, MCKINSEY & CO., DIVERSITY
WINS: HOW INCLUSION MATTERS (May 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/featuredinsights/diversity-and-inclusion/diversity-wins-how-inclusion-matters
[https://perma.cc/CX9R623H]; PETERSON & MANN, supra note 69; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Racial Equality: The Most
Important Things the Business Community Can Do, (U. Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ., Rsch. Paper No.
20-56, Colum. L. & Econ. Working Paper, Paper No. 635, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3723950
[https://perma.cc/66TR-XZX4].
252. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
253. The role that corporations play in creating an environment that is tolerant and inclusive
is especially important given that Americans spend a major part of their lives at work: in 2019, an
American worked, on average, 7.7 hours per day at his or her workplace and a total of 1,779 hours
annually. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., USDL-21-1359, AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY
—
MAY
TO
DECEMBER
2019
AND
2020
RESULTS
1
(July
2021),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE76-GETZ]; Average Annual
Hours Actually Worked Per Worker, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS
(last
visited
Oct.
18,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/M4EQ-YWAU].
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services matters greatly not just for how we feel about ourselves and
our society, but for corporations themselves. For that reason, thinkers
like Berle and Anderson have, from different perspectives in different
centuries, come to the powerful conclusion that the fulfillment of the
American ideal cannot occur unless powerful corporations themselves
embed a commitment to equality and respect in their way of doing
business. 254
The expanding universe of state corporate law reforms and
public company disclosure requirements surveyed in the previous Part
is sparking a much-needed conversation about Diversity, business, and
the proper role of corporations in society. But, as we addressed, they are
unlikely, in isolation, to achieve the comprehensive changes to broader
corporate culture needed to assure positive corporate reputations, to
protect all corporate stakeholders from discrimination and inequity,
and to capitalize on the business advantages of Diversity, Equity, and
Inclusion for investors.
The authority, and indeed, impetus, provided by corporate
fiduciaries under corporate law offers an important additional tool for
moving the dial. In this Part, we begin to connect the dots by providing
a foundational theory of how corporate law of fiduciary duty applies to
corporate DEI policies. Specifically, we situate fiduciary duty along a
spectrum of mandatory and discretionary actions that speak to
fiduciaries’ core obligations to pursue the best interests of shareholders
and the corporation.
In a first step, we explain the foundational directive embedded
in the corporate duty of loyalty as one that—while comprising a
substantive body of legal duties, norms, decisions, and traditions—is
not a field of law operating in hermetic isolation from others. Instead,
it is as much outwardly facing as internal, creating obligations to take
affirmative steps to comply with laws that are of critical importance to
the company and society.
In a second step, we then outline another key element of
corporate law important to any social question relevant to corporations:
254. As production in the United States became concentrated in corporations, Berle observed
that the dominance by corporations of the American economic scene changed the relationship
between corporations and the modern state. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on
Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U.
PA. L. REV. 933, 942–43 (1952). Large corporations amassed sufficient economic power to
materially invade an individual’s constitutional rights, and therefore, as creations of the state,
corporations have to carry out functions, such as applying the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, “for which in modern life by community demand the government is
held ultimately responsible.” Id. at 943. Berle described that this doctrine “constitutionalizes”
corporations. Id.
Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson takes a Berle-like perspective on the need for corporations to
embed constitutional values of equality and tolerance in their treatment of their workers in
particular. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND
WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 61–71 (2017). As Anderson shows, Americans spend a huge portion
of their lives in environments controlled by their employers, and unless these employers create a
workplace that allows them to feel respected and valued, regardless of their origin, the full promise
of equality cannot be realized. See id.
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the wide discretion afforded to fiduciaries under the business judgment
rule to go beyond mere law compliance. We show that this discretion
provides a safe harbor for corporate leaders to embrace effective and
ambitious DEI strategies. Within that safe harbor, fiduciaries have
wide discretion to take action they believe will ensure their
corporations’ respectful engagement with all stakeholders; improve
corporate decisionmaking, productivity, and reputation; and enhance
the firm’s sustained profitability and long-term value.
A. The Legal Pursuit of Profit
1. The Negative and Positive Components of the Duty of Loyalty
Although corporate law practitioners, judges, and scholars often
enjoy complicating the fiduciary duties owed by the directors and
managers of corporations, the foundational principles are, in fact, quite
focused. Indeed, it can be fairly said that there is really one fiduciary
duty—that of loyalty—and that properly understood, even the duty of
care itself can be understood as a subsidiary requirement of the basic
duty of loyalty, as we shall explain. In any event, both the duty of loyalty
and duty of care have important implications for corporations
addressing DEI, as both duties impose certain mandatory obligations
that fiduciaries must take to address DEI, and both enable them to take
discretionary actions to implement effective DEI policies if they believe
that is in their company’s best interest.
To understand why, a brief review of the duty of loyalty is
necessary. The duty of loyalty prohibits the director and officer from
self-dealing, bad faith, and fraud at the expense of the corporation—a
negative check on director infidelity. But even more, the duty of loyalty
has a positive or affirmative component demanding that directors and
officers make a good faith effort to promote the sustained profitability
of the corporation and the welfare of its stockholders. 255 Thus, a loyal
fiduciary must make a good faith effort to attend carefully to corporate
affairs and make sound decisions. For that reason, the duty of care
flowing from that obligation has itself emerged as the other most salient
duty in corporate jurisprudence.
The duty of care’s implications for corporate fiduciaries are
meaningful, even if the damages club to enforce it is comparatively
weak. Under common corporate law formulations, the normative duty
of care requires directors and officers to exercise “that amount of care
which ordinarily careful and prudent [people] would use in similar
255. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987) (the duty of
loyalty “embodies not only an affirmative duty to protect the interests of the corporation, but also
an obligation to refrain from conduct which would injure the corporation and its stockholders or
deprive them of profit or advantage”).
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circumstances” towards the corporation and its shareholders. 256 This
normative duty was largely just that for most of corporate law history,
because there were no cases holding directors liable for monetary
damages for breaches of the duty of care. 257 But the duty of care was
always important because normative duties, even without liability
potential, still had an important effect on behavior, and that is
particularly so for reputationally and mission-driven people like
corporate directors. 258
But, in the last century, the “soft law” operation of the duty of
care was buttressed by the “stick approach” adopted in Francis v.
United Jersey Bank and Smith v. Van Gorkom, and monetary liability
was imposed on directors for a lack of due care. 259 Even though Van
Gorkom set the liability bar at gross negligence for the purpose of
avoiding directors being too risk-averse because of liability risk, the
decision in Van Gorkom still generated great controversy over the
fairness and wisdom of holding independent directors liable for
negligence-based conduct. 260 The Delaware General Corporation Law
was therefore amended to provide corporations with the ability to adopt
charter provisions exculpating directors from liability for even gross
negligence. 261 Most other states took similar action and institutional
investors supported corporations in adopting them, so such provisions
256. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
257. See, e.g., William T. Allen, The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty of Care and the
Business Judgment Rule Under U.S. Corporate Law, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
307, 324 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (“The long history that was inconsistent with courts
directly imposing liability on corporate directors for violation of the objective standard of care was
interrupted by the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom.”); Joseph W.
Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968) (“The search for cases in which directors of
industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by
self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack.”).
258. One of corporate law’s long-standing techniques, exemplified by Caremark, which we will
discuss, is to use normative duties to drive behavior even when there is no personal monetary
consequence for the fiduciary in failing to live up to those obligations. For an interesting discussion
of the importance of norms in corporate governance, see Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter,
Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1619 (2001).
259. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826–29 (N.J. 1981) (holding the estate
of a director of an insurance company liable for her failure of due care in monitoring the
corporation’s officers, who included her husband and her sons, and detecting that the sons were
engaged in improper practices to the detriment of the corporation’s clients); Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (finding outside directors liable for monetary damages because they
were allegedly grossly negligent in their approval process of a premium-generating merger).
260. Van Gorkom was met with strong criticism for narrowing the business judgment rule and
the resulting consequences. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans
Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437 (1985) (explaining that directors will be less likely to take risks
and less willing to serve on corporate boards post-Van Gorkom); Lynn A. Howell, Post Smith v.
Van Gorkom Director Liability Legislation with a Proactive Perspective, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559,
560 (1988) (observing that Van Gorkom was considered to have “triggered the dramatic increases
in the number of shareholder suits filed, director and officer (hereinafter D & O) insurance policy
cancellations, skyrocketing premiums, and the flight of the outside directors” (footnote omitted)).
261. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2021).
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are now ubiquitous and render due-care damages remedies against
directors rare to nonexistent. 262
But, as a matter of director reputation and public scrutiny, the
directors’ normative duty to act with due care still has great
importance. It is critical when independent directors’ deliberative
process and efforts are important to the standard of review applied in
transactions involving conflicts of interests of management, 263
contested takeover attempts, 264 or sales of corporate control. 265
Moreover, and as we will discuss, directors’ actions in exercising care—
again, the deliberative process in which they engaged—bear on their
state of mind and whether they acted in good faith to fulfill their duty
of loyalty. For these reasons, complying with both the duty of loyalty
and the duty of care is constantly the focus of corporate boards, officers,
and their advisers.
In case law, the negative component of the duty of loyalty has
typically attracted most of the attention because it addresses the
important obligation for fiduciaries to avoid causing harm to the
corporation by acts such as unfair self-dealing 266 or the usurpation of
corporate opportunities. 267 The intention is to prevent any possible selfinterest exercising an influence that interferes with discharging one’s
duty to the best interests of the corporation and shareholders. Indeed,
it is in these negative loyalty cases where the independent directors’
obligation of care has often been the subject of most attention. 268

262. Cory A. McKenna, FDIC v. Rippy: Due Care and the Business Judgment Rule in the
Fourth Circuit and the Potential Implications for the Banking Industry, 20 N.C. BANKING INST.
189, 215 (2016); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02, Statutory Comparison, n.6 (2017).
263. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (applying the business
judgment rule standard of review to a merger between a controlling stockholder and its subsidiary
where the merger was approved from the beginning by a committee of independent directors and
an informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders).
264. E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (finding that the
directors’ show of good faith and reasonable investigation was enhanced by the approval of a board
of directors that was comprised of a majority of independent directors).
265. E.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (noting
that “the role of outside, independent directors becomes particularly important because of the
magnitude of a sale of control transaction and the possibility, in certain cases, that management
may not necessarily be impartial”).
266. Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary’s Duty of Loyalty, 84 LAW Q. REV.
472 (1968). For an iconic Delaware case involving this principle in the conflicted merger context,
see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
267. Eric Talley & Mira Hashmall, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, U.S.C. INST. FOR
CORP.
COUNS.
1
(Feb.
2001),
https://weblaw.usc.edu/why/academics/cle/icc/assets/docs/articles/iccfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E5BM-ACTQ]. For the classic Delaware case, see Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del.
1939).
268. For recent cases where the diligence of a special committee was relevant to a duty of
loyalty claim against conflicted parties, see In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014);
and In re S. Peru Copper Corp., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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The importance of the negative component’s role in addressing
conflicts of interests and self-dealing has, however, left the affirmative
component too often overlooked. Although it is widely understood that
fiduciaries should refrain from conduct that harms the corporation—
such as by unfair self-dealing or entrenching of themselves in office—
the fiduciary duty of loyalty demands more: that directors and officers
make a good faith effort to advance the best interests of the corporation
and its stockholders. 269 This affirmative component is not new but has
long been understood as central to the duty of loyalty in the corporate
law. 270
This affirmative obligation has at its core the requirement that
directors and officers act to promote the best interests of the corporation
and its sustained profitability, within the limits of their legal discretion
and their sense of ethics. 271 This obligation of loyalty does not in fact
put the pursuit of profit above all else. Rather, the most fundamental
requirement is that the directors and officers be loyal to the
corporation’s basic license from society, which allows the corporation to
seek profit, but only conducting lawful business by lawful means. 272
“Law compliance . . . comes ahead of profit-seeking as a matter of the
corporation’s mission, and directors owe a duty of loyalty to that
hierarchy.” 273 Thus, “one cannot act loyally as a corporate director by
causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to
obey.” 274

269. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney III), No. Civ.A. 15452, 2004 WL 2050138,
at *5 n.49 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004) (quoting BelCom, Inc. v. Robb, No. CIV.A. 14663, 1998 WL
229527, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 1998)) (the “ ‘duty of loyalty . . . imposes an affirmative obligation
to protect and advance the interests of the corporation’ ”).
270. E.g., 1 THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN
MUNICIPAL 420, 613 (N.Y., Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1888) (“ ‘A corporate body can only act by agents,
and it is of course the duty of those agents so to act as best to promote the interests of the
corporations, whose affairs they are conducting.’ ”). See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role
of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 633 n.9, 635 n.10 (2010) (gathering sources
demonstrating the lineage of this affirmative duty).
271. See, e.g., TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp. (In re TW Servs., Inc.), Nos. 10427,
10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (fiduciary duty of loyalty requires “manag[ing]
the corporation within the law, with due care and in a way intended to maximize the long-run
interests of the shareholders”).
272. See, e.g., Strine et al., supra note 270, at 651.
273. Id. For an important application of this insight to the law of sexual harassment, see
Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
1583, 1630 (2018), which explains how courts have recognized that illegal corporate conduct is not
loyal corporate conduct and can usually only be justified as a matter of necessity. That said, as the
authors note, scholars including Stephen Bainbridge have observed that a “de minimis” principle
may apply. See id. at 1630.
274. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also Metro Commc’n Corp.
BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131, 163–64 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Metro
claims that certain [ ] defendants breached their duty of loyalty by executing a plan to bribe
metropolitan officials in Brazil in order to obtain permits for Fidelity Brazil. . . . These allegations
are sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty . . . .”); Roth v. Robertson, 118

2022]

DUTY AND DIVERSITY

71

This affirmative obligation to honor society’s laws is the
foundation that permits the principled use of the enabling form of
current American general corporation statutes. Even under the
capacious flexibility of the Delaware General Corporation Law, the
most important example of an enabling statute, the law is not just
enabling, but, at the same time, prescriptive, allowing corporations only
to “conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes.” 275 Similarly,
certificates of incorporation may enable corporations to engage in any
business line or activity, but subject to an important bottom line: law
compliance. Thus, certificates of incorporation may provide that the
corporation may engage in any “lawful act or activity for which
corporations may be organized” 276 and “all lawful acts and activities
shall be within the purposes of the corporation.” 277 At the same time,
charters can be revoked when there is an abuse of the corporate
privilege. 278
2. Caremark Legal Compliance, Norms, and Their Relationship to
Corporate Value and Reputation
Corporate law’s emphasis on law compliance is more than a
recitation of ultra vires doctrine and requires more than that directors
and officers not consciously cause the corporation to break the law in
pursuit of profit. The duty of loyalty demands that the directors make
a good faith effort—i.e., genuinely “try”—to ensure that the corporation
has in place compliance and ethics policies that promote adherence to
the laws constraining its conduct. 279
This duty is famously associated with Chancellor Allen’s
decision in Caremark 280 and is now central to the functioning of any
effective board of directors and management team. 281 The case is
N.Y.S. 351, 353 (Sup. Ct. 1909) (explaining that where directors commit unlawful acts and cause
corporate loss, they are liable).
275. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2021) (emphasis added).
276. Id. § 102(a)(3) (2021).
277. Id.
278. See Craven v. Fifth Ward Republican Club, Inc., 146 A.2d 400, 402 (Del. Ch. 1958)
(“Continu[ing] serious criminal violations by corporate agents in the course of the discharge of
their duties could very well constitute the misuse of a charter.”).
279. For incisive discussions of the importance of law compliance to proper fiduciary behavior,
see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013 (2019); and
Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709 (2019).
280. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
281. For literature on the importance of Caremark, see generally Miriam Hechler Baer,
Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 967 (2009):
Even though the Delaware Supreme Court did not formally adopt Allen’s approach until
over a decade later, lawyers and compliance providers responded to Caremark by
expanding the level of services available to help directors ensure that proper systems
were in place to prevent and detect criminal violations;
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canonical, though the underlying facts still bear repeating. A health
care company had been indicted for felony violations. 282 Following the
indictment, Caremark stockholders initiated several derivative class
actions claiming Caremark’s directors failed to adequately supervise or
correct the conduct of Caremark employees, thereby allowing a
situation to develop and continue, exposing Caremark to enormous
fines and liability. 283
To provide context for his opinion considering the parties’
presentation of a settlement, Chancellor Allen first evaluated the
stockholder claims, cited various examples of the kind of conduct
satisfying this standard, and then made note of Caremark’s installation
of a monitoring system—the publication of an updated guide designed
to ensure compliance with applicable laws and implementation of a
policy requiring officers directly approve certain contractual
relationships in order to ensure compliance with federal regulations. 284
Chancellor Allen took an innovative approach to this important
fiduciary responsibility. He intentionally eschewed a negligence-based
approach to liability for a board’s failure to monitor the company’s law
compliance, placing it out of the reach of Van Gorkom’s gross negligence
standard and requiring plaintiffs to prove more to obtain relief. 285 To do
that, he formulated a standard based on the affirmative obligation of
directors to make an effort to act in the best interests of the
corporations. 286 Thus, he held that liability for failing to monitor would
turn on whether the directors failed to make a good faith effort to set
up and attend to a rational system of monitoring. 287 If they did not,
directors violated their duties of good faith to the corporation, 288 and by
extension, their duty of loyalty. 289
Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 681 (2018) (understanding Caremark as a
“soft law” that promotes social interests and corporate social responsibility); Pollman, Corporate
Oversight and Disobedience, supra note 279, at 2023 (noting that Caremark and its subsequent
case law led to the evolution of the doctrines of oversight and obedience within the duty of good
faith); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together:
A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Caremark and EESG
Strategy, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1885 (2021) (explaining the close linkage of EESG to Caremark’s duty
to implement and monitor compliance programs and the utility of integrating these efforts); and
Hemel & Lund, supra note 273, at 1630 (discussing how Caremark duties can prove significant in
sexual harassment claims).
282. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960 (Del. Ch. 1996).
283. Id. at 963–65.
284. Id. at 963.
285. See id. at 971.
286. See id. (“[I]n my opinion only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting
system exits—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 968.
289. See Strine et al., supra note 281, at 1897. (“Indeed, despite the fact that Caremark cases
rarely result in legal liability, leading corporate counsel regularly remind directors of this duty.
And recent Caremark decisions denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss have resulted in
renewed attention to directors’ oversight obligations.”).
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For the court, however, satisfying such claims involves
advancing one of the most difficult theories “in corporation law upon
which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” 290 And when applying
the standards to the facts at hand, the court held that the record showed
no evidence that the director defendants were guilty of a sustained
failure to exercise their oversight function. 291 To the contrary, the court
observed, the corporation’s information systems represented a good
faith attempt to be informed of relevant facts. Thus, Chancellor Allen
concluded, if the directors did not know the specifics of the activities
that lead to the indictments, they could not be faulted. 292
Though ultimately ruling in favor of the defendants, the
Caremark decision’s doctrinal importance is substantial. Under the
preexisting standard established under Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co., directors’ duties were “say no evil, see no evil”: as
long as no problems were flagged for directors, they could assume
everything was fine with no threat of liability. 293 Caremark institutes
an explicit affirmative duty, resuscitating foundational duty of loyalty
principles to be proactive in compliance efforts. 294 Additionally,
Caremark makes clear that corporate law comprises a substantive body
of legal duties, norms, decisions, and traditions, and is not a field of law
operating in hermetic isolation from others. Instead, the very DNA of
corporate law’s most foundational duty, that of loyalty, is outwardly
facing and designed to operate symbiotically with the legal constraints
and dictates of society to confine corporations to conduct that does not
harm society. Loyalty flows to the corporation’s legally chartered
mission, which is predicated on a statutory requirement that the
company will only do lawful business by lawful means. 295 Fidelity to
that statute mandates that fiduciaries make a good faith effort to
identify and understand the laws that are of material relevance to the
company and how its operations affect the legally protected interests of
its stakeholders, communities of operation, and society. And the duty of
loyalty therefore creates the prospect of liability arising from the breach
of such duties falling squarely on the independent directors as monitors.
Thus, although external social welfare laws are not incorporated by
reference into corporate law itself, the act of incorporation imposes
compliance duties that cannot be disregarded, especially where they
290. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
291. Id. at 972.
292. Id.
293. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
294. Roy Shapira, A New Caremark Era: Causes and Consequences, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1857
(2021).
295. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2021); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 3.01(a)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“Every corporation incorporated under this Act has the purpose of engaging
in any lawful business under a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.”).
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relate to key functions, operations, or activities of the firm that may
have material effects on others.
In the more than two decades since Caremark, Delaware courts
have largely required that in order to satisfy a claim against directors
for a failure to monitor, a stockholder plaintiff must show one of two
forms of deficient board effort to carry out their law compliance
responsibilities. One option is that the plaintiff demonstrate that the
board “utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system
or controls.” 296 Alternatively, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
board, having implemented controls, “consciously failed to monitor or
oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed
of risks or problems requiring their attention.” 297 These are both ways
of showing bad faith disloyalty: the first by showing a bad faith lack of
effort to address corporate compliance at all, the second by showing a
conscious failure to monitor corporate activities.
These standards are routinely acknowledged by Delaware courts
as difficult to satisfy—echoing Chancellor Allen’s statement to that
effect in Caremark itself. They are not impossible, however, and recent
suits have met the basic pleading threshold. 298 In the 2019 case
Marchand v. Barnhill, for example, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that a derivative action brought under the first Caremark prong could
proceed against the directors of Blue Bell Creameries, one of the
nation’s largest ice cream manufacturers, after the company had been
fined and the CEO had been indicted on various criminal charges
following a deadly 2015 listeria outbreak. 299 The court in Marchand
ruled that the shareholder complaint had alleged facts from which it
could be inferred that Blue Bell’s directors had failed to institute any
board-level oversight system for food safety—which was “mission
critical” for the monoline company—and, as a result, had not received
official notices of food safety concerns for several years. 300 The
Marchand parties ultimately agreed to a $60 million settlement, ten
days before trial was set to commence. Since Marchand, there have
been at least three additional Caremark cases Delaware courts have
permitted to proceed past initial pleading stages—in cases ranging from
296. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
297. Id.
298. E.g., Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d. 805 (Del. 2019).
299. Id. at 824; see also Meredith Kotler, Pamela Marcogliese & Marques Tracy, Recent
Delaware Court of Chancery Decision Sustains Another Caremark Claim at the Pleading Stage,
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(May
25,
2020),
HARV.
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/25/recent-delaware-court-of-chancery-decision-sustainsanother-caremark-claim-at-the-pleading-stage/ [https://perma.cc/K65V-DD2X]. The company
later pled guilty to crimes and paid a large fine. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Blue Bell
Creameries Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $19.35 Million for Ice Cream Listeria Contamination
– Former Company President Charged (May 1, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/blue-bellcreameries-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-1935-million-ice-cream-listeria [https://perma.cc/54HBWW69].
300. Kotler et al., supra note 299.
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failing to oversee the clinical trial of a company’s flagship lung cancer
drug 301 to another’s alleged failure to monitor financial statements and
related-party transactions. 302 In each, the defendant corporation’s
management faces the prospect of removal or other penalties.
Additionally, the defendant corporations are faced with the prospect of
millions of dollars of additional fines, along with harmful consumer and
public backlash. As important, failures in law compliance have
subjected corporations to huge corporate fines, management removals,
and reputational damage. 303
We do not want to overestimate the liability club of Caremark,
however, nor do we believe that is Caremark’s sole or necessarily most
important function. Rather, like Chancellor Allen himself, we believe
that Caremark’s primary value is in the incentives it provides to
corporate fiduciaries to take proactive, preventative action to ensure
that the corporation complies with society’s fundamental
expectations. 304 When a company’s board faces a Caremark case, the
company has almost always already suffered severe reputational,
stakeholder, and regulatory costs. By way of example, in cases where a
board managed to get a Caremark case dismissed, the record reveals
that the company had already experienced management replacements,
adverse publicity harmful to its reputation for integrity with key
constituencies like customers, and regulatory fines and injunctions. 305
301. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
302. Hughes v. Xiaoming Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112, 2020 WL 1987029 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).
303. See, e.g., Dean Seal, McKesson Settles Derivative Suit Over DOJ Fine For $175M, LAW360
(Apr. 22, 2020, 2:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1266395/mckesson-settles-derivativesuit-over-doj-fine-for-175m [https://perma.cc/2NFE-3U6S] (reporting that the DOJ hit McKesson
with a $150 million fine for allegedly violating the Controlled Substances Act, following which the
shareholders filed a derivative suit that settled for $175 million); Nandita Bose, Walmart to Pay
$282 Million to Settle Seven-Year Global Corruption Probe, REUTERS (June 20, 2019, 11:47 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walmart-fcpa-idUSKCN1TL27J
[https://perma.cc/X6VA99AL] (Walmart agreed to pay $282 million—$144 million to the SEC and $138 million to the
DOJ—to settle investigations related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and its alleged failure
to maintain a sufficient anti-corruption compliance program).
304. Chancellor Allen’s view that normative duties of care can be important in influencing
behavior and his view that going too far in enforcing the duty of care by actions for monetary
damages is reflected at length in William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning
the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van
Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449 (2002).
305. See, e.g., In re MetLife Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2019-0452, 2020 WL 4746635, at
*10, 19 (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2020) (dismissing Caremark claims against MetLife for failing to monitor
its compliance with its obligations to pay annuitants in a timely and complete manner, even
though the company had failed to pay retirement benefits in a timely way to 13,500 retirees,
overstated its earnings substantially as a result and had to restate, paid regulatory fines, and
replaced its CEO); Mike Leonard, MetLife Board Dodges Lawsuit Over $500 Million Annuity Error,
BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 18, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporategovernance/metlife-board-dodges-lawsuit-over-500-million-annuity-error [https://perma.cc/TY48Z3GS] (MetLife paid a $10 million fine to resolve related SEC charges); Lananh Nguyen &
Katherine Chiglinsky, MetLife Names Khalaf CEO, Replacing Kandarian After Stock Slump,
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These costs usually only grow with litigation, which may be
more likely over time. Scholars and practitioners have taken note of the
uptick in the successful number of cases escaping motions to dismiss
and searched for explanations for it. One factor cited for the trend is the
greater use of section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
which grants stockholders a qualified right to inspect the corporation’s
books and records. 306 Delaware courts have long advocated that
plaintiffs in a derivative suit use this tool before bringing a complaint,
so that they can meet their pleading burden under doctrines like
Caremark.
Given evolutions in how boards do business, this tool assists
plaintiffs’ lawyers in accessing valuable information in seeking support
for a Caremark claim, especially given that a petitioner in a section 220
action only has to show a credible basis to infer fiduciary wrongdoing to
get access. 307 With boards of directors acting in more informal ways and
the ease of information flow by electronic means, the books and records
relevant to investigating a potential Caremark claim have expanded,
not just in form, but in utility. For that reason, petitioners have been
able to procure emails, text messages, and other more informal
communications when a petitioner shows that the board in question
relied on those means to conduct its business. 308 Given that Caremark
requires good faith efforts, corporate books and records that are devoid
of efforts can themselves help a plaintiff meet its burden to plead facts
supporting an inference that the defendants failed to make the good
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/metlife-names-khalaf-ceo-replacingkandarian-after-stock-slump-1.1194913 [https://perma.cc/VK7U-8WGQ] (MetLife’s CEO resigned
following the company’s stock price tumble caused by investigations in connection with which the
company publicly acknowledged material weakness in its internal controls); In re Gen. Motors Co.
Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9627, 2015 WL 3958724, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2015) (dismissing
Caremark claim for failing to monitor where ignition switches in cars were unsafe, had to be
recalled, multiple deaths occurred, and the company suffered over $1 billion in financial losses and
a $35 million fine, which was the highest fine paid as a result of a National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration investigation into a recall); see also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
964 A.2d 106, 113, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009) (dismissing Caremark claim for failing to oversee company’s
participation in the subprime markets where it was undisputed that the company suffered billions
of dollars of losses as a result of underwater loans); Dan Wilchins & Jonathan Stempel, Citigroup
(Nov.
2,
2007,
6:05
PM),
CEO
Prince
to
Resign:
Reports,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-citigroup-boardmeeting/citigroup-ceo-prince-to-resign-reportsidUSN0233640620071103 [https://perma.cc/7BT8-W2J3] (Citigroup’s CEO resigned as the bank’s
losses from the subprime mortgage crisis continued to grow).
306. For an incisive discussion of the relevance of section 220 to Caremark suits, see Shapira,
supra note 294.
307. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Lebanon Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund, 243 A.3d 417, 428 (Del.
2020) (“But where a stockholder meets this low burden of proof from which possible wrongdoing
or mismanagement can be inferred, a stockholder’s purpose will be deemed proper under Delaware
law.”). Some scholars view the Delaware courts as having relaxed this standard even more in
practical terms. Shapira, supra note 294, at 18.
308. KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 203 A.3d 738, 758 (Del. 2019) (holding that the
trial court abused its discretion by excluding email communications from the stockholder’s demand
for the company’s books and records given that the company conducted formal corporate business
through informal electronic communications).
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faith effort at monitoring required to identify and address key
compliance risks in the first instance, or were aware of a major
compliance issue and failed to make a good faith effort to address it. 309
Of important note is another reality: Even if a complaint is not
sufficient to support an inference of bad faith and does not survive,
public revelation of corporate monitoring practices that fall short of best
practices can be embarrassing for the defendants and harmful to the
corporation’s reputation.
In fact, it has long been understood that corporate law decisions,
even ones that ultimately find no liability, can reflect poorly on
corporate fiduciaries in ways that are hard to shake. 310 Given the
increasing focus of investors on EESG and other issues of social
responsibility—which typically arise in areas where the corporation
most affects others and thus are integrally related to issues of legal
compliance—boards are likely to be under continuing pressure to put in
place effective monitoring policies and to actively address material legal
risks that could endanger the company’s value and reputation. 311 Not
only that, to the extent that regulators take a more assertive
enforcement posture during the Biden Administration than during the
Trump Administration, the salience of preventive compliance by
directors and managers may grow even more.
B. Fiduciary Law’s Safe Harbor for Rational Business Judgments
Corporate law goes beyond requiring corporate fiduciaries to
ensure that adherence to the law is taken seriously. The business
judgment rule gives them substantial room to create a corporate culture
with higher standards of integrity, fairness, and ethics than the law
demands if they believe that will increase the corporation’s value,
enhance its reputation, or otherwise rationally advance the best
interests of the corporation and its stockholders. 312 So long as the
309. For example, in Marchand, the absence of records showing the board had any reporting
or other policies to ensure the company was acting to ensure its compliance with food safety laws
helped the plaintiffs convince the Delaware Supreme Court they had stated a claim. Marchand v.
Barnhill, 212 A.3d. 805, 822–23 (Del. 2019).
310. A distinguished scholar addressed this well and in depth a generation ago. See Edward
B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009
(1997). Professor Shapira has amplified this reality, and its role in the Caremark context, in his
valuable recent work. Shapira, supra note 294.
311. Strine et al., supra note 281, at 1902 (“A variety of domestic and international sources
have put pressure on companies to adopt corporate policies and plans for sustainable
governance.”).
312. See PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01 (AM. L. INST. 1994) (observing that business decisions made based on ethical considerations
are “not only appropriate, but desirable”); see also Christine A. Hemingway & Patrick W.
Maclagan, Managers’ Personal Values as Drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility, 50 J. BUS.
ETHICS 33 (2004) (considering that personal values make a difference in the adoption and
implementation of corporate social responsibility initiatives). A recent survey found that the
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directors believe in good faith that such standards are in the best
interests of the corporation, the business judgment rule protects them
from judicial second-guessing at the instance of a complaining
stockholder.
For example, under Delaware law, the test under the business
judgment rule is the lenient one of bare rationality. 313 This forgiving
test means boards have wide discretion to promote corporate norms
that treat employees and consumers with respect and that promote a
reputation for integrity and fairness for long-term sustained
profitability. Thus, under Delaware law, if the board believes that
action benefiting stakeholders like workers or creditors has a rational
relationship to the best interests of the stockholders, 314 the business
judgment rule protects the board from stockholders seeking to overturn
their judgment in litigation.
This discretion bears emphasis. That the empirical evidence is
mixed on an issue, or even tilts the other way on a decision, does not
deprive that decision of the protection of the business judgment rule.
Rather, so long as there is a rational basis for the board’s decision, it
must be respected. Perhaps the most controversial illustration of that
principle came in the high-profile drama over Time’s decision to stick to
buying Warner Communications for a premium rather than accepting
a gigantic $200 per share offer from Paramount, a bid that involved a
premium exceeding $75 per Time share. In his decision—known as
Time-Warner—denying Paramount’s bid for an injunction, Chancellor
Allen famously said:
It may be that in a well-developed stock market, there is no discount for long-term profit
maximizing behavior except that reflected in the discount for the time value of money. It
may be the case that when the market valued the stock of Time at about $125 per share
following the announcement of the merger, an observer blessed with perfect foresight
would have concurred in that value now of the future stream of all returns foreseen into
eternity. Perhaps wise social policy and sound business decisions ought to be premised
upon the assumptions that underlie that view. But just as the Constitution does not
enshrine Mr. Herbert Spencer’s social statics, neither does the common law of directors’
duties elevate the theory of a single, efficient capital market to the dignity of a sacred
text.
Directors may operate on the theory that the stock market valuation is “wrong” in some
sense, without breaching faith with shareholders. No one, after all, has access to more
information concerning the corporation’s present and future condition. It is far from

values of the majority of Americans align with supporting DEI, as documented by their response
that corporations should promote DEI policies in the workplace. Jill Mizell, The American Public
Wants Companies to Take Action on Advancing Racial Equity – Especially Black Americans, JUST
CAP. (July 9, 2020), https://justcapital.com/news/the-american-public-wants-companies-to-takeaction-on-advancing-racial-equity-especially-black-americans/ [https://perma.cc/S6LE-XYP4]. For
that reason, business leaders who have similar beliefs would be applying an ethical perspective
that is shared by many in the American public.
313. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
314. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986).
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irrational and certainly not suspect for directors to believe that a likely immediate market
valuation of the Time-Warner merger will undervalue the stock. 315

Chancellor Allen recognized that there was a strong chance that
the Time stockholders would be disadvantaged by the board’s decision
not to abandon the combination with Warner and accept the lucrative
$200 offer from Paramount, but held that the directors’ fiduciary
judgment had to be respected even under the heightened
reasonableness standard of Unocal, stating:
The value of a shareholder’s investment, over time, rises or falls chiefly because of the
skill, judgment and perhaps luck—for it is present in all human affairs—of the
management and directors of the enterprise. When they exercise sound or brilliant
judgment, shareholders are likely to profit; when they fail to do so, share values likely
will fail to appreciate. In either event, the financial vitality of the corporation and the
value of the company’s shares is in the hands of the directors and managers of the firm.
The corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their
powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of shares. In
fact, directors, not shareholders, are charged with the duty to manage the firm. 316

On appeal, Chancellor Allen was affirmed in a decision that
went even further in emphasizing the deference that courts had to give
to boards’ decisions about debatable issues, even in the less forgiving
context of reviewing their actions defending against a takeover. 317
Time-Warner emphasizes our core conclusion that the business
judgment rule provides a corporate law safe harbor for directors to
pursue their own vision for what is good for the company so long as
there is a rational basis for their course of action. Even more than in
cases involving heightened scrutiny, the business judgment rule
commands that courts not intrude on decisions about a corporation’s
business philosophy and strategy. For that reason, Stephen Bainbridge
has rightly called the business judgment rule an abstention doctrine, 318
which leaves stockholders dissatisfied with the board with recourse to
the corporate ballot box, not the courthouse.
Distilled down, these principles support this succinct summary
of the duty of loyalty under Delaware law:
The duty of loyalty requires fidelity to the corporation’s best interests, which requires a
good faith effort to:
i) first and foremost, ensure that the corporation honors its charter to conduct only
lawful business within lawful means;

315. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, & 10936, 1989 WL 79880, at
*19 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
316. Id. at *30.
317. 571 A.2d at 1154 (“Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate
plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate
strategy.”).
318. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
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ii) within the limits of its legal discretion and ethical judgment, seek to promote the
sustainable profitability of the company for the best interests of its stockholders.

And properly understood, the obligation to try to act with skill and
prudence—i.e., to exercise due care—is itself a fundamental
requirement of the duty of loyalty. “A faithful fiduciary is duty-bound
to try to act with care.” 319
Delaware law also provides directors and officers protection if
they take good faith action that unintentionally causes the corporation
to be found to have overstepped its legal bounds. For starters, any suit
for damages for a breach of the duty of care is governed by a forgiving
gross negligence standard, one selected specifically to free corporate
leaders from fearing that their good faith actions will be subject to
liability at the instance of second-guessing litigants and courts. 320 And,
as we discussed, liability under that standard is likely to be unavailable
for plaintiffs because of the prevalence of exculpation provisions barring
due care damages actions against directors.
In many other states, both the flexibility and, by extension, the
protections afforded fiduciaries are even greater. Statutes exist that
allow directors to govern their corporations in a multi-stakeholder
manner in which constituencies such as workers, communities, and
customers can be treated as equal ends of corporate governance. 321 In
these jurisdictions, even the weak rational relationship test of Delaware
law connecting action benefiting stakeholders to stockholder welfare
need not be satisfied. Similarly, there is an emerging for-profit entity
form, the Public Benefit Corporation (“PBC”), that requires boards to
govern in a way that is socially responsible and respectful of all
stakeholders. Under these statutes, directors have a “shall” duty
toward society and stakeholders, and actions can be brought to enforce
that duty. 322 In addition, under the Delaware PBC statute and statutes
like it, a PBC director is afforded the full protections of the business
judgment rule and deemed to have satisfied the director’s fiduciary
duties if such choices are “both informed and disinterested and not such

319. Strine et al., supra note 270, at 636 (emphasis omitted).
320. Chancellor Allen’s discussion of the policy basis for limiting due care liability and for the
business judgment rule in Gagliardi v. TriFoods International, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del Ch. 1996),
is one of the most coherent and convincing. For similar reasoning, see In re Lear Corp. S’holder
Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 651–52 (Del. Ch. 2008).
321. Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders
Bargain, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (finding thirty-three states with constituency
statutes in force during the period from 2000 to 2019); see also, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b)
(McKinney 2021); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (2021); FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(6) (2021); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2021).
322. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 365(a) (2021); see also Why Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation,
BENEFIT CORP., https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/why-pass-benefit-corporation-legislation
(last visited Dec. 30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/JK9S-WQFF] (noting that thirty-eight states,
including the District of Columbia, have passed PBC legislation).
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that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve.” 323 This
statutory standard affords substantial discretion to PBC directors in
making decisions and is widely understood as enabling them to balance
the promotion of public benefits, fair stakeholder treatment, and
shareholder value in good faith, without fear of judicial intrusion. 324 As
a result, outside of Delaware, and in PBCs in Delaware and elsewhere,
fiduciary duty law is more, not less, supportive of other-regarding
corporate policies like those calling for more Diversity, Equity, and
Inclusion.
V. CORPORATE LAW’S VALUE FOR CORPORATE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE
DIVERSITY, EQUITY, AND INCLUSION
The affirmative obligations underpinning the corporate duty of
loyalty, along with the discretion afforded to directors and managers in
the exercise of their duties and pursuit of the best interests of
shareholders and the corporation, have important implications for
corporate Diversity policy. First, the corporation is charged with an
expectation of lawful conduct—and Delaware corporate law explicitly
identifies legal compliance as a core feature of the duty of loyalty. As
such, it requires fiduciaries to ensure corporate compliance strategies
exist to assure compliance with key civil rights legislation and
antidiscrimination mandates that go to the heart of their operations.
Fiduciaries are also not excused from ignoring red flags indicating
widespread discrimination; should they do so, not only do companies
risk liability accompanying such violations, but directors too face
possible derivative suits and liability.
Second, the business judgment rule affords directors who view
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion as important values with enormous
flexibility to advance such goals, and to do so on firm legal footing as a
matter of corporate law. Simply put, beyond the moral call to right past
wrongs, or the statutory and Caremark-based interests in ensuring that
corporate policies do not fall afoul of antidiscrimination and civil rights
laws, there are rational evidentiary and logical arguments for believing
that there is money to be made, and saved, for corporations that take
DEI seriously. There is the required nexus to the best interests of
stockholders Delaware law mandates. This business rationale for
effective DEI policies invokes the protections of the business judgment
rule and enables a wide range of policy reforms that go beyond statutory
minimal protections embodied in long-standing civil rights laws—or the
323. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 365(b) (2021); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1707 (McKinney 2021); CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231 (West 2021).
324. Jesse Finfrock & Alfredo Silva, COVID’s Impact on PBC Fiduciary Duties: Understanding
Director Obligations in an Economic Downturn, JD SUPRA (June 23, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/covid-s-impact-on-pbc-fiduciary-duties-83482/
[https://perma.cc/8NGD-JVPS].
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recently announced targeted reforms—to address the full range of
equity issues in which corporations affect their stakeholders and
society.
A. Corporate Law’s Antidiscrimination Obligations
Given the obvious materiality to society of civil rights laws and
the reputational and economic harm that arises where they are ignored,
there is no rational basis to argue that Caremark duties do not require
good faith efforts to comply with them. Some, like Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, require that companies avoid discriminating on the basis of
race, sex, sexual orientation, and other bases not relationally connected
to hiring or serving the consuming public. Similar laws also apply in
many of the global markets in which American corporations operate
and constrain corporate discrimination. 325
As such, these laws are foundational and affect the corporation’s
employment practices and its relationships with customers and
contractors. So do laws like the ECOA or FHA that require corporations
to provide equal access to important services, such as banking and
credit, and to not discriminate in the provision of those services. 326 As
such, they lie at the heart of capital access, and in doing so, target
business operations, practices, and strategies at the core of regulated
markets or industries in which companies operate. Virtually all impose
penalties and fines where they are ignored, or can form the basis of class
action litigation. They also, as discussed earlier, carry the potential of
serious reputational damage, especially in this moment where
customers, clients, and workers are more willing than ever to hold
corporate actors to account for failures in equal treatment. The adverse
publicity and regulatory scrutiny that attend these kinds of violations
can cause obvious harm to a corporation and its shareholder value. 327

325. E.g., 2013 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Gender Equality in Education,
Employment and Entrepreneurship, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2017),
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264279391-en [https://perma.cc/MQ9N-5SA4]. The 2013 Gender
Recommendation also calls on members to cooperate with relevant stakeholders, including the
public and private sectors, to elaborate and implement guidelines and practices to promote gender
equality. Id. More recently, the OECD Council adopted the Recommendation of the Council on
Gender Equality in Public Life, which focuses on greater accountability and oversight for gender
equality in employment in the public sector. 2015 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Gender
(2016),
Equality
in
Public
Life,
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264252820-en [https://perma.cc/XZG7-378C].
326. See supra notes 170–173 and accompanying text.
327. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Social Responsibility, ESG, and Compliance, in
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE (Benjamin van Rooij & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2021)
(compiling business literature showing the potential utility of high-quality EESG practices in
mitigating risks from lawsuits and regulators, and consumer and employees backlash, and
lowering cost of capital). Indeed, Jamillah Williams has presented evidence suggesting that civil
rights law, with a deeper historical, political, and moral grounding, appears to exert a stronger
normative influence than larger “business case”-backed arguments for Diversity. Jamillah
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To comply with their Caremark duties, corporate boards must
make a good faith effort to ensure the company has policies in place to
monitor compliance with the laws requiring corporations to provide
equal opportunities to job applicants, employees, contractors, and
customers regardless of their race, gender, or sexual orientation. 328 For
all major corporations, by way of example, Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on not only race, color, and sex (including
pregnancy, sexual orientation, or gender identity), but also national
origin, disability, and genetic information (including family medical
history). 329 Employers must also create a poster informing employees of
their rights and respond promptly and consistently to discrimination
complaints. 330 Employers may additionally be required to provide
reasonable accommodations (changes to the way things are normally
done at work) because of an applicant’s or employee’s religious beliefs 331
or disability. 332 Caremark requires good faith efforts by directors to
ensure their companies have policies designed to promote compliance
with these legal requirements.
In other instances, Caremark compliance may require
monitoring systems tied to a company’s industry-specific DEI legal
duties. 333 For financial institutions, for example, the ECOA prohibits
discriminating against borrowers based on race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, family status, or age, and its prohibition comprises a core
feature of the very business of banking. It also imposes a range of
disclosure requirements, including notices for applicants of consumer
and business credit to ensure that they are aware of the ECOA’s
prohibitions and communications informing them as to reasons why
they were denied credit. For firms engaged in retail lending, from
deposit-taking institutions to marketplace lending platforms, the
ECOA’s substantive requirements and disclosure obligations imposed
on creditors are part of their business; failure to incorporate and comply
can expose companies to stiff punitive sanctions that can reach up to
1% of the creditor’s net worth in class actions. 334 Compliance with these
important duties thus comprises an essential aspect of protecting the
long-term value of any lender. Caremark would thus require systems
Bowman Williams, Breaking Down Bias: Legal Mandates vs. Corporate Interests, 92 WASH. L. REV.
1473, 1473–1513 (2017).
328. See generally Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the
Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 403–04 (2002).
329 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
330. Many labor laws include a requirement that employers post notices about employees’
rights in the workplace. For various posting requirements, see Workplace Posters, U.S. DEP’T OF
LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topics/posters (last visited Sept. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8F48XYJX].
331 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
332. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
333. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 821 (Del. 2019).
334. CHRIS BRUMMER, FINTECH LAW IN A NUTSHELL 336 (2020).
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for ensuring that proper disclosure practices are adhered to, and that
the board was able to, and did, monitor the information gleaned from
those systems or reported to them.
Along similar operational lines, Caremark requires boards of
financial institutions to establish monitoring systems for any
obligations they face under the Community Reinvestment Act, a federal
law requiring federal regulators to assess how well banks fulfill
obligations to service low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. Like
the ECOA, compliance with the CRA is a core feature of effective
banking operations, in large measure because federal regulators
develop scores to evaluate applications for future approval of
bank mergers, charters, acquisitions, branch openings, and deposit
facilities. 335 Banks are required to inform customers of their scores
when such information is requested, and their scores are also publicly
available online in a Federal Reserve database, thereby creating
significant pressure for banks to comply given public relations
pressures. 336 Additionally, failure to meet CRA obligations exposes
banks to a range of penalties, including curbs on new branch openings
or otherwise growing their business. The degree to which a bank
adheres to the CRA as a result can directly harm a bank’s reputation,
profits, and overall shareholder value. Fiduciaries, by extension, are
thus required to ensure that a system for CRA compliance exists, and
that material developments and information generated from it can be
shared with and disseminated to them.
Corporations have increasingly recognized that effective DEI
compliance efforts are required by Caremark and are increasingly
expected by all corporate stakeholders. This confluence has itself given
rise to new legal theories by corporate plaintiffs’ lawyers, arguing that
fiduciaries have not only failed to comply with Caremark in their DEI
policies, but have misled investors by overstating their adherence to
their own stated DEI goals.
Thus, in a spate of new complaints, stockholder plaintiffs have
alleged that companies are making untrue statements about their
commitment to DEI in their public disclosures and thereby violating
securities law. 337 In some of these complaints, the plaintiffs also allege
335. See Jorge Sun, Is CRA Compliance Enough for Community Banks?, BANKING EXCH. (Dec.
1, 2020, 12:37 PM), https://www.bankingexchange.com/community-banking/item/8493-is-cracompliance-enough-for-community-banks [https://perma.cc/UB82-6HBR].
336. See FFIEC Interagency CRA Rating Search, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL,
https://www.ffiec.gov/craratings/ (last updated Nov. 10, 2020, 3:02 PM) [https://perma.cc/ER56AFFH].
337. Eight board diversity lawsuits were filed in 2020. Most were filed against technology
companies with operations based in California (such as Oracle, Qualcomm, and Facebook),
although there were lawsuits filed involving non-technology companies and companies located
outside California as well (such as Danaher Corporation). See, e.g., Complaint, Falat v. Sacks, No.
20-cv-01782 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2020); Complaint, City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Joyce
Jr., No. 20-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2020); Complaint, Lee v. Fisher, No. 20-cv-06163 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 1, 2020); Complaint, Esa v. Pilette, No. 20-cv-05410 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020); Complaint,
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that directors have breached their fiduciary duties by failing to ensure
that their corporations had in place effective compliance programs and
efforts addressing key nondiscrimination laws. 338 Along with monetary
damages, the lawsuits typically seek a variety of remedial measures,
including adding African American directors to the defendant
company’s board, creating a fund to promote diversity and inclusion in
the defendant company’s workforce, tying executive compensation to
specific hiring goals, and instituting periodic board diversity
training. 339 Thus, not only the claims, but the forms of relief sought, are
novel for corporate and securities law cases. 340
We want to emphasize again that allegations are just that—
allegations—and that most of the claims that have been filed in
California but involve Delaware corporate law will fail to survive
motions to dismiss, as most plaintiff suits do. 341 And in many if not most
cases, plaintiffs face significant pleading challenges not only for
derivative lawsuits based on duty to monitor failures, but also for claims
premised on defendants making untrue statements of material fact—
and which by extension require plaintiffs to plead with particularity
facts indicating defendants’ states of mind.
But the allegations underscore our earlier observations that
deserve highlighting. Plaintiffs are picking up on the fact that
Kiger v. Mollenkopf, No. 20-cv-01355 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 2020); Complaint, Ocegueda v.
Zuckerberg, No. 20-cv-04444 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2020); Complaint, Klein v. Ellison, No. 20-cv-04439
(N.D. Cal. July 2, 2020). The last of the lawsuits was filed against Cisco Systems on September 23,
2020, just days before California Governor Gavin Newsom signed AB 979 into law. See Complaint,
City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Bush, No. 20-cv-06651 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2020). One
commentator speculates that the enactment of the California legislation seems to have interrupted
the filings of the lawsuits, perhaps because the new statute requires at least part of the relief the
claimants sought in filing the suits. See Kevin LaCroix, The Top Ten D&O Stories of 2020, D&O
DIARY (Jan. 4, 2021),
https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/01/articles/director-and-officerliability/the-top-ten-do-stories-of-2020/ [https://perma.cc/U42A-HPU4].
338. In Ocegueda v. Zuckerberg, for example, plaintiffs sued Mark Zuckerberg and the board
of Facebook alleging that the company’s directors had violated their fiduciary duties by their
inaction on diversity and inclusion issues. Complaint at 79, No. 20-cv-04444 (N.D. Cal. July 2,
2020). The complaint alleges a range of other corporate law violations relating to an alleged failure
to implement and monitor a reasonable system of internal controls and policies relating to
compliance with a HUD complaint against Facebook alleging that Facebook violated the FHA by
allowing advertising on its platform which discriminates based on race, ethnicity, gender, and
other protected categories. Id. at 5, 16, 30, 50.
339. See LaCroix, supra note 337.
340. The plaintiffs in most of the lawsuits are forwarding a novel and quite aggressive breach
of fiduciary claim on the basis of what is ultimately a failure to diversify, and argue that it
constitutes a “conscious failure to perform their fiduciary obligations.” Yet, the plaintiffs seem to
disclaim that these claims arise under Caremark. The plaintiffs instead argue that the defendants
know they should be taking more assertive action to promote diversity, but have consciously failed
to do so. See, e.g., Complaint at 50–55, Ocegueda v. Zuckerberg, No. 20-cv-04444 (N.D. Cal. July 2,
2020). This is a theory that comes into stark tension with the business judgment rule. The proxy
disclosure claims have their own difficulties, and will require a showing of intent, loss, causation,
and damages under the federal securities law precedent in order to be successful.
341. Ocegueda, for example, was recently dismissed for misstating underlying facts—perhaps
most importantly by missing the fact that two of Facebook’s nine directors are Black. Ocegueda v.
Zuckerberg, No. 20-cv-04444, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52465, at *26 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2021).
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compliance with civil rights laws is important for corporations not only
as a moral matter, or as a function of a company’s public law
obligations, but also as a matter of corporate law. Civil rights laws
comprise material, systemically important bedrock rules that are
essential for corporations to honor as a function of their fiduciary duties
and due to their charters from society to conduct only lawful business
by lawful means.
The consequences of noncompliance are as varied as the facts
(and damages) that can exacerbate it. What is certain, though, is that
the press will often cover claims of failed civil rights compliance
intensively, that the defense will be expensive, and that there is the
potential for additional unfavorable information arising that will
compound the harm already suffered as a result of the underlying
issues that had previously drawn adverse attention.
But for our purposes, suits like these underscore the point that
for the risk-averse fiduciary who is simply trying to avoid negative
consequences for the company and herself, fiduciary duty law requires
attention to a range of DEI issues. Failure to try to ensure that the
company complies with core antidiscrimination laws not only exposes
the company to fines and other regulatory harm if there are violations,
but also exposes fiduciaries to Caremark suits in Delaware or similar
duty of loyalty claims forwarded in other jurisdictions. To dwell just on
whether or not the plaintiffs prevail misses our basic point and that of
Caremark itself. By the time cases like these are brought, the
corporation has already lost, through adverse regulatory action,
internal tumult, and a damaged reputation.
For these reasons, the prudent, risk-averse director seeking to
promote the best interests of the corporation will engage at the board
level to make sure that the board and management are working
together to comply with DEI-relevant laws requiring corporations to
provide equal treatment of their workers, customers, and communities
of operation.
B. Corporate Law’s Protections—and Transformative Potential
We now address another important role of corporate law
principles: supporting corporate DEI policies that go beyond mere good
faith efforts at law compliance and embrace a comprehensive approach
that makes Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion integral to the company’s
business strategy, culture, and stakeholder relationships. That is, we
address corporate leaders who genuinely support Diversity and believe
that their companies should embrace it fully, but who might harbor
concern that attention to DEI is somehow improper as a matter of
fiduciary duty. For academics, the concern may seem remote, but for
practitioners it can be very real. For many generations now, some have
argued that boards of directors should be narrowly focused on
maximizing corporate profits, who at best may grudgingly accept that
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corporate boards have to devote some attention to law compliance, but
nothing more. Instead of spending any time on DEI, boards should just
get hell-bent for leather to increase profits, do the legal minimum, and
let external regulation be the sole impetus for social progress. 342
Corporate fiduciaries should not worry whether their companies have
higher-than-required ethical standards and try to make profits in a
manner respectful of employees, customers, and the communities in
which they operate. That is, we cannot avoid dealing with those who
adhere to the narrowly profit-focused perspective of Milton Friedman.
But this blinkered view is not even persuasive under the
corporate law of Delaware, the state corporate law largely understood
to be most focused on stockholder welfare. As we have explained,
Delaware law not only requires directors to put law compliance ahead
of profits, it gives directors wide discretion to determine what is in the
long-term best interests of stockholders. 343 Directors are entitled to
govern on the view that a corporation that has hiring and promotional
practices seeking to tap the full potential of the available workforce and
to include people of Diverse backgrounds, perspectives, and talents will
have an employee base that is more creative, more capable of relating
to Diverse customers, more content, and therefore more likely to
productively increase the firm’s effectiveness. Directors are entitled to
take the view that customers, strategic allies, and institutional
investors will be more likely to want to have an ongoing relationship
with a company they perceive as committed to high standards of
inclusion and nondiscrimination and that is more representative of
342. Commentators and scholars continue to hew to Milton Friedman’s view that companies
should focus narrowly on profit, and not issues like their own environmental or broader social
impact. See, e.g., Bradford Cornell & Aswath Damorodan, Valuing ESG: Doing Good or Sounding
Good? 20 (March 10, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com//abstract=3557432
[https://perma.cc/BM7J-ZQW8]. Typically, they argue that addressing issues like climate change
or DEI should be the province of external laws, not voluntary corporate action. Id. But they
typically ignore the role corporate power has had in eroding external protections for stakeholders,
including workers, and the reality that without internal change within corporations, the political
dynamic to make sure there are robust, across-the-board protections for society will not exist. In
fact, Friedman himself opposed the New Deal and the civil rights laws of the 1960s, rendering his
nod to external laws a thin beard for his support of nineteenth-century economics and social
policies. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 111, 115 (1962) (opposing civil and
labor rights legislation). For more discussion about Friedman’s opposition to civil rights and labor
rights legislation and the flaws in his doctrine, see Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Joey Zwillinger, What
Milton Friedman Missed About Social Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/10/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-inequality.html
[https://perma.cc/JRT8-72NU] (“Not only that, Mr. Friedman sought to weaken the rules of the
game by opposing basic civil rights legislation, unions, the minimum wage and other measures
that protected workers, Black people, and the environment.”); and Colin Mayer, Leo E. Strine, Jr.
& Jaap Winter, The Purpose of Business Is to Solve Problems of Society, Not to Cause Them,
PROMARKET (Oct. 9, 2020), https://promarket.org/2020/10/09/purpose-business-solve-problemssociety-not-cause-them-friedman/ [https://perma.cc/9EBT-E9VU].
343. Paramount Commc’ns., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); Air Prods. &
Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 93 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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society’s overall Diversity. Directors are entitled to take the view that
the harm that can flow from poor DEI practices far outweighs the costs
of committing their company to doing things the right way and spending
the costs necessary to do so.
Under the business judgment rule in Delaware, judgments of
this kind are protected, as they have a rational relationship to
stockholder welfare. In states that allow boards to govern with a multistakeholder focus, there is even less basis for an argument that
promoting good DEI practices is improper, as directors in these states
need not put profit ahead of customers and workers. 344 And under the
emerging public benefit corporation model and its “shall” obligation to
treat all stakeholders with respect, a failure to have sound DEI policies
itself exposes the board to possible suit for injunctive relief. 345
The logic and rationale for DEI is not only a matter of cost
avoidance. Rather, as we have shown, there is, at a minimum, a rational
basis for business leaders to conclude that effective DEI policies will
help them create and sustain smart, thoughtful, resilient, respected,
and thus sustainably profitable corporations. The information base
suggests that attention to DEI issues does not conflict with a proper
respect for stockholders’ interest in a sound, long-term return; indeed,
given the evidence, there is a basis to infer that inattention and
insensitivity to important DEI issues bearing on corporate
relationships with employees, customers, and business partners is what
risks firm value in the twenty-first-century economy. 346
These empirical and logical arguments are also supported by
market behavior. As we have noted, institutional investors
representing diversified investors acknowledge that corporate DEI
practices bear on their ability to create sustainable profits in a domestic
and international economy, where the diversity of the available
workforce, consumers, and strategic partners is growing, not
narrowing. Investors not only expect companies to embrace the full
range of talent, consumers, and possible partners available to maximize
value creation, but to also avoid the harm that comes from being
perceived as adverse to inclusion. 347 Without consumers, corporate
profits are hard to come by, and we have also shown that consumers,
and particularly the younger consumers who will determine the longterm fate of today’s businesses, increasingly want to buy from
companies that share their values. 348
Corporate law supports corporate leaders in acting on this
information. Even in shareholder-friendly Delaware, the business
344. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2021); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85
(2021); FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(6) (2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2021).
345. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §365 (2021).
346. For this reason, former CFTC Commissioner Sharon Bowen has advocated including the
absence of diversity as a risk factor for companies in the public and periodic disclosures.
347. See supra Section III.D.
348. See supra Section II.A.
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judgment rule affords directors substantial room to determine the best
way to create value and to put in place a corporate culture with higher
standards of integrity, fairness, and ethics than the law demands.
Corporate law also gives fiduciaries protection if they decide that the
best way to avoid violations of law and negative reputational harm to
the corporation and achieve longer-term value is for the corporation to
embrace policies and goals that go beyond the legal minimum and to
strive for the exemplary, even at the cost of short-term shareholder
value. Fiduciaries may reasonably conclude that in order to create a
prudent safety margin against law violations, a robust DEI program is
necessary to instill trust in regulators and the public that can help if
there is a situational lapse in compliance and promote confidence in the
workforce and customer base that will inspire their loyalty and greater
productivity.
Other protections deserve note as well. Importantly, Delaware
treats a Caremark claim for failure to make good faith efforts to comply
with key antidiscrimination laws like Title VII differently than if a
corporation’s good faith effort to achieve Diversity, Equity, and
Inclusion results in an unintentional violation of law. If a board failed
to make any good faith effort to ensure corporate compliance with civil
rights laws, and thereby exposed the firm to lawsuits crippling the
company, that would expose them to Caremark liability and no
exculpation or indemnification would be available because the conduct
involved bad faith and disloyal action not subject to statutory
immunization. By contrast, when a corporation takes good faith action
to redress long-standing inequality, corporate law principles provide
protection to the directors and officers against personal liability; indeed,
Delaware law provides directors and officers protection if they take good
faith action that causes the corporation to be found to have overstepped
its legal bounds. This is relevant as it is, of course, conceivable that a
corporation that undertook a comprehensive DEI strategy designed to
promote greater inclusion of women and minorities in the company’s
workforce could face suit if someone who did not get hired or promoted
alleged that particular programs or policies resulted in unlawful
“reverse” discriminatory practices. Under Delaware law, directors and
officers may be indemnified so long as their actions were intended to
benefit the corporation, even in a criminal case, so long as there was no
reasonable cause to believe their actions were unlawful. In defending
themselves in litigation and in seeking indemnification, corporate
directors are entitled to rely upon advice they receive from expert
advisers in management and from outside advisers, such as law firms
and firms that specialize in human resources issues, as evidence of their
good faith. 349 For these reasons, corporate leaders who address DEI
349. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 28, § 141(e) (2021).
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issues in a thoughtful way, with the advice of key managers and
qualified advisers, have no rational basis to fear liability.
In a very real sense, then, corporate law empowers fiduciaries to
adopt ambitious policies aimed at achieving greater Diversity, Equity,
and Inclusion that they believe are in the corporation’s best interests.
This empowerment does not just extend to issues within the workplace
but authorizes action to embed a commitment to DEI in all the
company’s relationships with its stakeholders. 350 Corporate leaders
may—and some have already acted to—embed a commitment to DEI in
all the company’s relationships. 351
Notably, such conduct would be voluntary. But nonaction would
not be free of market consequences insofar as business rationality may
in fact compel a faithful fiduciary who seeks to promote the sustainable
profitability of the company to focus on good DEI policies and practices.
As we have shown, there is a rational basis to conclude that companies
which have more diverse workforces and boards perform better, and at
least as well, as those which do not. 352 We have also shown that the
racial and ethnic diversity of workforce and customer bases is growing,
and there is thus a rational basis to conclude that companies that access
all avenues of talent and can relate to a broader array of stakeholders
and partners will be more successful. 353 As a pure matter of business,
directors cannot blind themselves to change in a dynamic world, and
the trends toward globalization and domestic diversity are economic
realities that a director faithful to his affirmative duty of loyalty must
bear in mind.
Put bluntly, there is money to be made by companies that take
DEI seriously, expand their hiring and promotional pools, and increase
their customer base by seeking in an equal and inclusive way to get the
most out of their workforces and profitably expand their services and
product sales to as many customers and communities as feasible.
Furthermore, there is evidence that corporate action to promote
equality will increase overall economic growth by generating more
350. The purpose of this Article is not to advocate best practices for how to do that. But others
have done so and have argued for: embedding DEI and other EESG goals in executive
compensation, special efforts to make cross-racial group meetings integral to corporate
decisionmaking, recruiting at educational institutions that serve more minority and less affluent
students, and working to ensure that the company serves all communities with equal respect. See,
e.g., Eavis, supra note 70; Strine et al., supra note 270. And, in an incisive new article, scholars
have argued that institutional investors should hold companies accountable for moving toward
quality DEI practices and outcomes, and have suggested useful metrics to enable that more
successfully. See Martinez & Fletcher, supra note 46.
351. For an example of a successful company who believes that a commitment to DEI is fully
consistent with its duties to its stockholders, see the policies of JPMorgan Chase & Co. Racial
CHASE
&
CO.,
Equity
Commitment,
JPMORGAN
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/impact/racialequity
(last
visited
Oct.
18,
2021)
[https://perma.ccWNJ4-ZS7J].
352. See supra Section II.A.
353. See supra Section II.C.
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consumers and consumption and create a more virtuous environment
for long-term wealth creation, to the benefit of corporate profits. For
this reason, a loyal fiduciary may conclude that it is duty-bound to make
a good faith effort to foster good DEI policies and practices as an
integral part of a rational strategy to promote a sustainably profitable
corporation. 354
CONCLUSION
The clarification of corporate law that this Article offers will not,
in itself, cure the lack of representativeness of American corporate
boards and management teams. Nor does it provide a simple answer to
the broader equity challenges that must be met if the corporate sector
is to meet the growing expectation to treat all its stakeholders with
equal respect. It is, however, a piece of a larger puzzle and a vital legal
and policy tool to help our nation live up to its ideals in vital economic
activities essential to human freedom and dignity. Internal corporate
action can address critical issues that current external reforms either
overlook or will be unable to solve without operating in concert with
internal corporate action. We applaud in principle the emerging
external law efforts to spur greater Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in
the behavior of American companies. But, as we have explained, these
external efforts have important limitations in terms of their application
only to public companies, their inability to address the full range of
issues where sensitivity to DEI issues is important to corporate
treatment of stakeholders, and the difficulty any external regulation
has in embedding values and norms in a complex organization, unless
the leaders of that organization support that themselves. The full
promise of DEI in creating not only a fairer nation, but stronger, more
resilient, and sustainably profitable American businesses can only be
realized if corporations themselves embrace these values in all the
important ways in which they affect their stakeholders and society. Our
goal in this Article is therefore focused, but important. We hope to have
shown that corporate law itself has a positive role to play in supporting
corporations in taking ambitious actions to promote DEI and
contributing to a more inclusive and fair economy and nation.
For too long, corporate law has been misunderstood when it
comes to important social matters that happen to make business sense.
Diversity is one area where a course correction is needed. In the current
354. See DELOITTE, supra note 150, at 24:
Leaders . . . should recognize purpose-led actions taken by their organizations can have
a threefold impact: Those initiatives can not only help society—they can help business
and have a positive influence on employees’ concerns. Some potential
activities: . . . Ensuring diversity and inclusion across the organization, and promoting
compensation structures that reduce income inequality and create a fair distribution of
wealth.
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moment, that is being slowly recognized by businesses themselves. But
history shows that our ability to stay focused on issues of inequality is
erratic, and there remains substantial resistance to DEI in our society.
What we demonstrate is this important reality: corporate law is no
island to itself, and the corporate law of fiduciary duty does not
constrain directors and managers from promoting DEI. If anything,
fiduciary duty pushes corporate managers legally, financially, and
reputationally to focus on these important issues as part of their duty
to promote the best interests of the corporation, increase its sustainable
profitability for the benefits of its stockholders, and ensure that the
corporation honors the laws of the society that chartered it.
In sum, corporate law allows and in fact encourages corporate
leaders to do the right thing. Whether they do it is up to them and the
institutional investors to which they owe their positions—fiduciary
duty law leaves them with no excuses for failing to do so. Thus, the
ultimate question is not whether business leaders can implement
effective Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion policies, but will they?

